Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-099
Wednesday
22 May 1991

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Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-099 22 May 1991

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Chervov Rejects AFP, INTERFAX Reports *[INTERFAX]* 1
Foreign Ministry Official on Arms Cuts, Summit *[INTERFAX]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Ignatenko Briefing on Visits, G-7, Free Travel Law *[TASS]* 2
Comments on Summer 'Social Explosion' *[Moscow Radio]* 2

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

China

Text of Jiang Zemin Message to Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 21 May]* 3
'Hint of Artificiality' Marks PRC Talks *[IZVESTIYA 22 May]* 3
Sino-Soviet Ties a Future 'Model' for Asia *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 May]* 4
Jiang Zemin Visit Turns 'Sad Page' in History *[Moscow Radio]* 5
Commentary Views Changes in Sino-Soviet Relations *[Moscow International]* 5

Northeast Asia

Commentary Assesses DPRK-Japan Talks *[Moscow International]* 6
Conference Discusses Asia-Pacific Peace, Security *[TASS]* 6
Gorbachev Message to Asian Science Conference *[PRAVDA 21 May]* 7

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Moscow Urges Ending Military Aid to Cambodia *[Moscow International]* 7
Vietnamese Political Environment Assessed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 16 May]* 7

Near East & south Asia

Bessmertnykh Interviewed on Mideast Talks *[Madrid YA 17 May]* 9
Bessmertnykh Mideast Tour Results Assessed *[TRUD 16 May]* 10
Gorbachev Sends Condolences on Gandhi's Death *[TASS]* 11

Sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Ethiopia *[TASS]* 11
Soviet Diplomat Comments on Angolan Settlement *[TASS]* 11
Commentary Views RSA-Namibia Talks on Port *[Moscow International]* 12
Changes in African Power Structure Viewed *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 13

East Europe

Commentary on Foreign Aspects of SFRY Crisis *[Moscow International]* 14
Havel Quoted on Vandalism of Tank Monument *[IZVESTIYA 21 May]* 15
Dubcek 'Embarrassed' by Incident *[Prague TV]* 15
Albania's Alia Interviewed on Improving Ties *[Moscow International]* 15

West Europe

Cheney's Remarks on 'Threat' to Turkey Assailed *[Moscow Radio]* 15
TASS Denies GDR's Kessler Fled to USSR *[TASS]* 16

Latin America & Caribbean

Open Mediation To End U.S.-Cuba Tension Urged *[IZVESTIYA 17 May]* 17
Commentary Views Aims of Pinochet Tour *[Moscow International]* 18

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Highlights of USSR Supreme Soviet Sessions 19
17 May *[Moscow TV]* 19
21 May *[Moscow TV]* 19
Tentative Agenda for USSR Supreme Soviet Reported *[INTERFAX]* 19
Supreme Soviet Presidium on Work of 5th Session *[TASS]* 19
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 16 May *[PRAVDA 17 May]* 20
USSR Supreme Soviet Focuses on Union Treaty 20
Lukyanov Address *[Moscow TV]* 20
Session Proposals Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 21
Closed Meeting Held *[INTERFAX]* 21
Supreme Soviet Adopts Consumer Rights Law *[Moscow Radio]* 21
Supreme Soviet Debates Exit, Entry Law 22
Commission Differs Over Options *[IZVESTIYA]* 22
Law Adopted; Deputies' Opinions Detailed *[Moscow Radio]* 24
INTERFAX Notes Cost, Emigration Figures 24
U.S. Congress' Baltic Interference of Concern *[TRUD 15 May]* 25

Political & Social

Gorbachev Cancels 12 Jun ILO Visit *[Bern International]* 25
Gorbachev Issues Decree on Consumer Budget *[PRAVDA 22 May]* 25
Cabinet, Republics Amend Sales Tax Rules *[Moscow Radio]* 26
Yeltsin Comments on Division of Power, New Laws *[INTERFAX]* 26
General: Air Force No Replacement for Aeroflot *[TASS]* 27
Fedorov Denies Exit Law Will Change Policy *[INTERFAX]* 27
Poll Shows Public Unenthusiastic About Travel *[INTERFAX]* 27
Cabinet To Give 'Incentives' to Air Controllers *[Moscow Radio]* 28
Controllers Threaten To Carry Out Strike *[IZVESTIYA 22 May]* 28
Petroleum Minister Discusses Industry Reform *[Moscow TV]* 28
Supreme Soviet Amends Union Treaty *[INTERFAX]* 29
Academician Discusses Current USSR Situation *[TASS]* 29
Deputies Form Anti-Extremist Group *[PRAVDA 21 May]* 30
Implications of Moscow-Republics Accord Eyed *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 18]* 30
Yelena Bonner Speaks on Sakharov Anniversary *[Moscow TV]* 31
Friends, Associates Remember Andrey Sakharov *[TASS]* 33
Internal Affairs' Gromov Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 34

Economic

CPSU Panel Views Destatization, Privatization *[PRAVDA 20 May]* 40

Agriculture

Deputy Prime Minister Notes Decline in Farming *[TASS]* 41
CPSU Commission Discusses Prices, Procurements *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 18 May]* 41
'Supplements' To Defray Increased Farm Costs *[IZVESTIYA 15 May]* 42

Scientific

Object Seen Floating Around Mir *[Moscow TV]* 43
Press 'Denied' Coverage Rights for Space Launch *[PRAVDA 20 May]* 43
Study on Chernobyl Shows No Increase in Cancer *[Vienna Radio]* 44

Military

New Draft Terms Do Not End Conscription Policy *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 May]* 44
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Plight of Deserters *[14 May]* 44
Seminar on Lessons of World War II Opens *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 May]* 45
Ivashutin on War's Outbreak *[TASS]* 45
Defense Minister Meets With Service Veterans *[TASS]* 46

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Baltic Council To Discuss Possible USSR Sanctions *[BALTFAX]* 47
Baltic Finance Ministers Disagree on Payments *[IZVESTIYA 21 May]* 47
Lithuania Cables Moscow Over Airborne Division *[Radio Vilnius]* 47
Lithuanian Official Criticizes Russia on Treaty *[BALTFAX]* 47
Lithuania Proposes Budget Talks With Center *[Radio Vilnius]* 48
Vagnorius Supports Soviet Economic Program *[BALTFAX]* 48
Lithuania Will Withstand Division Pressure *[Radio Vilnius]* 48
Lithuanian Foreign Minister on New Constitution *[BALTFAX]* 49
Lithuania Rejects Gromov Claim on TV Occupation *[Radio Vilnius]* 49
Reportage on Baltic Leaders' White House Talks 49
Leaders Cited on Meetings *[EKHO LITVY 11 May]* 49
Landsbergis Meetings Reported *[EKHO LITVY 8 May]* 50
Landsbergis Speaks to Congress Panel *[EKHO LITVY 10 May]* 50
Landsbergis Talks With Bush Cited *[EKHO LITVY 11 May]* 52
Washington Policy Toward Baltics Viewed *[EKHO LITVY 11 May]* 52

RSFSR

Fourth Congress of People's Deputies Continues 53
Moscow TV Reports 21 May Proceedings 53
21 May Proceedings Reviewed *[Moscow Radio]* 53
TASS Rounds Up First Day 54
Presidency Issue Discussed *[TASS]* 54
Presidency Bill Passed *[TASS]* 55
Khasbulatov Describes Work *[Moscow TV]* 55
Deputies Cited on Expectations *[PRAVDA 21 May]* 56
Yeltsin Says He Will Pursue 'Radical Reforms' *[INTERFAX]* 56
Ryzhkov Called Yeltsin's Main Presidential Rival *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 21 May]* 57
Reform Efforts, Character Praised *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 17 May]* 58
Addresses Campaign News Conference *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 21 May]* 61
Discusses Agricultural Program *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 14 May]* 62
RSFSR Presidency Election Schedule Too Tight *[PRAVDA 20 May]* 65

Western Republics

Belorussian Political Strike Expected 22 May *[TASS]* 67
Activists on Republic Dispute *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 19]* 67
Belorussian Miners Reply to Procurator *[INTERFAX]* 68
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Debates Constitution *[Kiev International]* 69
Ukrainian Party Central Committee Briefs Press *[Kiev International]* 70
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Approves New Cabinet *[Moscow Radio]* 70
Ukraine's Kravchuk, Croatia's Tudjman Brief Press *[Belgrade TANJUG]* 70
Moldovan Supreme Soviet Disrupted by Clashes *[TASS]* 70

Caucasus

South Ossetia Tension 'Somewhat Lessened' *[TASS]* 71
Special Purpose Militia Unit Set Up in Georgia *[TASS]* 71
Military Commander on Boy's Shooting *[Tbilisi Radio]* 71
Georgia on Eve of Presidential Elections Viewed *[TASS]* 71
Armenian Appeal for Observers Published *[TASS]* 72
Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Reviewed *[Yerevan Radio]* 72
Armenian Council Views Condition of Deportees *[Yerevan Radio]* 72
Azerbaijan Presidium Meeting Reported *[Baku Radio]* 73

Central Asia

Alma-Ata Roundable Discusses Union Treaty *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 73
Kazakh President Receives RSFSR's Silayev *[Moscow Radio]* 73
Talks on Direct Links Discussed *[Moscow TV]* 73
Kazakhstan Examines Tax Scale, Draft Laws *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 74
Kazakhstan To Lead in Developing Market Economy *[INTERFAX]* 74
Uzbek Army Accord With General Staff Explained *[IZVESTIYA 15 May]* 74
More on Shenin's 15-18 May Tour of Uzbekistan *[PRAVDA 20 May]* 75
Tajikistan Plans State Property Auction *[TASS]* 75

Chervov Rejects AFP, INTERFAX Reports

OW2005040891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 17 May 91

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"]

[Text] Earlier this week, DP [Diplomatic Panorama] reported on the forthcoming U.S. visit of Soviet Commander in Chief General Mikhail Moiseyev, quoting an interview with his aide General Nikolay Chervov. General Chervov today issued the following statement in reply:

"The signing of the Paris Treaty on Conventional Weapons was an event of major importance. It was beneficial both for us and for the West alike as it makes possible sharp reduction of military tension. Unfortunately, the treaty has yet to come into effect. The West is using all means possible to accuse the Soviet Union of preventing it from being ratified, and has not stopped short of a disinformation campaign. On May 15 Agence France-Presse, requoted by INTERFAX, reported me as saying that the USSR was willing to make significant concessions to the USA. I made no such statement. I am further quoted in the interview as saying that the Soviet commander in chief was planning to offer major cuts in the number of tanks and armoured vehicles attached to Soviet naval bases. This is also untrue. Furthermore, no concrete figures were given on reduced naval strength. These figures have simply been made up either by AFP or by INTERFAX.

There is further case of mis-reporting. INTERFAX emphasises and I quote: "The USSR commander in chief and a number of his deputies are opposed to various sections of the European Conventional Arms Treaty". INTERFAX is of course entitled to emphasise what it likes. However, this statement, has clearly been quoted out of context in a delilberate attempt to portray representatives of the Armed Forces in a negative light, which is incorrect and insupportable. All the more so when the general's visit, as is well known, is aimed at paving the way for the forthcoming presidential summit and comes at a time when there is good cause for optimism.

I don't know just who was responsible for these fabrications. They are clearly a deliberate and irresponsible attempt at insinuation which will not help us solve any problems."

Foreign Ministry Official on Arms Cuts, Summit

OW2205042991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

["Interview in Soviet Foreign Ministry: Across-the-Board Progress on Disarmament Is Desirable" by M. Mayorov, diplomatic correspondent from "Diplomotic Panorama"]

[Text] The Soviet chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev is currently in the USA. Senior Soviet Foreign Ministry staffer Mikhail Lysenko told DP [Diplomatic Panorama] that his visit to the USA was agreed on in a telephone conversation between the Soviet President Gorbachev and the U.S. President Bush. The main objective of the visit is to discuss two sets of issues, primarily in relation to the implementation of the CFE Treaty signed in Paris last year.

Another subject was the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit at which the parties should have their say on the final stage of talks to prepare a strategic offensive arms reduction agreement.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry staffer was asked about why the agenda of General Moiseyev's talks in Washington included subjects connected with the CFE Treaty if, in accordance with some reports, all the differences in the field were removed during a recent meeting between Bessmertnykh and Baker in Kislovodsk, Morth Caucasus, the USSR. Lysenko answered that the dialogue between the two foreign secretaries on this issue "had been constructive" but there still remain "certain technicalities and hard-to-solve details requiring agreed efforts." Their range is quite broad, which requires meetings of high-level experts, including the Soviet chief of General Staff and his current U.S. negotiators.

Asked about the prospects for a strategic offensive arms treaty to be finally signed, Lysenko answered that he "would not wish to be engaged in guesswork" but specified that, as in the case of conventional weapons, the parties continue to have largely "technical, even though quite complex, issues also requiring a very serious examination." Is there any linkage being established between the elaboration of the strategic offensive arms treaty and the settlement of differences on conventional arms? According to the Soviet diplomat, the U.S. establishes linkages, the Soviet Union does not. We proceed from the desirability of an across-the-board progress on disarmament, both on strategic offensive arms and on conventional forces.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry staffer noted that the agenda of the upcoming summit will also include other questions, including those of a regional nature. The results of Bessmertnykh's and Bakers' Middle East tours are evidence that both partners have a vital stake in their discussion.

Lysenko also repeated that he would not want to make guesses when he answered the last question of the DP correspondent: Will Moscow go as far as to organize the summit if the summit holds no prospect for any agreements on arms control to be signed (a distinct possibility, judging from a White House statement)? All he answered on the matter is: The White House, as well as the Soviet President, is likely to support a large-scale summit.

Ignatenko Briefing on Visits, G-7, Free Travel Law

LD2105152391 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's visit to the USSR, which began today, is a logical continuation of the Soviet-Italian dialogue, including personal contacts between the leaders of the two countries, said Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko.

Speaking at a briefing here today, Ignatenko stressed that the Soviet president was in favour of making "this intensive dialogue deeper and broader and imparting new shades of confidence to it."

"We shall welcome Giulio Andreotti to Moscow as a leader whose contribution to a new situation in Europe and the world is indisputable and considerable," the presidential spokesman said.

Ignatenko told the briefing that Margaret Thatcher was due to arrive in Moscow on May 27 at the invitation of the Soviet president. The former British prime minister will meet President Mikhail Gorbachev, scholars, students and cultural personalities and address the Soviet parliament.

In accordance with an agreement between Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush, presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov, a member of the USSR Security Council, and Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov will leave for the United States on Monday, May 27, Ignatenko announced.

He said they were expected to talk with the presidential economic council and probably meet President George Bush as well.

Asked if the Soviet president will take part in the G-7 meeting in London, Vitaliy Ignatenko replied: "I can say with certainty that Mikhail Gorbachev will accept the invitation."

"As regards Mikhail Gorbachev's attitude to the USSR Supreme Soviet's adoption of the law on free travel by Soviet citizens out of and into the Soviet Union, "he is satisfied with the fact that the law has been passed." The adoption of this law, Ignatenko said, "can be viewed as yet another step forward in the process of democratizing the country."

Asked if it was true that the Soviet Union, as reported by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, was interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Israel, Ignatenko said that no such contacts in whatever form had been established between the USSR and Israel.

On Mikhail Gorbachev's attitude to the Russian presidential election campaign and candidates for the post, Ignatenko said that the president was absolutely quiet with regard to the campaign. "He does not consider it possible for himself to take a stance toward any of the candidates and as the Soviet president will display reserve," the spokesman noted.

Commenting on Eduard Shevardnadze's recent statement on the possibility of using UN forces to settle ethnic conflicts in the USSR, the presidential spokesman said: "This is Shevardnadze's personal view. It does not reflect the stance of the Soviet leadership, which does not share the view."

Comments on Summer 'Social Explosion'

LD2105205291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] At a briefing by Ignatenko, the head of the USSR president's press service, the program for the visit to the USSR by Guilio Andreotti, which has just started, was reported today, as well as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's forthcoming meeting with Margaret Thatcher. Journalists were told that at the end of the week Comrades Primakov and Shcherbakov are to travel to the United States, where they will have important contacts with economic advisers to the U.S. President.

In connection with the forecasts of certain observers about a possible social explosion in the USSR this summer, Ignatenko said that all the activities of the Soviet leadership are aimed at there never being any social explosion.

China

Text of Jiang Zemin Message to Gorbachev

PM2105151791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Telegram from Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, to President M.S. Gorbachev: "Telegram to the President"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Gorbachev!

Successfully concluding the official visit to the USSR, personally and on behalf of all the Chinese comrades accompanying me I express to you and, through you, to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Soviet Government, the CPSU Central Committee, and the great Soviet people sincerest thanks for your warm and friendly welcome.

The brief visit and fruitful meetings have left me with unforgettable impressions. Everywhere we went we felt the great Soviet people's deep feelings of friendship for the Chinese people. I am profoundly convinced that the friendship between the two states, the two Communist Parties, and the peoples of the two countries will develop further.

I wish the peoples of the Soviet Union happiness!

Jiang Zemin

'Hint of Artificiality' Marks PRC Talks

PM2105195791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 May 91 Union Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion:" "Dialogue in Two Dimensions"]

[Text] The visit to the Soviet Union by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, has ended. Meetings and talks. Dinners and suppers. The signing of documents. The laying of wreaths. A cultural program. In general, outwardly everything was as usual. Including the now-usual restraint on the part of the press. We write not about a festive occasion, about a ceremony, but about the essential business. About important work.

Nonetheless, analyzing the course of the visit and examining the whole set of circumstances which preceded and accompanied it, it has to be stressed that Jiang Zemin's visit was not entirely routine, it was not simply "one of...."

The USSR and China occupy the greater part of the Eurasian continent. The two countries' human resources and their natural wealth have practically no parallel. It is possible to argue at length about the criteria of what constitutes a "great power," but both the USSR and China are unquestionably great powers and will remain so in the foreseeable future. All this assures them an outstanding role in world politics and a big share in determining the main trends of international life.

Both China and the USSR are entirely independent in the elaboration of their foreign policy strategies. But inasmuch as their fundamental interests objectively coincide, their approaches to the solution of many international problems coincide—notwithstanding the nuances that are always possible. This reinforces the positions of each of the countries and strengthens their influence on the world political climate.

I would not like my reflections to be interpreted as pitting a Moscow-Beijing "axis" against other states. Such an "axis" does not exist, neither Moscow nor Beijing needs it. Moscow is working actively to improve its relations with the United States, Japan, and India, for example. We are confident that our Chinese friends feel no concern as a result of this. In turn, as far as I understand, Moscow proceeds from the premise that global stability calls for stable and equal Chinese relations with Japan, and America, and India, and, ultimately, with all the countries of the world community.

Both the USSR and China are open to the whole world. However, in the whole world there are no two other states that share such a long border. This demands that we view each other's interests, concerns, and anxieties with heightened attention. Jiang Zemin's visit has demonstrated that this is understood in both Beijing and Moscow.

Apart from their purely political, state dimension, Soviet-Chinese talks also have a substantial ideological dimension. After all, they are not merely two great powers, they are also socialist powers, despite all the reservations that can be expressed today about the epithet "socialist," they are states and societies which are deliberately ideologized, which see their "scientific basis" in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It is true that the socialist experiment that began in the USSR in 1917 and in China in 1949 can hardly be rated as successful. Otherwise there would be no need for the perestroyka in our country or the profound reforms in China.

The main thrust of the Soviet perestroyka and the Chinese reforms is more or less in the same direction. Both Beijing and Moscow emphasize the socialist nature of the transformations—it is not a question of dismantling socialism, but of modernizing, perfecting, and improving it.

It is on this point—on how it can be perfected and improved—that people in the USSR and in China think and act differently. In the Soviet Union it is politics which has forged ahead. The democratization of public life has noticeably outstripped economic reforms. In China it is the economy which is in the lead. The attempt at a democratic breakthrough "from below" ended in the tragedy in Tiananmen Square. Theoretically everything here is understandable and explainable. But in practical terms it is precisely here that the danger lies. The danger

of ideological disputes (what "is appropriate" and what is not), which can—as has happened before—complicate and spoil interstate relations.

But there are at least two safeguards. First, it is recommended to "separate" ideology from politics, to separate theoretical discussions from practical political actions. This helps. Even if not always, because it is impossible totally to strip politics of ideology. Second, it is recommended not to interfere in "domestic affairs," that is, to exclude them from the talks, to refrain from appraisals, from approval or criticism. That also helps. Although it leaves a hint of artificiality and pretense since it curbs the chances of a thorough discussion about the main issue—about which way we are heading.

In Moscow both these factors were taken into account. The sides "briefed" each other on their domestic problems.... There was total noninterference, but there was no in-depth and exhaustive comparison of the different paths and the different methods of transforming socialism. At the present stage of Soviet-Chinese relations this is probably unavoidable. The period of insults and suspicion is still too close, its impact is still felt. The next step is to learn freely and frankly to discuss even those questions on which there is no consensus. And I mean discuss, that is, learn from each other rather than lecture each other.

The face of the 21st century will depend to a considerable degree on what kind of societies develop in the USSR and in China and how they collaborate with each other. More frequent, highly meaningful contacts based on trust between the political leaders of our countries are one of the most important elements of such collaboration.

Sino-Soviet Ties a Future 'Model' for Asia

PM2105143591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Observer's Notes:" "A Model for Asia"]

[Text] It is, nonetheless, a shame that the complexities of our internal crisis prevent many of my fellow citizens from properly assessing those foreign policy events which, at another time, would undoubtedly have been called historic. That is precisely the thought that came to me last Friday after the press conference by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the PRC Central Military Council. In fact it is just two years, a negligible time in diplomatic terms, since M.S. Gorbachev visited China to "close the past and open the future" and normalize relations between the two states. Life has shown that the principles proclaimed in 1989 were no mere declaration. The normalization of relations was greeted with complete understanding by the Soviet and Chinese peoples, who did not lose their fond feelings for one another during the long years of confrontation.

It cannot be denied that the two states have had to travel a difficult path in order to realize how valuable good-neighborliness and cooperation are and how important it is for each of them to have their rear secure. In my view, the whole experience of this path was concentrated in a brief remark by the Chinese guest during the press conference. Answering yet another question from journalists determinedly seeking elements of conflict in Soviet-Chinese dialogue, he noted: "You are all looking for differences in our approaches, but I have come to the Soviet Union to broaden cooperation and mutual understanding."

Yes, Jiang Zemin's visit, during which the concrete results of the implementation of the ideas proclaimed in 1989 were assessed, showed that our countries are reaching a new level on the whole range of bilateral ties. That also applies to the implementation of the long-term program for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and other contacts in the sphere of the economy and culture. It also applies to the development of contacts in the political sphere in which ties between the two countries' communist parties will henceforth occupy an important place.

This is most probably just a coincidence but it has turned out that, both last month and this, Soviet foreign policy seems to have focused on the East. In April M.S. Gorbachev visited Tokyo. The visit received an ambiguous assessment in the world press and from many of my Soviet colleagues. The fact that certain Soviet proposals were not grasped in Tokyo engendered doubts about the feasibility of implementing them at all.

But now after the Soviet-Chinese talks it seems to me that possible answers were given in Moscow to the challenges voiced in Tokyo. There is much talk now about the new world order which is to be created after confrontation is removed. It seems to me that both present and, to an even greater extent, future Soviet-Chinese relations are an acceptable model for Asia and the rest of the world. After all, their main feature is that they are not directed against third countries. At the same time, while not being allies, the USSR and China pay considerable attention to strengthening security. Our countries' talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and the strengthening of confidence in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region and the agreement already reached on the basic principles of that process are unprecedented in the political life of Asia and the Pacific. Essentially this is the first time that two countries in Asia have agreed on the possibility of a bilaterally coordinated lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The border settlement is of particular significance both for our two countries and for the stability of the whole region. This is not only a question of whether the common border of over 7,000 km will be a zone of peace and accord. It is a question of whether the settlement of territorial disputes in Asia is possible in principle. After all, many still consider that it is precisely territorial

claims that will prevent the Asian countries from making rapid progress in the security system.

During the visit an agreement was signed on the eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese state border. Thereby it was demonstrated unconditionally that even territorial problems can be resolved. All it needs is the mutual desire. Nowadays only specialists recall the "major obstacles" which at one time clouded our relations. However, it is too soon to speak of complete accord even now. The fact that the agreement has been concluded on a certain section of the border shows that there are still disagreements on other sections. However, the search for solutions is taking place at the negotiating table, not using various forms of pressure. The sides are definitely not operating according to the "all or nothing" principle. They are striving to secure a zone of agreement and then expand it.

I should like to note one more thing: The experience of Soviet-Chinese relations shows that if people focus solely on territorial questions and make them paramount there is no progress. It is necessary to build normal relations and develop trust between states, then even territorial disputes will not be seen as dramatic.

Thus, Jiang Zemin's visit to the Soviet Union showed not only that Soviet-Chinese relations are developing rapidly for the good of the two peoples. These relations can also be seen as a model for the future in Asia.

Jiang Zemin Visit Turns 'Sad Page' in History

LD1905183491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 19 May 91

[Commentary by Vladimir Kulikov]

[Text] The summit visit of Chinese leaders, the first for 35 years, has compelled Chinese society to return to the history of our relations, and, above all, to perceive the prospects for their further development. Vladimir Kulikov, our correspondent in Beijing talks about this:

[Kulikov] This history is indeed full of zigzags and disruptions in the development of political, economic, and cultural ties. This had a painful effect on many people on both sides of the border. It was with resentment and incomprehension that tens of our specialists left China in great haste in 1968, recalled by the Soviet side; and in the opposite direction sped trains carrying Chinese students, people getting work experience, and workers, who by resolute decision of their leaders, were with equal haste returning to their homeland. Ties were broken off, cooperation ceased, plans were wrecked, as, sometimes, were people's destinies, families.

This sad page in our history was turned by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to China, which opened up a new era in our ties; by the visit to the USSR by Chinese Prime minister Li Peng last summer; and also by the current visit to Moscow by the Chinese general secretary. The agreements signed, and a whole series of documents approved just beforehand, allow conclusions to be drawn about the current level of our ties. First and foremost, positive changes have been arrived at in the border issue, on problems of reduction of the armed forces of the two countires in border areas, and lowering of armed forces here to a level corresponding to normal good-neighborly relations.

The circle of issues in the international sphere on which our countries had different approaches, is shrinking: This was clearly shown by interaction between the USSR and China during the Persian Gulf crisis. And, conversely, the sphere of economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation is rapidly expanding. The USSR is now China's fifth international trading partner, after Hong Kong, Japan, the United States and Germany. Last year the volume of bilateral trade reached $3.9 billion: As for border trade, this has increased 11-fold in the past few years, and today amounts to 1 billion.

Commentary Views Changes in Sino-Soviet Relations

LD2005181891 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 20 May 91

[Commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin]

[Excerpts] The Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin has ended his visit to the Soviet Union and the results of his talks with the Soviet President Gorbachev are summed up in a joint communique. Here is a commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin:

I can definitely say that the two years that have passed since Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China were very eventful. Over the period the two countries not only cast off the hostile accretions of the recent past, which aggravated their relationship, but they have switched over to developing friendship and cooperation. It is very noteworthy that the countries did not return mechanically to their allied ties of the 1950's or to common tough ideological dogmas. They spoke openly about the existence of different views connected with historical and cultural developments of the two countries, whose specific features and methods in holding reforms within the framework of the socialist choice, and such a reasonable approach is necessary to determine directions and practical steps of bilateral relations. [sentence as heard]

It is also important that the sides' desire to maintain friendship and cooperation is not mere political declarations. It speaks about the real state of affairs. [passage omitted]

These statements have aroused a keen interest in the world because, as many people in the 1950's feared the Soviet-Chinese alliance, later no less fearful was a possible perspective of a large military conflict between the two states, and now we can state with full reason that there are no more grounds for such fears. Very promising is also the future cooperation between the Soviet Union

and China in normalizing the international situation, reducing armaments, and settling regional conflicts. [passage omitted]

All this allows me to say, writes Aleksandr Pogodin, that there is full inconsistency of allegations that the now [as heard] state of the Soviet-Chinese relations may create some threat to the third countries and the general state of affairs on the international arena. To the contrary, the implementation of principles which were the topic of negotiations in Moscow between the Soviet Union and China promises to become an important positive factor in stabilizing the whole system of international relations.

Northeast Asia

Commentary Assesses DPRK-Japan Talks

SK2205065291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1430 GMT 21 May 91

[Commentary by Aleksey Nikolayev from the "World Today" program]

[Text] The representatives of Japan and the DPRK are holding the third round of their talks. For now, neither side can tell how long it will take to establish their embassies. The goal, however, is to normalize relations by overcoming the conspicuously difficult issues.

The talks are being held in Beijing. Our station commentator Aleksey Nikolayev comments on the talks being held to normalize DPRK-Japanese relations:

It seems that Pyongyang is interested in hastening the course of the talks. At the talks held in Beijing, the representative of North Korea proposed to shelve the secondary issues and to deal with the direct issue of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the issues mentioned by Pyongyang is the reparation to the DPRK for what Japan did in the past. I look back at the fact that precisely this issue served as one of the stumbling blocks at the last talks.

For now, the Korean side thinks that the issue will not be dismissed but it is reasonable to discuss it following the opening of the embassies in Pyongyang and Tokyo.

Then, what is the opinion of the Japanese side? Tokyo is giving an impression that it is not in a hurry to normalize relations. At the same time, it is focusing on the issues which are not directly linked with the relations between the two sides. They are the question of the nuclear safeguards on the Korean Peninsula, dialogue between the two Koreas, and the question of UN membership for North and South Koreas.

Of course, these are all important issues. However, is it justifiable to make only the DPRK accountable for making progress in settling all of these issues? Possibly, joint efforts, mutual respect, and reciprocal negotiations are necessary.

Japan has close relations with the ROK and the United States. So what role Japan should play is clear.

Conference Discusses Asia-Pacific Peace, Security

LD2105224891 Moscow TASS in English 2137 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Suprun]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Arms control in the Asian-Pacific region and the peaceful settlement on the Korean peninsula were discussed on Tuesday during the second day of work of an international conference in Moscow. The conference is being attended by political scientists, scholars, and public figures from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States of America (USA), Japan, China, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia.

It was noted that the focus of the danger of a third world war breaking out has shifted from Europe to Third World Countries. Being one of the planet's hot spots, Northeast Asia, according to former U.S. Congressman Bruce Morrison, deserves the world community's closer attention, primarily because nuclear weapons are deployed there.

Morrison said that the nuclear powers, such as the Soviet Union, the United States and China should work in closer cooperation to ensure the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons in the region. Stronger political and military confidence building measures, Bruce Morrison said, would permit a more optimistic outlook for trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Professor James Miller of University of Washington said the experience of German unification should be applied to solve the Korean problem. However, he said, the specifics of this problem leaves little hope that German experience could be used in full.

Professor Han Si Chu of Korea University said he settlement depended to a considerable degree on the withdrawal of American nuclear arms from the Peninsula.

According to Soviet scholar Aleksey Zagorskiy of the institute of the world economy and international relations, the main obstacle on the way towards the Korean settlement is the lack of political will . "No progress is likely to be achieved without a North-South political understanding of the type achieved in Europe", he said.

The conference will continue its work tomorrow.

Gorbachev Message to Asian Science Conference

PM2205083391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[Undated message from President M.S. Gorbachev: "To the Scientific Conference on the Problems of Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean"]

[Text] It is very important that science, which has already made an indispensable contribution to ending the Cold War, has begun to energetically tackle the problems of the new phase of world development. Just about the most promising sphere of this development is the Asia-Pacific region, including the region's northeast, to whose development your conference is devoted.

I greet you and the idea enshrined in the conference program by its initiators and organizers. I think that the results of your program and the ideas which you will discuss are necessary to all who seek a new, peaceful order in the world.

Soviet-U.S. collaboration and recent high-level meetings between the Soviet Union and Japan, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union and China are paving the way for a process which, I hope, will be beneficial for the hundreds of millions of people living in this part of the world.

The new political thinking will continue to help peoples see one another as they really are, and to nurture an atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation. I rely on your support for its principles.

I wish the conference participants fruitful work here and success in the future too. I do not doubt that your efforts will take their place in the general historical movement toward the civilization of the 21st century.

[signed] M. Gorbachev, President of the USSR

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Moscow Urges Ending Military Aid to Cambodia

BK2205062391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1200 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Lately, the prospects of a solution to the Cambodian problem have dimmed to a certain extent. However, there is still reason to think that this setback is only temporary and that in the near future the international community will perhaps take new steps toward ending this protracted conflict. What are the views in Moscow concerning the prospect of a solution in Cambodia?

Answering this question from our correspondent (Petr Choranov), Comrade (Valentin Sviridov), the expert on the Cambodian issue at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, has this to say:

[Begin (Valentin Sviridov) recording in Russian fading into Cambodian translation] In the seeking a solution to the Cambodian problem we see the most important factor as normalizing the situation not only in Indochina but also in Southeast Asia and even outside the region.

The elimination of the conflict in this region will be a major step toward creating an open region for cooperation and development in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Faithful to the idea of a political solution is Phnom Penh where it is firmly believed that the Cambodian problem can be solved only through political means.

In this process, the first real major breakthrough terms was the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989. This helped contribute to the Cambodian national reconciliation process. As a result, a Cambodian Supreme National Council was set up in September 1990. Only recently, all warring parties agreed in principle to a voluntary cease-fire starting from 1 May 1991.

All these steps, along with the UN peace plan in the form of a package of draft documents, and the bilateral diplomatic efforts of those contributing to solving the Cambodian people, including the recent Soviet-Vietnamese and Soviet-Chinese talks, have created a real basis for a comprehensive political solution in Cambodia in the near future. Now this process is in the final stage. The decisive say will certainly come from the Cambodian parties themselves because they are the ones who will decide the country's destiny.

Although agreeing with the majority of points of the UN plan, the State of Cambodia continues to firmly raise a number of conditions. These conditions primarily relate to the necessity of preventing the reappearance in the country of the genocidal regime, the regime which at one time killed up to three million people.

The ending of outside military aid to all Cambodian parties can become a major point in the search for peace for Cambodia. This idea, which was at one time proposed by the Soviet Union, has now received increasing international support. The Soviet Union is ready to take concrete steps in this direction by considering as important the consolidation of the cease-fire in Cambodia and by stopping outside military aid as part of a comprehensive solution, linked to various steps planned by the Paris conference.

Vietnamese Political Environment Assessed

91UF0754A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 May 91 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Kabannikov: "What Is Being 'Tossed' to the Vietnamese Communists. On the Eve of Their Congress"]

[Text] Hanoi—The pages of the Vietnamese press are usually monotonous and contain scanty information, but they have become noticeably livelier in recent weeks.

This is because of a polemic in which certain participants have been expressing ideas that have long been considered seditious.

One of them is 79-year-old historian Nguyen Haq Van, former director of the publishing house for literature in foreign languages. "The people...have lost all confidence in the ruling echelon," he wrote in one of his open letters which ended up in the Western press. "The absence of democracy in the party and society has alienated many people." The highest leadership, in his words, "consists of comrades who are either too old or too sick. Their style of thinking and working is outdated and they are incapable of perceiving the realities of the times."

Another "reader" is South Vietnamese literary scholar Vu Hanh Tho, who managed to express his opinion on the pages of the Soviet press: "All the immense losses and deprivations and the fratricidal epic started over pseudocommunist ideologies have turned out to be in vain... The Vietnamese people have become disenchanted with the ideals of socialism and Marxist-Leninist theory."

As we now understand, the fact that not everyone thinks the same in a large country with such a complicated history is a completely normal phenomenon. But under the conditions of Vietnamese reality, where the party enjoys the "exclusive love and confidence of the working class and all people of the country" (this is what is written in the charter), an attempt to express any other opinion aloud is akin to throwing oneself on top of a live grenade. And without any special hope of having anyone at home know about it. It is necessary to resort to the Hong Kong or Thai press. With considerable risk to oneself, by the way. Hanoi writer Duong Thu Huong was arrested in April. In the words of the head of counterintelligence of the SRV Ministry of Internal Affairs, "she took advantage of the renewal, glasnost, and democracy in order to work against the party, and she also tried to send 'antisocialist materials' and 'documents containing information about internal secrets' to the West."

Bui Tinh, a leading Vietnamese journalist and former deputy editor-in-chief of the central CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] organ, the newspaper NAHN DAN, did something different. Last fall, after participating in the "Humanite" celebration in France he decided not to return home and then made a series of disclosures on the BBC, telling about the world of the Vietnamese nomenklatura, which he knew first-hand, and demanding radical political reforms.

And these are only a couple of bubbles bursting to the surface of the externally calm body of water of Vietnamese political life, the inside of which is nonetheless beginning to boil. The formal occasion for the discussion was the Seventh CPV Congress to be held in June. But the discussion very quickly went beyond the framework of collective development of documents signed beforehand in the Central Committee. In reality the people were interested not at all in the clarification of the concept of "communism" but in quite concrete issues raised by the crisis in the USSR, the collapse of the socialist system, and all the events in Eastern Europe.

The strict political censorship, trying to keep the polemic "on track," has evoked dozens of letters, appeals, and applications. Even the present leader of the country's Fatherland Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, because of considerations of censorship, was unable to publish his own opinion in the press organ of the same front—the newspaper DAI DOAN KET. People who are known in Vietnam such as former Comintern worker Nguyen Thanh Tuan and Chan Van Dau, a former associate of Ho Chi Minh, and philosopher Pham My Cuong ended up in the same situation. Since xeroxes are standing right in the stores, it was easy for the new Vietnamese samizdat to get started. Discussion clubs are being created and they are talking about certain "informal" movements.

I was sitting in a tiny, dimly lit cafe with a young person I will call Chinh, who calls himself a dissident. On the anniversary of the breakup of the student demonstrations in Beijing, they organized something like their own solidarity demonstration. That is all they have accomplished up to now. "What do you want?"—I asked him. "Pluralism, freedom of speech, democratic elections," he answered quickly. "And who will support you?" He shrugged his shoulders in bewilderment: "The people!"

The people are mainly peasants—more than 80 percent of the population of 66 million. It would be hard to imagine a people who love their work more or are further removed from politics than these residents of the Vietnamese heartland where it takes newspapers weeks to make their way. The hundreds of thousands of city shop and eating house owners who engage in the semilegal business of tradesmen and small-scale entrepreneurs are no more politicized. Youth are also aloof to politics.

Let us move on from Chinh to his "economic program." Here, too, it becomes clear that the Vietnamese democrats do not seem even to want anything. A free market? But it has actually been in existence here for several years. Private property? There are thousands of private businessmen in the country, and one of the recently enacted laws has reinforced the right of each Vietnamese who has reached 18 years of age to own a private enterprise. The transfer of the land to the peasants? Everything is leading to this; indeed it has already been turned over, for otherwise Vietnam would not have its present abundance of food products.

"But all these are half measures and things are moving slowly because of the resistance of corrupt bureaucrats and dogmatists," says Chinh. He is probably right in his own way. But, looking at our own experience and the extremely difficult path our recent allies have had to take to the market, one cannot but see what a striking turn toward a normal economy Vietnam has achieved since

the end of the eighties. This has been recognized even by such a serious organization as the International Monetary Fund.

Here is where one finds the key to the situation in Vietnam and at the same time the source of the confusion of those who place the Vietnamese leaders in the same category as the regimes in Cuba or North Korea. The only thing they have in common is the orthodox rhetoric used to justify the right of a single party to a monopoly on power. But under the robes of orthodox communists in Vietnam one finds pragmatists who in practice long ago rejected the dogma of the political economics of socialism.

The development of events in the SRV can be understood more easily in the context of the experience of other Asian countries. Regardless of how we may feel about this, many of Vietnam's neighbors have proved that economic progress is by no means directly linked to democracy in society. The "minor dragons" came to flourish through dictatorship and only afterwards were elements of democracy allowed in. Taiwan and Singapore achieved their well- being under the conditions of single-party systems. Authoritarian regimes have always accompanied a budding market. It would seem that this is the model of development toward which the Vietnamese leadership is now leaning, having proclaimed a course toward a free market economy and "stability" in the political system. And so far this intention is being justified. The country has begun to emerge from the impasse at which the more faithful followers of the teachings have found themselves. For the first time in many years the population is fed and well dressed. In spite of the misgivings of the conservatives, the reforms have not undermined the system but have given it a certain durability.

Of course, the sorrowful labor of the present-day Vietnamese dissidents will not be in vain. Even if the current discussion is only to a certain degree capable of influencing the atmosphere of the approaching party congress, weakening the position of the dogmatists, and facilitating the assumption of power by younger and more pragmatic people. They are still laying the first stone in the foundation of Vietnamese democracy, which in time will become a necessary companion to economic pluralism.

Incidentally, it cannot be ruled out that in a decade and a half or two the Vietnamese system will be called socialism. And if the experiment is successful, I assume that nobody will object to this.

Near East & south Asia

Bessmertnykh Interviewed on Mideast Talks

PM2105150991 Madrid YA in Spanish 17 May 91 p 41

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh by Vladimir Markov in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Moscow—The Soviet foreign minister has paid the first visit to Israel since the severance of relations. Moscow has reassumed a leading role on the chessboard on which Arab-Israeli peace is at issue.

[Markov] What were the results of your mission?

[Bessmertnykh] In the first place, we have entered fully into the region's problems. Second, we have become convinced that there are more difficulties than we believed. They must be taken into account in order to be able to create a sound basis with respect to the conference. Another extremely important result of the tour is that virtually all the countries of the region expressed their readiness, albeit to various degrees, to negotiate peace—the word most often used by all the interlocutors.

[Markov] What role could the USSR play in that process?

[Bessmertnykh] Previously, if one group of countries was allied with the USSR, the other was allied with the United States. This situation held us apart. Today, the USSR negotiates with everybody on an equal basis—with Arabs, Palestinians, and Israelis. They all want the USSR to play an active role in the region. I interpret this as a positive factor.

[Markov] Are there prospects of success?

[Bessmertnykh] I do not wish to arouse false hopes: The difficulties which we must surmount—organizational and technical difficulties—are enormous. When all is said and done, what is happening is that the old stereotypes—some of which are not intellectual in origin but have a strong emotional element—are breaking down.

[Markov] What has been achieved so far?

[Bessmertnykh] We are in the middle of the initial stage of preparations for the peace conference. I believe that its final parameters can be formulated by June or July. I believe that it is extremely important that we have agreed from the outset to use UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the legal framework within which the conference in question should proceed.

[Markov] What is the validity of the principle of territory in exchange for peace?

[Bessmertnykh] This basic principle is implied when the UN Security Council resolutions are at issue. There are no differences in interpretation between the joint sponsors.

[Markov] What about the Palestinians' participation?

[Bessmertnykh] Three forms of participation are being discussed—a delegation of their own, or their membership of the pan-Arab delegation, or a Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation.

Bessmertnykh Mideast Tour Results Assessed

91UF0755A Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 May 91 p 5

[Report by TRUD correspondent Z. Nalbandyan: "'Lace Work'—Results of A. Bessmertnykh's Near East Trip"]

[Text] Cairo, 15 May—Our consular staff in Cairo needed a whole bus to carry the belongings of members of the Soviet delegation from the aircraft to the hotel. And while the suitcases were traveling along the dusty streets of the Egyptian capital, their owners, approximately 30 diplomats, journalists, and security officers, were working flat out, supporting, describing, and guarding the Soviet minister's meetings with leading statesmen.

The readers will ask, possibly: Does the problem of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict really excite the Soviet Union to such an extent that, setting aside all other business, A. Bessmertnykh undertook this wearying tour of Near East capitals?

In the search for an answer I suggest that the readers recall that back in March U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker undertook a big Near East tour. It was all understandable at that time: The Americans were attempting to take advantage of the initiative acquired as a result of the rout of Iraq to resume the movement toward peace on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. The intention was to convene a regional conference of all interested parties under the aegis of the United States and then switch to bilateral negotiations.

However, despite the fact that a felicitous moment really had been chosen and that experienced diplomat J. Baker (let us give him his due) was approaching the role of mediator in the best possible way, the idea did not work. The disagreements between the parties proved insurmountable. But it is not fortuitous that Baker is famed as a politician who prefers that his name under no circumstances be associated with failure. And the secretary of state undertook a further two tours of the Near East. The results of the negotiations were shrouded in such secrecy that the exasperated journalists christened Baker "secretary surreptitious." But when, in April, the head of American diplomacy surprisingly set off for Kislovodsk, this raised observers' eyebrows.

"This could have meant nothing other than a request for assistance," a well-informed Western diplomat told me in Cairo. "The Americans realized that their trusteeship was looming excessively over the participants in the discussions, who would like to see at the negotiating table alongside 'Uncle Sam' someone capable of balancing the tough pressure of Washington."

It is hard to confirm or refute this assumption, but the fact that the Soviet minister was accorded a decidedly warm and cordial reception in all countries of the region without exception is an incontrovertible fact.

That people rejoiced in his presence in Syria was natural. The USSR has long favored Syria with its friendship and supplied it with weapons and skilled experts. The presence of a friend at the negotiating table could only strengthen Damascus' position.

But the decidedly warm reception in Israel was, it seems, a pleasant surprise. After all, Israel has for many years been on the other side of the line on the ideological front. In addition, the Israelis had always declared that they would not agree to the Soviet Union's participation in the peace process in the region until the USSR restored diplomatic relations with it which were broken off in 1967 following the "six-day war." Our minister, to judge by everything, was not even reminded in Jerusalem of this "categorical" condition. On the other hand, as Israeli Foreign Minister D. Levi said following the meeting, his country would welcome Moscow's direct participation in a Near East settlement.

For Jordan's King Husayn the Soviet Union's presence at a conference, whatever it might ultimately turn out to be, is also good news. After all, his country, which has suffered appreciably economically because of the dubious political position adopted at the time of the war in the Persian Gulf, is now in dire need of financial injections from the West. Participation in the peace process would enable Jordan to obtain such assistance, and the Soviet Union's sponsorship would afford an opportunity for it to preserve its intrinsic dignity here.

A.A. Bessmertnykh spoke to your TRUD correspondent about Egypt's reaction to his visit in the warmest terms. The negotiations with Egyptian President H. Mubarak and other Egyptian leaders revealed, in his words, a high degree of concurrence of views. In turn, the Egyptian leader highlighted the USSR's role particularly, emphasizing the importance of our country's participation in the planned international conference.

The Soviet minister did not visit the Israeli-occupied territory but there came from London, where a most authoritative Palestinian leader, Faysal al-Husayni, was staying at the time, a statement of his, which emphasizes the "leading role" of the USSR in a peace settlement.

But what was A. Bessmertnykh seeking during this trip? The veil of secrecy and the fog of diplomatic wording prevent us from discerning the actual results, but, as the Soviet minister declared during a joint news conference with the U.S. secretary of state in Cairo, "we have emerged from the tunnel onto a broad plateau." If it is borne in mind that this was an answer to the question: "Is there light at the end of the tunnel," the results of the meetings and discussions should be considered positive. According to J. Baker, at the present time more disagreements have been overcome than remain. The main obstacles are the contradictions between Syria and Israel on the question of the kind of peace conference it should be and of who will represent the Palestinians.

As V. Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, told me, there are still many nuances requiring painstaking diplomatic work. It was

for a conclusive ascertainment of these "nuances," evidently, that our minister once again on the return journey looked in on Damascus, and for the U.S. secretary of state for the umpteenth time in the past two months headed for Israel.

Nonetheless, while extremely restrained in his evaluations, A. Bessmertnykh spoke in Cairo about "guarded hopes" and called the talks "lace work."

The regional press considered the Soviet minister's trip entirely successful. The Egyptian press, for example, while avoiding strong expressions, unanimously notes the progress toward Arab-Israeli dialogue. Observers believe that the thorough and fruitful activity of our diplomatic mission during the trip reinforced the USSR's authority in the region. "The Near East is greatly impressed by the peace-making efforts of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh," Cairo's THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE writes in its lead article. "Having plunged into the labyrinth of a Near East settlement, the Soviet Union has shown that it retains influence in the region. The difference is merely in the nature of Moscow's interests: The hegemonism of past years has given way to efforts to achieve a just peace." On the other hand, as the Saudi newspaper 'UKAZ believes, the Soviet leaders have shown Washington that they are dependable partners even when the domestic situation in the USSR leaves much to be desired.

The trip was also useful from the viewpoint of bilateral relations with the countries which the Soviet minister visited. According to A. Bessmertnykh, questions of economic cooperation were discussed in all the capitals, but in particular detail with Egyptian Prime Minister 'A. Sidqi. A comprehensive program of measures to strengthen Soviet-Egyptian economic relations was outlined here.

But the delegation was decidedly out of luck with the weather. May in the region has proven hot, with sandstorms almost daily. The thermometer everywhere showed 40, and in Saudi Arabia even more. The enervating heat complicated the Soviet diplomats' "lace work." Let us hope that their efforts were not in vain and that as a result it will be possible not only to shift the heavy Near East stone from a standstill, if only somewhat, but also to achieve real advantage for our country. Both politically and economically.

Gorbachev Sends Condolences on Gandhi's Death

LD2205065591 Moscow TASS in English 0618 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent a message of condolences to Indian President Ramaswamy Venkataraman in connection with Rajiv Gandhi's assassination.

"We are deeply shocked by the news of the terrible crime. Rajiv Gandhi, whom the Soviet people knew and appreciated as a prominent modern state and political figure who continued the great national cause of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi and made an unfading contribution to the Indian-Soviet friendship, has been killed. We are filled with indignation over this monstrous crime," the message said.

"On behalf of the government and the peoples of the Soviet Union I convey the deepest condolences to you, Mr. President, and to the entire population of India in connection with the great loss," it said.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Ethiopia

LD2105201591 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The Soviet Foreign Ministry on Tuesday issued the following statement on the situation in Ethiopia:

According to reports, the military-political situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated over the past few days. Under conditions that arose, President Mengistu Haile Mariam decided to resign and left the country today.

The State Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia called on all opposition forces to cease fire and halt at positions occupied at present. Central authorities expressed readiness to negotiate the formation of a coalition government.

Addis Ababa also appealed to the Soviet Union, the United States and the European Community countries for assistance in terminating hostilities and starting talks between the warring sides.

The Soviet Union is deeply concerned about the growing armed conflict in Ethiopia. We call on the opposing forces to cease fire immediately, to overcome hostility and distrust and sit down at a negotiating table for the benefit of national reconciliation.

The Soviet Union is ready to actively assist the beginning of the negotiating process in the interests of peace and stability in Ethiopia. It will cooperate with all those sharing these positions.

Soviet Diplomat Comments on Angolan Settlement

LD2105180291 Moscow TASS in English 1351 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow May 21 Tass—Agreements between the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels to settle the long-running military conflict in Angola improve the situation in southern Africa, according to diplomatic sources in Moscow.

"This sets a very important example for regional settlements," a senior Soviet diplomat told TASS.

Six rounds of talks revealed the diversity and complexity of the problem—the war in Angola has raged for many years, inflicting vast material damage and resulting in a great number of civilian deaths.

However, sides involved in the conflict showed responsibility, political realism and readiness for dialogue and compromise.

As a result, agreements on peace were initialed in Lisbon early in May and are expected to be signed on May 31.

Cooperation between Portugal, the Soviet Union and United states played a very constructive role in the talks, as well as prevalence of new thinking in the international community, according to a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on the outcome of the sixth rouvd of talks.

A ceasefire between government forces and UNITA rebels is now a reality, having gone into effect on May 15.

However, it is too early to speak about the end of the long-standing Angolan crisis. This is just the beginning of a settlement and concrete results can be analysed only after the "general election, planned for September-November 1992, the senior Soviet diplomat said.

"The next year and a half will show how events will develop, and we can now only hope that the current turning point will be sealed in Lisbon on May 31," he said.

Political realism on the part of the sides and a favourable international climate could make the process irreversible, he said.

A settlement in Angola has great regional importance and would improve the situation in southern Africa, he said.

Coupled with Namibia's independence, granted last March, and positive changes in south Africa, the Angolan settlement could create a situation in southern Africa that could help settle acute politucal and economic problems in the region, he said.

Commentary Views RSA-Namibia Talks on Port

MB1805115491 Moscow in Afrikaans to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 17 May 91

[Commentary by Vladimir Valentinov—read by announcer]

[Text] A second round of talks is currently taking place in the Namibian capital, Windhoek, between delegates of this young republic and South Africa. The issue being discussed is the future of the deep sea port of Walvis Bay, which lies within Namibian territory. Vladimir Valentinov writes:

The question of Walvis Bay remains a stumbling block in relations between the two countries. The Namibian Constitution, as well as international law, state that the port is an integral part of Namibian territory. This is also stated in UN Security Council Resolution 432, which is legally binding.

South Africa continues, however, to usurp ownership of this economically and strategically important enclave. At the same time the deep sea port, the first along the whole of the west coast of Africa, is of primary importance for the socioeconomic development of independent Namibia. Virtually all of Namibia's import and export activities are carried out at Walvis Bay, but under the firm control of South Africa.

As a result, Walvis Bay continues to be the valve that Pretoria can close at any time in order to strangle Namibia's economy and influence its policies. Until now this has not happened, however, and due to the positive changes taking place in South Africa's domestic politics it is hoped that it will not happen.

But there can be no guarantee on this. The Namibian Government realizes this and is insisting on the earliest possible handing over of Walvis Bay to its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the Namibian Government is looking for, or, rather, is being forced to look for, an alternative to Walvis Bay.

It is hoped that trade can be routed via the Angolan port of Namibe. Such a project would, however, be enormously costly. According to preliminary estimates it could amount to between $100 million and $150 million. At this stage Namibia is simply not in a position to spend so much money.

It is therefore clear that the acquisition of the deep sea port by Namibia would be an incentive to the development and independence of the country's economy. In addition, it would be of great significance to the other countries in the region which do not have outlets to the sea.

At the first round of talks both parties defended their individual positions on the matter. The talks produced no solution. All that South Africa was prepared to agree to was the possibility of more favorable conditions for Namibia's use of the port and its facilities. In other words, Namibia had to recognize Walvis Bay as South African territory.

Judging by Namibian Government statements, it is of the opinion that Walvis Bay must become a part of Namibia. This is a fair and just demand. This is why observers see the discussions in Windhoek between Namibian and South African representatives as very complex, due to the irreconcilable positions of the two parties.

But let us not anticipate matters.

Changes in African Power Structure Viewed

91UF0744A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 May 91 Second Edition p 7

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent I. Tarutin: "Autumn of the Patriarchs—The Black Continent is Changing its Power Structures"]

[Text] Harare—*Waiting any longer clearly made no sense. It was past midnight, and the plane had left at 0500 in the morning. Hints that the first Soviet journalist to come to Somalia after an 11-year break would be received by the leader of the country were, evidently, simply a courtesy. And suddenly the telephone rang. The voice in the receiver said meaningfully: "The president will see you at his residence. A car has been sent." I looked at my watch; the hands showed that it was just after two. I later learned that, like Stalin, the Somali leader preferred to work at night. Where does this general dislike of daylight come from?*

Having sped along deserted streets and having passed on the way several guard posts, the car came to a halt at a massive gate with numerous sentries carrying submachine guns at the ready. The yard was also full of soldiers. And subsequently, as we walked along some passageways, we were constantly running into guards.

We finally came to a room in semi-darkness. In a chair in a corner, with his eyelids partially closed, as is the way with old men, sat Mohamed Siad Barre, a corpulent individual with a heavily- lined, dark-complexioned face. In place of the customary embroidered uniform of official photographs, a shirt unbuttoned to the chest and bedroom slippers on his bare feet. I remember particularly his lifeless eyes, as if coated with ash. There came to mind the hero of Marquez's novel "Autumn of the Patriarch."

I recalled this recent visit when news came from Mogadiscio that detachments of opposition groups had captured the city and that Gen Mohamed Siad Barre had gone into hiding in an unknown direction. He had ruled the country with an iron fist for more than 20 years. He had survived repeated conspiracies, defeat in the war with Ethiopia, and the attacks of insurgents, had constantly shaken up those closest to him, removing potential rivals, had woven the most artful intrigues and dealt ruthlessly with dissidents, and was, for all that, swept away by a wave of discontent.

The past year proved fateful for many regimes in Africa. Anti- government unrest rolled through Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Zaire, Zambia, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, the Central African Republic.... It was as though the dam of the boundless tolerance of ordinary Africans broke, and the stream of their anger cascaded over it, forcing the ruling upper stratum to heed the voice of the masses. One and the same demand was put forward everywhere— democratization.

It has become topical for, seemingly, absolutely dissimilar regimes. Thus, the Ivory Coast had always been considered a showcase of the West and had declared its attachment to bourgeois values. But Benin, for example, had proclaimed an orientation toward a socialist path of development.

Two antipodes, seemingly. But granted the manifest difference in the development patterns taken as a model and the diametrically opposite rhetoric, the two regimes were essentially related. In both cases power was of an authoritarian nature and concentrated in the hands of a leader and his immediate entourage. The opposition was mercilessly suppressed. The machinery of repression enjoyed complete license. The mass media and all intellectual life were weighed down by censorship.

The USSR was formerly accused of patronizing despots, when some of its allies implanted in their countries a worse version of our ideas of that time. Indeed, there was much that was negative in the "progressive," as we then put it, states of the black continent as regards the suppression of liberties. But no more than in many pro-Western countries.

Until recently one-party governments or the army were in power in 38 of the 45 states in the region south of the Sahara. Dictatorships became established, with the rare exceptions, with surprising regularity in tropical Africa. Recent fighters against colonialism, who had frequently negotiated imprisonment, began to subject dissidents to persecution and leave their opponents to rot in torture chambers. The heralds of freedom became leaders to be worshiped. Bokassa of the Central African Republic altogether contrived to have himself declared emperor. And he tried to copy his own enthronement ceremony from the coronation of Napoleon. Many leaders, even those who had come to replace tyrants and who had initially castigated tyranny, themselves became usurpers after a certain length of time.

It is difficult to provide an unequivocal answer as to why it is that fate has seemed to hang over the continent. The main and principal reason has been the overall backwardness, the low level of political consciousness, the absence of democratic traditions and the lack of rights and the downtrodden nature of the people.

A cult of the firm hand emanating from tribal vestiges and the figure of the tribal leader has been historically vindicated in African society.

Finally, there is one further aspect. Akenke Mujari, dean of the Social Sciences Faculty of Uganda's Makerere University, says. In Africa political office is regarded everywhere as a means of enrichment. Corruption is a most prevalent disease of the machineries of state formed on the "family" principle, on the basis of kindred and tribal ties.

Power provides tangible material benefits far more than any other sphere of activity, and this is why people are so reluctant to let go of it. "Too many African leaders have

been more concerned with hanging on to power than safeguarding the interests of their peoples," Barber Conable, president of the World Bank, believes.

But the aspiration to centralized leadership and a strong hand is largely understandable, the South African commentator N. Sndebele told me. The majority of nations in Africa are essentially only just laying their foundations. Under these conditions a multiparty system would lead to the formation of ethnic groupings and an intensification of tribal contradictions. There are enough sorry examples of this. So we should not oversimplify matters and see only the negative side, my partner pointed out.

But the objective and subjective circumstances which engendered the aspiration to authoritarian structures on the black continent are, as before, still in evidence. What, then, has brought about their sudden and mass cave-in? "The events in East Europe to a considerable extent," German Africa specialist Michael Mersch observes. "However far off Africa may be, the impetus which they imparted has reached it also, becoming a detonator of discontent," he tried to persuade me.

It was the USSR which was the first to advance the slogan of the priority of values common to all mankind in international relations. There has been a change of mood in the West also. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has declared that "governments which pursue a policy of repression and are mired in corruption should not look for assistance." French President Francois Mitterrand pointed out at a recent meeting of francophone African countries in Paris that relations with them would be correlated "with their efforts pertaining to greater liberalization and democratization." And U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen said in an television interview that "democracy is becoming the principal criterion of the American approach in dealings with African states."

It is significant that words have been followed by deeds. Despite the insistent requests of the authorities of Gabon and the Ivory Coast for help in putting down street unrest, the French paratroops stationed there have not intervened. The Elysee Palace also gave units of its Foreign Legion in Chad instructions not to act, as before, on the side of the Hissein Habre regime, which was, as a result, toppled by rebel forces. London and Washington have warned Kenya that they will cut the aid they grant it, in excess of $1 billion annually, as a sign of protest against the arrest of opposition figures, and have demanded the release of political prisoners and the restoration of freedom of speech and the independence of the courts.

A multiparty system has been introduced in a whole number of states: the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Benin, and Mozambique have abandoned the legislatively enshrined monopoly of power. Angola is moving in the same direction. Its president told delegates to the congress of the ruling MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Party of Labor at the end of last year that the present congress would, obviously, be "the last under one-party conditions." Movement has also been observed in Ethiopia, where the party, according to Mengistu Haile-Mariam, is prepared to think about a broader coalition.

Former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, one of the continent's most respected politicians, who incidentally left office voluntarily, sagely observed: "Of course, even the countries in Africa which are governed better than others still have a long way to go for people to really believe in freedom of the individual and the possibility of his acting at his own discretion within the framework of the corresponding laws." This will undoubtedly take time. But a very serious and important change has occurred, for all that. And, possibly, the autumn of other "patriarchs" will mark Africa's spring.

East Europe

Commentary on Foreign Aspects of SFRY Crisis

LD2105174491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] The general political crisis in Yugoslavia has again aggravated to a dangerous point. Aleksandr Shakhin of our staff draws attention to its foreign policy aspects:

There is a direct link between the state of Yugoslav affairs and the degree of world interest in them. The worse the situation, the greater the anxiety. The interest is quite logical. Disintegration of the country can have the most negative effect on peace and stability in Europe. If a civil war breaks out neighboring, and not only neighboring, countries will be involved in the conflict in a greater or smaller extent. That's why the world community as a whole speaks for preserving the Yugoslav Federation, for stabilizing the situation and for democratic reforms in the country.

But where does support end and interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia begin? There are reasons for asking this question. How should one regard the Western embargo on admitting Yugoslavia to different European integrating associations, or the Western veto on providing the country with foreign currency? Here is the latest news: The United States has declared its suspension of all types of economic aid to Yugoslavia. This was demanded by congressmen alarmed by the violations of human rights.

What does Yugoslavia itself think of such Western concern? Belgrade observers believe it is unacceptable that definite foreign circles are trying to activate political forces in Yugoslavia, fanning interethnic conflicts and civil war. On the pretext of assisting Yugoslavia these circles are trying to reach their own goals. Those in the West who speak of support for the Markovic government and simultaneously veto plans of actual assistance aggravate the situation in practical terms. We have heard

much about American congressmen who do not wish to realize the difficulties of the transition of East European countries to reforms and frankly stake on individual republics and their leaders as if this is a question of a horse race not politics. So this kind of reaction from Belgrade is quite understandable.

As for the Soviet approach to Yugoslav affairs, it is quite clear. We want to see Yugoslavia a united and prosperous state. We stand for its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders. But this is up to the people living in that country. It is true that the situation is extremely contradictory and complicated, but this kind of advice, or economic sanctions of outsiders, can only worsen it.

Havel Quoted on Vandalism of Tank Monument

PM2105103191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from roundup of IZVESTIYA, SIBINFORM, TASS, POSTFACTUM, and REUTER reports: "V. Havel: Place for Tank Is in Technical Museum"]

[Text] CSFR President V. Havel, speaking on radio, has denounced the desecration by a group of Czechoslovak parliamentarians of the monument to the liberating servicemen—the tank in Prague's Smichov region. Representatives of a freely elected parliament, he said, do not have the right to behave like that. "I would not be at all surprised if the parliamentarians' action has an adverse effect on friendly relations with this country," V. Havel stated. Here he noted that the majority of citizens believe that the tank is not the best way of remembering the casualties of the war. In his opinion "it is necessary to announce a competition for a sculpture which would be a worthy monument to the dead. The best place for the tank, which in any case is rusting, is in a technical museum."

Dubcek 'Embarrassed' by Incident

LD2105191291 Prague Federal Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Federal Assembly, today met in the Kremlin Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The two representatives informed each other about the work of the parliaments of the two countries.

The substantial part of the talks was devoted to the issues of economic and commercial cooperation.

Alexander Dubcek was received during a break in the session of the fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian parliament. The short meeting linked up to the talks held in Prague last week.

Prior to the departure of Alexander Dubcek from the Kremlin, we asked him:

[Begin recording] [Reporter] Mr. Chairman, was the question of the Smichov tank mentioned during the talks?

[Dubcek, in Slovak] Yes it was mentioned but not by them. I could not avoid conveying to them the standpoint of the president of the republic, my own and the rest of the Czechoslovak public that we do not consider such behavior a good step toward improving our relations. On the contrary we believe that this interferes with the new elements in our mutual relations on which we are working. I could not avoid mentioning this, and to be honest I must say that I was not very happy when I had to say a few words on this topic, as this is a question of the end of the war and it is a matter connected with numerous sacrifices on our territory. Also, it is a historical monument and I think that our reputation in the western democratic world, in Europe and in the world was considerably damaged by that, and I felt embarrassed. [end recording]

In the evening the chairman of the Federal Assembly took part in the opening of an international congress marking the 70th anniversary of the birth of the late academician Andrey Sakharov. Also present was USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and a number of other representatives of political and public life.

Albania's Alia Interviewed on Improving Ties

LD2105174191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Albanian President Ramiz Alia has said in an interivew for Radio Moscow that a process of democratization is under way in the country. It has spread to the political, economic, and social spheres. The crisis in the country can be overcome, said Ramiz Alia, if our forces unite. He said that Albania is interested in expanding relations with both the West and the East. This is required by the interests of the nation. We do not give preference, said Ramiz Alia, to either the left or the right side. He thought there were good prospects for relations of his country with the Soviet Union.

West Europe

Cheney's Remarks on 'Threat' to Turkey Assailed

LD2105132791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0343 GMT 21 May 91

[Commentary by Anatoliy Koritskiy, Mayak correspondent in Turkey—from the "Panorama" program]

[Text] I will say frankly that I had personally closed my file on the so-called Soviet military threat. No sensible person would use this hackneyed and false theme today, I thought. But no, it turns out that it is back from the dead. U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney gave an interview to the Washington correspondent of the leading Turkish newspaper MILLIYET. The words of the Pentagon chief are there in heavy black print on the front page: "Turkey

in Danger;" "Threat from the USSR Remains." In Mr. Cheney's opinion, all the positive changes which are taking place in Europe, including those in the military sphere, are far from NATO's southern flank, that is, from Turkey, and do not affect the latter in any way. In other words, the reduction of the Soviet military budget by more than 14 percent, the reduction of the Armed Forces by 500,000 men, and their new, defensive structure, and so on, have, as it turns out, merely made it possible to preserve the notorious Soviet threat to Turkey.

Leaving such arguments to the conscience of the defense secretary, I will just note that all the changes in our Armed Forces in Central Europe that I have mentioned affect the troops stationed in the northern Caucasus as well. The group of our troops in the south, as has been announced, has been subject to reductions since 1989, and will be cut by 60,000 men. I am sure that Mr. Cheney could not be unaware of this.

What then constitutes the Soviet threat to Turkey? Perhaps the new treaty on friendship, neighborliness and cooperation that was signed during the recent visit to Moscow by Turkey's President Turgut Ozal, in which we called each other friendly countries for the first time in the history of our relations? Or perhaps the supplies of Soviet natural gas, which Turkey is using to tackle many urgent ecological problems?

Why then was there a need to resort again to the mythical Soviet threat right now, when major and positive shifts are taking place in virtually every sphere of Soviet-Turkish relations, in the political, economic and even the military spheres? The reply to this question is supplied by the defense secretary himself. I quote: We ought to carry out a number of steps, among them steps on Turkey's territory, to provide support for our troops in case there is a need to return quickly to the Persian Gulf zone. That is, the matter concerns additional military pledges to Turkey, and in particular the stockpiling on its territory of arms for U.S. troops, and the provision for them of all they need for rapid interference anywhere in this already explosive region. It is difficult to put this dubious enterprise into practice without the image of an enemy. That is why an interview about the so-called Soviet threat is appearing again.

TASS Denies GDR's Kessler Fled to USSR

LD2105224791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1820 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Berlin 21 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy: Willi Stoph, former chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, and Heinz Kessler, GDR minister of national defence, and Fritz Streletz and Hans Albrecht, members of the national defense council of the GDR were arrested here last night. Together with Erich Honecker they are accused of "instigation to murder."

Some of the FRG's mass media report this fact as a sensation. The Berlin B.Z. newspaper did not even begrudge making it the lead story. The header, printed in large letters, on "the flight of Honecker's best friend in Soviet uniform to the USSR" will probably remain imprinted in the consciousness of many of its 300,000 readers.

The events of the past night were commented on in more restrained form by the DPA and ADN agencies. They report, for example, that according to the assertion of the special group set up under the procuracy to investigate "governmental crime," immediately after the erection of the "Berlin wall" in 1961, the border guards were given orders permitting them to use weapons in extreme cases to stop attempts at illegal crossing of the East German-West German border. It was modified several times. Approximately 190 people were victims of the "Berlin wall" during the time of its existence. Documents discovered in the archives lay the blame for this crime first and foremost on the GDR's national defense council. Therefore the authorities also adopted the decision on the arrest of the four above-mentioned. According to Jutta Limbach, the Berlin justice senator, fresh arrests are also possible, the agencies report.

And that perhaps would have been that. But certain circumstances of H. Kessler's arrest are bewildering, to say the least.

Yesterday at the approach roads to the Soviet military airfield at Sperenberg near Berlin, large-scale police roadblocks were set up and a total surveillance of all vehicles of the Western Group of Forces was organized. It turns out that the police had received information that H. Kessler was allegedly planning to flee to Moscow from here, disguised in Soviet military uniform. This was supposedly the explanation for the hasty arrest.

At the Berlin section of the USSR embassy in the FRG, the TASS correspondent was told that this fantastic account was completely groundless. Just three months ago army General H. Kessler, member of the former "Free Germany" national committee, received an official invitation from the management of the Krasnogorsk memorial museum of German antifascists to come here as a guest of honor in connection with the organization of a special section devoted to his antifascist work. Owing to H. Kessler's wife's illness, the trip did not take place at that time. The museum management repeated its invitation on 7 May. As a foreign passport holder, and in possession of an entry visa for the USSR on a completely legal basis, H. Kessler reserved a ticket for 22 May on Aeroflot flight Su-112, and a return ticket for 4 June. All these details were put on computer and are no secret.

Ordering large-scale checkups on all Soviet military vehicles, the authorities quite liberally interpreted the USSR-FRG treaty on conditions of Soviet troops' temporary stay in and planned withdrawal from FRG territory. In paragraph 1 of article 2 this document says, inter alia, that Soviet troops have the right "to freely move

around in their transport vehicles along public communication routes." Paragraph 7 of the same article makes it incumbent upon German authorities "to refrain from any actions preventing Soviet troops from exercising their rights and duties."

The great commotion caused by the police has proved absolutely aimless. After coming home from a weekend stay with his children and finding on the door a new lock and an order to report to the police, H. Kessler strictly obeyed and was arrested.

The FRG leadership has spoken more than once in favor of creating an atmosphere of confidence around the Soviet troops stationed in Germany now. The hasty actions of the police and the inappropriate version of the Soviet side's intention to organize the former GDR minister of national defense's escape to Moscow will hardly serve this purpose.

Latin America & Caribbean

Open Mediation To End U.S.-Cuba Tension Urged

PM2005095391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 May 91 Union Edition p 6

[A. Kamorin article: "Cuban-American Relations Frozen by the Cold War. In the Trap of Chronic Mistrust"]

[Text] Havana—This year is uncommonly rich in events in Cuba. Moreover, the most topical of these are the upcoming Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party and the Pan-American games, the preparation for which has now enveloped the entire country and has somehow pushed the commemorative dates of historical events into the background.

This is natural—today Cubans have too many urgent and pressing problems to enjoy themselves at lavish jubilees. But nevertheless there is one anniversary, in my view, which merits our standing still and looking back. I am talking about the battle that raged 30 years ago in a marshy area on the south coast of Cuba whose name was at that time little known even to Cubans—Playa Giron. Now it is known to the whole world, and it fully deserves to be—the events that took place there became a landmark in Cuban history.

...It was a worrying period. The cold war was approaching its apogee, and Cuba had become one of its "hottest" fronts. By that time the United States had already stopped regarding Fidel Castro as a "none-too-compliant southern neighbor." In their eyes he had turned into "an agent of world communism" and "a threat to hemispheric security," and in those days this was not an assessment—it was a verdict. In Washington's view the upward development of Soviet-Cuban contacts, including contacts in the military field, justified any actions that could "stop Castro."

At the beginning of 1961 the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and a tight blockade was imposed around the island. In CIA training camps located in the United States itself and in Central America, "invasion forces" were being trained at full speed, the backbone comprising Cuban emigres who had fled the country after the revolution.

The advance guard of these forces, which numbered 150,000 men and was called "Assault Brigade 2506," had the task of seizing a beachhead on Cuban territory where a new government could be established, which would immediately ask for direct U.S. military assistance... The landing began 17 April, but 72 hours later the Playa Giron beachhead seized by the mercenaries had already been liberated, and "Brigade 2506" itself had essentially been liquidated.

For Cuba, the victory at Playa Giron signaled liberation from "geographical fatalism." This doctrine, which claimed that Latin American states were doomed to follow the United States because they had no chance of opposing it, had long prevailed in Cuban minds. The events of April 1961 showed them that their "northern neighbor" was not all-powerful, and this brought in its wake an explosion of patriotic feelings. On the wave of enthusiasm caused by this victory, revolutionary Cuba got increasingly involved in the struggle against "world imperialism," personified in its eyes by the United States, and became one of the Soviet Union's most zealous allies in the cold war that was spreading at the time.

...Years have gone by. Everything has changed in today's world. The leaders of the USSR and the United States have triumphantly buried the cold war. Not without some bloodshed, regional conflicts which yesterday still seemed all but eternal are steadily moving toward a solution. But for Cuba and the United States the cold war goes on, and moreover the sides are getting perceptibly more intransigent. Washington, clearly expecting East Europe-style events to take place on the island, prefers to exert pressure on Cuba from many sides, not wishing to make contact of any kind with Fidel Castro. As we can see, the Cuban leadership has no intention of making the first overtures to its "age-old enemy" either. Practical experience shows that such a climate of chronic mistrust is a good environment for a different kind of misunderstanding, in which one of the sides could simply lose its nerve...

Soviet diplomacy is attempting to have some sort of influence on the development of events by fulfilling the role of "shuttle intermediary" between the conflicting sides. However, as yet there has been no news of any impressive successes on the road to direct dialogue between them. Can it be, observers believe, that the time has come to make the transition from confidential consultations to mediation that is open to the eyes of world public opinion? Various options are possible, and any one of them merits attention if it promises a way forward to the elimination of one of the planet's last cold war

sanctuaries. I am sure that this would be the best way of promoting the national interests of all the countries involved.

Commentary Views Aims of Pinochet Tour

LD2105231791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 20 May 91

[Commentary by Sergey Koshkin]

[Text] Commander-in-chief of the Chilean Armed Forces, General Augosto Pinochet, once that country's dictator, is continuing what is widely seen as an almost globe-trotting tour. What is he trying to gain abroad? Here is a commentary by Sergey Koshkin:

The general's itinerary is kept in secrecy for what was described as security reasons. Dictators, even have-beens, always suffer from a mania of being hunted and seldom reveal their whereabouts.

The general and his entourage left the country aboard a military aircraft on 10 May, but it was later reported to be landing in Brazil, although newspapers spoke of other countries, such as France, South Africa, Iran, Portugal, the United States, and China. It is only once the plane has actually landed that one could assume with full confidence that the general's visit has in fact began.

France's refusal to grant entry preceded General Pinochet's covert visit to Britain, but London had to call off its invitation under pressure from the British public and parliament.

According to a statement he made before leaving Chile, the aim of his tour is arms deals. One other reason may be the general's desire to see the world and to try to present himself as a democrat after so many years of self-isolation. Last year he had to cede power to a civilian government, nor did he manage to stop free elections. [sentence as heard] However, General Pinochet is still in the limelight and may be hoping to win the laurels of a democrat.

He's far from the political scene, for the time being at least, but the general's chance of raising his prestige after years of dictatorship and human rights' abuses is very slim.

Supreme Soviet

Highlights of USSR Supreme Soviet Sessions

17 May

LD1705223891

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1815 GMT on 17 May carries a 30-minute "USSR Supreme Soviet Session" program, containing recorded highlights of proceedings at the USSR Supreme Soviet session held in Moscow on 17 May.

The program opens with a speech by Kalmykov, chairman of the Committee on Legislation and Law and Order, who gives an article-by-article explanation of amendments made for the second reading of the law on the higher arbitration court, and the law on the procedure for resolving economic disputes.

No objections are voiced and the laws are adopted.

Venyamin Yakovlev, chairman of the Higher Arbitration Court, praises the laws just passed.

The chamber examines the draft law on the introduction of special ranks of warrant officers and senior warrant officers in the internal affairs bodies. The law is adopted without discussion.

At 1913 GMT an announcer says that the Soviet of the Union started work in the afternoon. Ivan Laptev, chairman of the chamber, told the deputies about the laws adopted by the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union also adopted these laws without discussion, he points out.

He concludes by saying: "On 20 May the participants in the session will continue work at a joint sitting of the chambers. It is expected that the deputies will return to the long-suffering draft law on exit and entry to the USSR."

21 May

LD2105214991

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 2044 GMT on 21 May carries 23 minutes of recorded highlights of the USSS Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 21 May.

USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov opens the session and congratulates the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress on its opening. He reminds deputies that today would have been Andrey Sakharov's 70th birthday.

Lukyanov says that today's sitting is devoted to the Union treaty. Parliamentary committees have considered the issue very thoroughly. The treaty will be the product of an agreement among the republics but the Supreme Soviet has its part to play, he says.

At 2049 GMT the announcer introduces Georgiy Tarazevich, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy chairman who reports on the discussion of the Union treaty in parliamentary committees. Tarazevich says that the draft received approval and support on the whole, but committee members did make proposals, 240 in all. He summarizes them and answers some of the points raised on various articles in the draft treaty.

Tarazevich answers questions, then deputies decide to hold a discussion behind closed doors, the announcer says. The session will conitnue tomorrow.

Tentative Agenda for USSR Supreme Soviet Reported

OW2005083691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 17 May 91

[Text] A tentative agenda of the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the next two weeks reads as follows:

On Monday, May 20, the session is to discuss in the second reading a bill on the order of leaving and entering the country by Soviet citizens and a bill on the introduction of amendments and additions into the law on the order of resolving collective labor disputes.

Tuesday will be devoted exclusively to a draft union treaty, and Wednesday to a bill on the protection of the rights of consumers (in the second reading). On Thursday, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will work in committees and commissions. On Friday, both chambers will seprately debate in the first reading draft fundamentals of the legislation on foreign investments in the USSR and discuss the realization of the land reform.

The next week will be no easier for the Soviet legislature. On Monday, May 27, the session is scheduled to debate in the second reading draft fundamentals of the civil legislation and hear a report on the budget, planning and finance commission on the extension of credits by the state bank of the USSR to the Soviet finance ministry. Tuesday will be left for a debate on draft fundamentals of the legislation on incomes indexation (the first reading) and for the ratification of the treaty between the USSR and foreign states on the promotion and mutual protection of investments.

On Wednesday and Thursday the Soviet parliament will work in committees and commissions.

On Friday the chambers will sit separately to debate in the second reading a bill on inventions in the USSR.

Supreme Soviet Presidium on Work of 5th Session

LD1705091491 Moscow TASS in English 2005 GMT 16 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 16 TASS—The Presidium of the Soviet parliament met in the Kremlin today to discuss work on a treaty of Union and changes in the agenda of the current, fifth session of the parliament.

The meeting under the chairmanship of Anatoliy Lukyanov discussed the procedure for considering proposals submitted by committees and standing commissions of both houses of the Soviet parliament and individual deputies concerning the draft treaty of Union.

The Presidium also defined a list of bills the parliament is due to consider in connection with the implementation of the government's anti-crisis programme.

It recognised the need to consider first of all the bills on indexation of individual incomes, demonopolisation and privatisation, foreign investments and other regulatory enactments aimed at overcoming the crisis in the country and ensuring the social protection of people under the conditions of transition to a market.

The Presidium also discussed other problems relating to the further work of the Soviet parliament's current, fifth session.

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 16 May

PM1705132191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Sitting"]

[Text] A sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was held 16 May in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of A.I. Lukyanov.

It discussed the question of the procedure for considering proposals made by committees and standing commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers, deputies' groups, and individual deputies with regard to the draft of a new Union treaty.

The presidium stipulated the list of draft laws to be considered at the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the implementation of the USSR Government's anticrisis program. It was deemed necessary to submit for immediate discussion by the supreme organ of power draft laws on indexing citizens' incomes, demonopolization, destatization and privatization, and foreign investments, along with other legislative acts designed to overcome the crisis situation in the country and provide the population with social protection in conditions of the transition to a market.

The sitting also discussed certain other questions relating to the continuing work of the Fifth USSR Supreme Soviet Session.

USSR Supreme Soviet Focuses on Union Treaty

Lukyanov Address

LD2105222291 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 2044 GMT 21 May 91

[Remarks by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 21 May—recorded]

[Text] We are commencing our work the day the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress of People's Deputies opens and I would like, on your behalf, to wish the Russian Federation Congress success in its work and constructiveness in solving all questions in the interests of the cohesion of the USSR and the friendship of the peoples of our country. [applause]

We are opening this session on the day when Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, our deputy, a humanist, a major scientist, would have been 70 years of age, and our country will also be marking this date today.

You and I, comrades, have agreed that today's session should be devoted to the draft of the new Union treaty. You are aware that a discussion on the Union treaty is going on in the Supreme Soviets of the republics. Many of them have sent in their conclusions on the Union treaty and proposals on individual articles—constructive proposals and proposals disagreeing with certain ways of solving questions, and so on.

There is no doubt that the USSR Supreme Soviet, which consists of representatives of all our republics, and all our autonomous formations, can also not fail to participate in discussion on this most important document which has been published. At the same time, we proceed from the fact that, first and foremost, the treaty will be worked through in our standing commissions of the chambers, and Supreme Soviet committees, so that all factions and all groups of deputies can work on it.

It must be said that this work has been carried out, and carried out very thoroughly. All comrades submitted their proposals and the possibility arose of even compiling a kind of comparative table for the document. The Supreme Soviet Presidium directed the proposals to be generalized so that they can be summarized for you.

Of course, every one of you knows that the treaty will be the product of an accord between the republics that founded the Union. But it is beyond doubt—and this has been agreed at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies—that representatives of the Union's organ of power will be participating in the preparation, in the preparatory committee. Specifically, the congress included in the preparatory committee, as you know, the USSR president, the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, and the Soviet of Nationalities chairman. Thus, the opinions you will express today during this sitting will enable us to study the issue also from the position that will be

expressed here in the Supreme Soviet, from the position of those criticisms and those proposals that USSR people's deputies will submit.

Session Proposals Reported

LD2105104691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] We have one more link-up. This is the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Parliamentary correspondent Gennadiy Kolenov is working there. We hear you Gennadiy.

[Kolenov] Good day, respected radio listeners. Today at a joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the very important and topical issue of the draft Union treaty is being considered. Opening the morning session, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, having spoken about the agenda, wished success and constructive work to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress of People's Deputies, which has opened. He also recalled that today is the 70th birthday of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, and this date will be marked throughout the country.

After this Georgiy Tarazevich, its chairman, gave a report from the Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities for Nationalities' Policy and Inter-Ethnic Relations. He told the Supreme Soviet about the results of discussion on the draft treaty on the Union of Sovereign Republics in the committees, commissions, and deputies' groups of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I remind you that at the proposal of USSR people's deputies and in accordance with a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, discussion of the 9 March draft was held in all 24 committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as in 10 of the 23 deputies' groups. As a whole, this version of the draft Union treaty was approved. At the same time, many remarks and proposals were made on improving it.

Thus, for example, the Commission for Nationalities' Policy and Inter-Ethnic Relations considers it expedient to use the name of the document, the Union Treaty. The Committee for State Construction for Affairs of Women, Families, and Demographic Policy, the Commission for Economic Relations Between Republics and Autonomous formations, and the Soyuz Deputies' Group consider it essential, in the full designation of the state, to proceed from the results of the All-Union referendum held on 18 March this year. The discussion in committees and commissions put forward a formulation for the preamble on recognizing the rights of nations and peoples to self-determination. It is well-known that international acts on human rights speak about the rights of peoples to self-determination but not of nations. The concept of the people [narod] is of a more distinctive nature.

[Answer] Yes, this is clear, Gennadiy.

[Kolenov] Other remarks and amendments were also taken into account in the draft. Then Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich answered questions and after this the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet began a closed discussion of this issue. I end my report on this.

Closed Meeting Held

OW2205045291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] At a meeting behind closed doors Tuesday the Soviet Supreme Soviet decided to postpone the voting on the draft resolution about the new Union treaty until Wednesady, May 22, because the draft needs to be elaborated.

A people's deputy of the USSR Sergei Belozertsev told IF's [INTERFAX's] correspondent that "the speech by the USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov contradicted the Statement of the ten. According to A. Lukyanov, the Center will decide everything. Speaking on the treaty's clause about the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, Anatoly Lukyanov said it can take place in a year and a half because only working out a new constitution will take about 9 months and the parliament cannot be dissolved before that time". While the Statement of the Ten says a new constitution should be prepared and adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies within 6 months after signing the Union treaty. [sentence as received]

According the Belozertsev, A. Lukyanov stated that the divorce suit with republics willing to break wawy from the Union will take no less than 5 years and "talks with them will be very tough".

Supreme Soviet Adopts Consumer Rights Law

LD2205131691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1200 GMT 22 May 91

["Live linkup" with correspondent Leonid Lazarevich at the Kremlin]

[Excerpts] The Supreme Soviet has already finished its work today with the morning and afternon session. Worthy of note is the fact that it has adopted its 100th law; and it seems to me to be very important indeed that this law concerns the protection of consumer rights, protection of the rights of all of us. [passage omitted]

Concluding the sitting, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decision [postanovleniye] on the draft Union treaty. This decision points out the expediency of bringing the draft Union Treaty wholly into accord with the results of the all-Union referendum which took place on 17 March. With this, I end my live linkup on the USSR Supreme Soviet session."

Supreme Soviet Debates Exit, Entry Law

Commission Differs Over Options

PM2005111591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 May 91 Union Edition pp 1-2

[Report by parliamentary correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "'No Entry Sign' at Entry and Exit Remains So Far"]

[Text] Drama. Perhaps there is no briefer or more accurate way of describing the action which developed in the last hour of the 16 May evening joint sitting of the Union parliament. The dramatic destiny of the draft law on entry to the USSR and exit from it has every grounds for going down in the history of the lawmaking activity of the country's Supreme Soviet.

As is the custom, a lull preceded the storm. The deputies devoted the entire daytime sitting to an article by article discussion of the draft law on the USSR state security organs. We have already noted the high quality of the document submitted for a second reading. The course of the debates confirmed that assessment. Work proceeded in general calmly, in a businesslike manner, and at the start of the evening sitting the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted, for the first time in our state's history, a law on the state security organs. V. Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB, who took part in the work of the sitting, voiced his attitude toward the new law.

In particular he stressed that the staffers of the state security organs have been waiting for this law for a long time and were among the initiators of its adoption because they want to live by the law, by the truth, to march in step with history, in step with the entire Soviet people, resolutely liberating themselves from the grave, tragic burden of the past with which our fatherland's history is filled. We understand the crucial moment in which we are living, V. Kryuchkov said. I think the question is like this—either there will be the power of laws and of the truth in our country or the power of violence, of tyranny, of desecration of man, could prevail in it for a long time. In individual regions of our country we are already encountering that situation.

The speaker drew the deputies' attention to the fact that the country has now entered a period of crisis of a kind from which we can emerge only all together. We realize what consensus is, what the path of joint struggle is. But at the same time if we encounter violence, if calls to reason and the law remain unanswered, i think we must act. And the law which has been put into our hands is a very sharp tool. We shall use it only by legal means and only when we encounter resistance. We have the USSR Constitution, we have the constitutional system. This system has undergone serious ordeals and there have also been tragic pages in our history. But at the same time our Constitution and our laws enable us to live under conditions of peace and consensus.

The speaker also thanked the sitting's participants for the fact that the concept of the law is based on approaching the examination of the security organs as a single category. He assured the deputies that the state security organs personnel will do everything to be up to the job and strictly observe the spirit of the law to ensure that the grave shadow of the past never again looms over the KGB. In conclusion V. Kryuchkov supported the actions of the country's parliament aimed at retaining the Union—"our main value."

If the long and painstaking process of the discussion of the draft law on the state security organs could be compared with a lawmaking marathon then the word spring is more appropriate to describe the course of the adoption of the next legislative act. In literally five minutes, without any debate, the deputies approved at its second reading the law on an absolutely new supreme state organ—the USSR Control Chamber, which has replaced the abolished USSR People's Control Committee. The chamber's chairman was also elected. He is A. Orlov, former deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union planning and budget and finance commission, who is well known to the deputies.

Here the lull gradually came to an end. The country's parliament switched to a discussion of the situation which has taken shape in connection with the vote on the adoption as a whole of the draft law on entry and exit. As we have already reported, the draft did not receive support in the Soviet of Nationalities last time. That situation is envisaged in article 117 of the USSR Constitution. In the event of the outbreak of disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, it states, a commission should be created on the basis of parity from representatives of the chambers and a compromise version should be elaborated and submitted at a joint sitting.

The results of the commission's work were described to colleagues by its leader, Deputy I. Laptev. The sitting's participants were offered three versions of a solution. The first version is that the draft law should in fact be sent for a third reading. The law is accepted as a whole, but its article by article approval will take place only after the parliamentary committees in conjunction with the government have prepared a new draft resolution on the procedure for its introduction. It is proposed to hold the third reading at the current session.

The second option is that the parliament is asked to vote on a procedural question: That in accordance with Article 142 of the Rulings it embark on an article by article examination of the draft law, after which the draft as a whole will be put to the vote and the question of a transitional resolution will be decided.

The third option is that the draft law be handed over for examination by the Soviet of Nationalities.

Commenting on these proposals, I. Laptev tried to persuade the deputies in as reasoned a way as possible that it is necessary to adopt the law. Since the draft law's

"lack of figures" could be regarded as the only stumbling block at the previous discussion (at any rate, there were no other serious complaints) the speaker focused attention primarily on the economic aspect of the question. And in our view he explained everything clearly enough—under the conditions of the market toward which we are all moving, the implementation of the law will be paid for by the people who leave. And it is perfectly possible that this implementation will also bring the country a profit.

I. Laptev urged his colleagues also to pay attention to the political aspect of the problem. The USSR has after all signed the Human Rights Pact, the Helsinki Act, and the Paris Charter. The importance of voting on the draft law lies in whether the country's supreme legislative organ will confirm those signatures or disclaim them.

And finally there is the moral aspect. It is a case of our ability to respect another person's choice. After all, I. Laptev noted, for that person it is all the same whether the door has been closed by a dictator or by 500 elected representatives of the people. We can raise questions about any prices, duty charges, or tariffs, but we cannot deprive a man of one of his basic rights.

The deputies who supported the draft law spoke mainly of this, of how it is primarily a case of a person's right to freedom, which cannot be assessed in rubles. Those deputies included Yu. Kalmykov, Yu. Sharipov, N. Tatarchuk, and Sh. Zhanybekov. The money problem was touched on by Deputy V. Gubarev, who announced that the Cabinet of Ministers has already prepared a plan to increase prices for services when drawing up documents for leaving the USSR. The cost of a passport for foreign travel, according to the deputy, is set in this document at 1,000 rubles.

The chair also supported the draft law. The presidium received a note whose author drew attention to the fact that during the debates A. Lukyanov was refraining from voicing his attitude toward the draft law. Answering the note's author, A. Lukyanov stressed that he is unequivocally in favor of the law's adoption. But at the same time he is sure that it is essential to create a precise mechanism for the law's introduction. Perhaps by doing it gradually, retaining the exit quota for a while.

And what about the opponents of the draft law? Deputies L. Sukhov and A. Kryshkin expressed their negative attitude in the form of questions for I. Laptev. The former was concerned by the moral aspect of the fact that people who have received free education in our country may leave the country and that as a result only invalids will remain. The latter, on the contrary, was worried by the consequences of open entry into the country. By the danger of the export of revolution and banditry with which, in the deputy's opinion, the internal affairs and state security organs will be unable to cope.

Serious objections to the draft law were heard only in Deputy T. Pupkevich's speech. Incidentally, he is one of the members of the parity-based conciliation commission and the only person to refuse to sign compromise versions. The deputy spoke of future unemployment, inflation, and the plight of working people in our country. His basic arguments against the draft law have not changed since the previous debates—first we must adopt "the laws our people need"—on the reform of wages, the indexing of incomes, on leave, and only then on entry and exit. A notable detail: T. Pupkevich's speech was the only one to be applauded.

And then the first compromise option was put to the vote. Within a few seconds it became clear that the situation, instead of emerging from the deadlock, had become even more deadlocked. This time the Soviet of Nationalities voted "for" and the Soviet of the Union was just two votes short of the necessary majority. I. Laptev mounted the session rostrum again. He voiced the hope that his colleagues from the Soviet of the Union had failed fully to understand the thrust of the compromise proposals—they had interpreted the three proposals as a single document—and suggested to the Soviet of the Union that it vote again. The chamber voted, and the first proposal again failed to receive support. Passions became heated. I. Laptev desperately tried to save the situation, but here Deputy A. Sebentsov unexpectedly asked to speak. He is one of the members of the parity-based commission but in contrast to T. Pupkevich, he had put his signature to the opinions and he criticized the first option and stated that only the second option was acceptable.

The chair put the second option to the vote. The result was 221 "for," 60 "against" and 25 abstentions. A. Lukyanov's opinion was that the option could not go through. I. Laptev tried to argue that it was a case, as enshrined in the proposals, of a procedural question for whose solution a simple majority is sufficient. But A. Lukyanov was unbending: The discussion was postponed until the next joint sittings. Then I. Laptev stated his refusal to take part in the work of the conciliation commission because of the actions of Deputy A. Sebentsov and again tried to draw the attention of A. Lukyanov to the fact that the second option had been adopted on the basis of the results of the vote. But it was already late. A decision was taken. The fate of the draft law on entry and exit will now be determined at the next joint sitting, to be held 20 May.

We gave the title "'No Entry Sign at Entry and Exit" to our report on the start of the debate on the draft law on the procedure for leaving the USSR and entering the Union. So far, as we can see, the "no entry sign" is in place.

On 17 May the Supreme Soviet chambers worked separately. In the morning a sitting of the Soviet of Nationalities was held under the chairmanship of B. Oleynik. The deputies discussed and approved at the second reading a draft USSR law on the supreme court of

arbitration and a draft law on the procedure for resolving economic disputes by the USSR supreme court of arbitration.

The members of the Soviet of Nationalities were also presented with a draft law on the introduction of the special ranks of "ensign" and "senior ensign" in the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry system. L. Sizov, USSR deputy minister of internal affairs, explained that it is a case of 30,000 Internal Affairs Ministry staffers who work as overseers [kontrolery] in investigation cells, prisons, and labor colonies.

The draft law on special titles was also supported by the Soviet of Nationalities.

Law Adopted; Deputies' Opinions Detailed

LD2005110691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 20 May 91

[Report by correspondent Olga Nasilenko at the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 20 May, presented by announcer Igor Grigoryev]

[Text] [Grigoryev] The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. In our program we are going to hear a direct dispatch from the Kremlin, and if I am not mistaken, an interesting piece of news awaits us. Let us listen. Here is our parliamentary correspondent Olga Vasilenko. Can you hear us?

[Vasilenko] Yes, of course. I have some interesting and long-awaited news. Our Union parliament has at last adopted a law on entry and exit. And you know, the reason it has adopted it is perhaps because one of the deputies, when the bill had been voted on as a whole, before the article by article discussion started—so, one of the deputies insisted upon a roll-call vote. He said he was ashamed to face the constituency, and did not want to blush for other people. Because you know, the debates, and serious debates at that, were starting to stir up again. Those speaking against were still the same: Sukhov, Kupkevich, Korenev. This team was lead by the not-unknown Deputy Kryshkin who, speaking on behalf of the workers, addressed the Union parliament in the following way: Comrade Deputies and Messrs. Emigrants.

[Grigoryev] Well, well....

[Vasilenko] (Anatoliy Makarovich Kryshkin) reminded us about AIDS and counterrevolution, and said that the law was required by one percent of the population, while the people did not need it. The people needed a law on leave and a law on indexation. The arguments used by Kupkevich were the same.

Well, quite true, we do need a law on leave, as well as a law on indexation—what with the price increases we are faced with now—but it was in the year 1948, when we were by no means less busy, that we signed the general declaration of human rights, and in 1975 we signed the Helsinki agreement. The question is, as Deputy Kim put it, whether we are going to observe this international legislation, and whether we are going to put life into it.

The law is going to replace thousands of minor resolutions which, as Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov put it, are tyrannizing hundreds of people. Because people are already going abroad today: around 400,000 people each year. Only they do it not on the basis of a law, but according to the will of a bureaucrat, who is not always helpful and not always competent.

[Grigoryev] We have had our own experience of all this, haven't we?

[Vasilenko] Frankly, I have not had much experience of this kind at all, but judging from what people say, things happen.

[Grigoryev] Well, we have had a lot of this in our past.

[Vasilenko] You are right. And you know, the speech made by Viktor Andreyevich Gubarev made a kind of sensation today. He is a member of the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission. He said that the financial calculation on how much the law is going to cost—the calculations presented by the government—are false. They were prepared with a single purpose, to stop the law. We mentioned these figures, in hard currency and in rubles. They are quite considerable. However, one of the articles of the bill reads, and I quote: Citizens travel abroad at their own expense, or at the expense of persons, enterprises, and public organizations financing their trip. Do you remember how horrified some of the deputies were by those figures?

Well you know, Kucherenko, chairman of the commission—the one where Gubarev works—said that the commission did not have such information at its disposal, and if Viktor Andreyevich [Gubarev] has it, it should be studied. However, this situation did not develop any further, and after the passing of the bill as a whole, it was discussed article by article. This discussion finished comparatively quickly—the bill has 18 articles; it is very compact and very well thought out. Now a resolution has to be adopted that will define when the bill, or rather the law now, is going to be put into effect: in July 1992, or in January 1993, or perhaps stage by stage. This is all from me, so far.

[Grigoryev] Thank you very much, Olga, for this information and for your very interesting and long-awaited news.

INTERFAX Notes Cost, Emigration Figures

OW2105095191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 20 May 91

[From "Business Today"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has adopted the whole of the Law on Entrance and Exit, which is to apply from January 1, 1993.

On May 20, after prolonged debates which in the main centred on the manner and time for the introduction of the new law, 320 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR voted for, 37 against and 32 abstained.

In the course of the next two weeks, the Cabinet of Ministers is to work out and present to the parliament a plan for the gradual introduction of the law, the first in the history of the Soviet Union to grant the right to leave the country for tourist aims and to emigrate freely.

The Law on Entrance and Exit, which the Soviet parliament first started to consider in 1989, is to be introduced after a delay. Officials say this is mainly because expenditure on customs and consular services will amount to tens of millions of rubles and million of dollars in the very near future.

According to some estimates, the coming into force of the Law on Entrance and Exit will lead to an increase in the number of those emigrating from the Soviet Union to 5.7 million in 1995.

U.S. Congress' Baltic Interference of Concern

91UN1522A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 May 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the International Affairs Committee"]

[Text] **At a meeting of the committee on 14 May in connection with the interest displayed by people's deputies, information of the USSR Foreign Ministry was presented on the U.S. Congress hearings held on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which certain leaders of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics participated.**

During the exchange of opinions, members of the committee and the people's deputies present at the meeting observed that it was difficult to view such a hearing as other than an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR. The Soviet lawmakers expressed serious concern over the actions taken by certain congressmen in connection with the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics.

The Soviet Union values the improvement in relations with the United States and the new climate of trust which has taken shape between the two countries in recent years, and it is now important to consolidate the positive trends which have emerged and ensure that officials do not transgress generally accepted international norms.

The participants in the meeting expressed the hope that foreign parliamentarians would make their initiatives concerning one region of the Soviet Union or another commensurable with the criterion of noninterference in its internal affairs. Such a realistic approach is particularly important now, when a constitutional mechanism for the discussion of questions of relations between the republics and the Union center has been created and has begun to operate.

News of a concept of the Soviet Union's new political treaties with the East European countries was presented by Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy. The basis of this concept are the tasks of extending political cooperation as an important component of the security of the USSR and its East European partners with regard for their interdependence in a regional and all-European context, long-standing historical traditions, the spiritual proximity of our peoples, and the positive experience of interaction. It is a question of realizing under current conditions the principles of good-neighborliness and broadening contacts between the USSR and the countries of the region, and assuring the regularity of political dialogue at all levels.

Members of the committee emphasized the importance of organizing the USSR's relations with its neighbors in East and Southeast Europe on a new treaty basis and the significance of the Soviet-Romanian Cooperation, Good-Neighbor, and Friendship Treaty, which was signed in April, as a first step in this direction. The impending elaboration and conclusion of treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic should contribute to stimulating relations with these states and surmounting the "pause" which came about by virtue of objective circumstances following the events of 1989-1990 in East Europe.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Cancels 12 Jun ILO Visit

LD2205113991 Bern Swiss Radio International in English 1000 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] The Geneva-based International Labor Organization [ILO] says the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has called off a planned visit to next month's annual conference. The ILO said President Gorbachev was due to address the conference on 12 June as the first ever head of state from an East European [as heard] country. It said Mr. Gorbachev regretted his decision but gave no reason for his absence.

The three-week meeting will bring together representatives from governments, employers' organizations, and trade unions.

Gorbachev Issues Decree on Consumer Budget

CM2205112191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 21 May 91 p 1

["USSR Presidential Decree on the Minimum Consumer Budget"]

[Text] In order to increase social protection for the population, and particularly the least well-off citizens, in the transfer to a market economy, pursuant to the

decisions of the fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and mindful of the agreement between the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the Council of the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions, the president has ruled as follows.

1. The use of a minimum consumer budget for determining spending on the acquisition of a range of consumer goods and services to satisfy people's main physiological, social and cultural requirements should become a practical part of the implementation of social policy. Minimum consumer budgets should be drawn up using uniform methods for the country as a whole, for republics and for regions, and used as standard social indices in the forecasting of changes to the standard of living of the population and in determining minimum levels of pay, pensions, allowances, grants, and other social payments, as well as state spending on catering in hospitals, boarding schools, day schools, and pre-school and other establishments in the social sphere. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers affirms the all-union minimum consumer budget, and the governments of the republics affirm the republican minimum consumer budgets.

2. It is to be insured that the range of goods and servics in the minimum consumer budgets is determined for the various socio-demographic groups of the population on the basis of scientifically substantiated standards, ethnic and other consumption peculiarities, and the real possibilities of the economy.

3. The average purchase prices for the relevant goods and services in all kinds of trade are to be used to assess the cost of minimum consumer budgets. In forming the physical mix of items in minimum consumer budgets, it is recommended that the consumer basket include a balanced range of goods and services in line with the following main items of expenditure of an individual or a family: foodstuffs, including bread and bakery produce, meat and its by-products, milk and dairy produce, animal oil, eggs, fish and fish produce, potatoes, vegetables and cucurbit, fruit and berries, vegetable oil and margarine, sugar and confectionery goods and other produce, clothing, household linen, footwear, medicines, sanitation and hygiene items, furniture, consumer durables for cultural and household use, housing and municipal services, cultural and educational activities and leisure, consumer services, transport, and communcations, and the attendence of children at preschool establishments.

The bodies of state engaged in elaborating the minimum consumer budgets are to take account of the alternative calculations of trade unions, consumer rights protection societies, and other public organizations.

4. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers and republican government are to review, no less frequently than once a year, the size of the cost of the minimum consumer budget, taking account of the growth of the consumer price index and to review the composition of the consumer basket no less frequently than once a quinquennium. Data concerning the structure and the size of the cost of the minimum consumer budget are to be published in official publications on a regular basis. Proposals concerning setting up a social programs fund and the procedure for making use of it are to be considered within a three-month period, account having been taken of the introduction of minimum consumer budgets. Decisions ensuring the implementation of this decree are to be taken by 1 July 1991.

M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.

The Kremlin, Moscow, 21 May 1991

Cabinet, Republics Amend Sales Tax Rules

LD2105144591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] With the aim of strengthening the social protection of the population, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, in a resolution of 19 May, abolished the levying of the sales tax on socially important goods in daily demand and services to the public, in accordance with a list to be published in the press. The governments of the republics are adding to the list of goods and services specified in the appendix to the existing resolution, proceeding from specific regional features and economic conditions.

Yeltsin Comments on Division of Power, New Laws

OW2105120791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Boris Yeltsin met at the Russian Feberation's Supreme Soviet with the people's deputies (parliamentarians) who are members of the parliamentary group Food and Health who had come to participate in the congress. In the course of the meeting the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet explained some of the provisions of a joint statement by the Soviet president and the nine highest republican executives. According to Yeltsin, much work had to be done for "the centre to recognize in square and earnest the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, even though it took 11 months (to do so)."

Touching the statement's proposed division of power and property between the centre and the republics, Yeltsin noted, in particular, that while earlier only 5 percent of the hard currency went to those who earned it, now this figure rises to 80 percent.

Addressing the criticism that local authorities know nearly nothing about the decisions passed by the Supreme Soviet and its leadership, Yeltsin noted that in addition to sabotage on the part of some local power structures, another cause is the Supreme Soviet "began to pass laws at a doubled speed" as an end had been put to endless political debates that had braked its work.

General: Air Force No Replacement for Aeroflot

LD2005161791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1414 GMT 20 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 20 May (TASS)—Air Colonel General Petr Deynekin, first deputy commander-in-chief of the USSR Air Force, rejected the possibility of using the military and their aviation equipment to maintain passenger transportation should Aeroflot aviation employees begin their strike planned for tomorrow. A three-fold increase in pay is the basis of the employees' economic demands.

"Military aviators cannot be a substitute for Aeroflot for a whole number of reasons," the general stressed in an interview with a TASS correspondent. He explained that this is because of a difference in technical equipment and the specific nature of the work of the Air Force and of Aeroflot.

"For military air traffic controllers to stand in for their colleagues from Aeroflot, they would have to be retrained, which would require time," Petr Deynekin believes.

The general stressed that military transport aviation will continue to assist Aeroflot to carry out certain special tasks involving freight delivery, and also during natural disasters.

"We are assisting Aeroflot in delivering humanitarian cargo to the Soviet Union from abroad. This does not, under the circumstances, mean that we are ready to begin regular transportation of air passengers," General Deynekin said in conclusion.

Fedorov Denies Exit Law Will Change Policy

OW2205095191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"]

[Text] The USSR Sypreme Soviet passed a law laying down the procedure for entering or leaving this country. DP's ["Diplomatic Panorama"] Igor Porshnev asked Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Fedorov for comments on the passage of the law.

According to the executive, the passage of the law does not change Russia's foreign policy in any major way, because right from the outset both the Russian parliament and its leaders have been in favour of this law that anchors an inalienable right of every individual.

But apart from this achievement, the law poses a host of questions, said Fedorov. It will certainly considerably increase the number of Soviet citizens willing to go abroad, and their rights must be reliably safeguarded. According to Russia's deputy foreign minister, the Russian Foreign Ministry sees the protection of their rights as one of its chief tasks. According to Fedorov, Russia (as distinct from the Soviet Union as a whole) should begin to be represented at the Soviet consulates abroad for this purpose. This has already been agreed in principle with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Fedorov noted that main flow of workforce and skilled labour will probably be from the territory of the Russian Feberation. In this connection, the diplomat said, Russia's Foreign Ministry may have to address the hitherto unfamiliar function: The regulation of "complex and possibly controversial" problems with the governments and state bodies of the countries Russia's citizens are to leave for.

According to Fedorov, the delay between the passage of the law and the date when it becomes effective (as late as January 1993) dampens much of the enthusiasm. This delay cannot but add to tension in the country. The probable deterioration of the economic crisis in the country will be "pushing people to leave", says Fedorov. Hopefully though, the passage of the law may urge the Union Government to take certain steps toward providing for its smooth operation, says Fedorov.

In our opinion, continued the deputy minister, it is of paramount importance to make the adopted law a "working" peice of legislation and to prevent its producing a multitude of enabling laws "capable of killing it".

In his speech at the ECOSOC session in New York yesterday, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev echoed his colleague's assessment of the law on entrance and exit. Among other things, he pointed to the need "to provide for the law to have full force since its effective date." "On that day," emphasized Kozyrev, "one on the main thresholds will be crossed separating totalitarianism from civilization and slaves to the system from citizens of a rule-of-law state." He also said that, like many other nations, "we have made sure from our own experience that neglect of human rights and maximizing ideological approaches to the organisation of social life is fraught with tragic consepuences. It is commonly acknowledged that concern with human rights, like charity, begins at home."

Poll Shows Public Unenthusiastic About Travel

OW2105102091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 20 May 91

["Viewpoint"]

[Text] The national Public Opinion Studies Centre (VCLOM) polled 3006 respondents in Soviet towns and country about foreign travel.

1. Asked: "Have you been abroad and what was the purpose of the visit?", nearly half the respondents (47 percent) answered that they had been abroad as tourists.

One quarter (25 percent) of those polled said they had been abroad during service in the Soviet military.

12 percent have been abroad on business.

9 percent have been to a foreign country to visit with relatives or friends.

6 percent took training abroad as exchange students.

2 percent worked under contract to a foreign company.

The total adds up to more than 100 percent as the respondents could choose more than one answer.

The poll indicates that 7 percent of the respondents plan to go abroad soon.

93 percent of those polled said that they did not plan foreign travel soon.

The poll also addressed plans Soviet citizens have to work in a foreign country.

2. Asked "What kind of work can Soviet people reasonably expect in a foreign country?", 40 percent of those polled answered, unskilled and unprestigious work.

16 percent believed that they would work in the same field in which they are working today but their job would require lower skills.

6 percent believe they will be doing the same kind of work abroad that they are doing in the USSR.

38 percent were not sure what to answer.

Significantly, 16 percent of the respondents agree to perform the most unprestigious work abroad (i.a., garbage collector, newspaper vendor, etc.)

57 percent would not agree to this kind of work.

27 percent were not sure what to say.

Cabinet To Give 'Incentives' to Air Controllers

LD2105200791 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] In order to ensure the stable work of air transport and the safety of flights, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a decision defining additional measures to give incentives for greater labor productivity and to improve work conditions at enterprises of the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

Controllers Threaten To Carry Out Strike

PM2205111591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[S. Taranov report: "Air Traffic Controllers' Strike Called Off an Hour Before Midnight 20 May"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to information available as of 1100 on 21 May, all flight and air traffic control services are working normally.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told at the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation that it proved possible to persuade representatives of the strike committee that no one is trying to deceive them and that the decisions adopted by the government will be implemented without reservations. Specifically, the air traffic controllers' profession is classified as a category 1 job with particularly difficult working conditions. Controllers will work a 36-hour week and their annual leave will total 33 working days. Their wages, which have been raised 50 percent, may go up even further if aviation enterprises start earning more. This will be possible if they receive the additional aircraft fuel and spare parts promised by the government.

I made another telephone call—to the headquarters of the central strike committee. Vladimir Brodulev declared:

"The strike has not been called off, it has been postponed until 10 August. The Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Trade Unions will seek legal recognition and, I am confident, will achieve the reregistration of its statutes. At present our main task, irrespective of official status, is to organize monitoring of the implementation of the government's pledges. If they are implemented as promised, we will happily call off the strike on 10 August."

A question to V. Kurilo, deputy minister of civil aviation:

Is any form of persecution of the strike organizers possible?

[Kurilo] This is ruled out, at any rate on the basis of some kind of arbitrary or subjective motives. Anyone's actions can only be appraised on the basis of the law. To be specific, the leaders of the traffic control trade unions and the Pilots Association—Konusenko, Malinovskiy, and others—are our comrades and colleagues. We have to work with them also in the future.

Petroleum Minister Discusses Industry Reform

LD2105112691

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1845 GMT on 20 May debuts the 15-minute "Meet the New Minister" program. Political observer V.P. Beketov interviews Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiyev, minister of the chemical and petroleum processing industry.

Beketov opens the program: "Preparing for today's filming, I took a look through the list of members of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers as approved by the Supreme Soviet. And there I found mostly new people. It is these novice ministers, first termers, who I wanted to introduce to viewers, and find out a few details for myself.

Our first meeting is with the Minster of the Chemcial and Petroleum Processing Industry Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiyev".

Seated in an office with Beketov, Khadzhiyev outlines his previous career and past ambitions, and notes the serious state of affairs in his sector and the entire economy.

On his ministry's approach to the problem, Khadzhiyev says. "We think that we have to take two first steps. The first step is to lease all of the state's property to people lease it". He continues: "We shall lease our state facilities, basic facilities, that is works and factories, to the labor collectives. That's the first step. And then, as leaseholders, being generally independent of us, as soon as they become leaseholders they become independent of the ministry". He continues: "Then, the second step is needed—conversion into joint stock, not the basic facilities—They will remain on leasehold terms—but the working capital. The working capital in our ministry comes to something like 17 to 18 billion rubles. If we say that the state will retain some kind of package of 50 percent at present, and so only 50 percent has to be bought up and benefits provided, then you see that we could find 7 to 8 billion rubles. We have about a million and a half ordinary workers. They could find 7 to 8 billin rubles. It isn't very much for each one to invest". More specifically, Khadzhiyev says: "I think that during this year we will convert our ministry into a joint-stock company, probably (?Union)-republican joint-stock company, as the property of all of the republics that make up our country, and probably by very rapid, and, I would say, precise steps we shall lease out the bulk of our enterprises, and then immediately afterwards go on to the conversion into joint stock".

Asked if there are any plans for his industry to switch to Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic jurisidiction along the lines of the coal industry, Khadzhiyev says: "We had several enterprises, but it seems to me that I managed to explain to most of them the senselessness of such steps". He goes on: "the enterprises' task doesn't lie in switching from one jurisdiction to another, but in what I am saying—becoming free leaseholders, not dependent on Russia, or Chechen-Ingushetiya, or the Union, but freely producing their output and trading in it throughout the world, including in our country".

Khadzhiyev comments on Gorbachev's recent decree calling for greater discipline in certain sectors of the economy: "We don't have the right to take away from people their legitimate right to strike if they are treated unfairly. On the other hand, we have to appeal to people, and they have to understand us, and be patient for something like a year or a year and a half, while we try to put our system and the economy in general on to a normal human course and begin improving our lives. So, on the one hand, I am in favor, because we have to do this, there is simply no other way out, but on the other hand, in the long term I shall be against it, because it is a restriction of people's liberty".

Supreme Soviet Amends Union Treaty

OW2105100991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Results of debates of the draft treaty on the union of sovereign republics in the committees, commissions, and parliamentary groups of the USSR's Supreme Soviet have become available. The deputies have on the whole approved the Union treaty, but have introduced a number of amendments. The most important of them are listed below:

The treaty's preamble should give greater prominence to the provision about the state's economic integrity.

A clause should be included in the treaty that each republic is a sovereign state whose sovereignty is defined within the limits of the treaty.

It should be underlined that the right of republics to freely choose their state system is to be exercised taking into account the will and interests of all the nationalities living on its territory.

The list of questions falling within the competence of the union should be broadened to include in particular nuclear energy research, meteorology, and geology.

The right to the ownership of land and other natural resources should be given to the union. All property and material of the Armed Forces of the USSR should be the property of the union.

The committees and commissions also proposed the clarification that the new Constitution of the USSR is to be adopted by the highest body of state authority of the country—the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

It has been suggested that the president of the USSR should be elected by the national vote following the adoption of the new constitution of the USSR.

Academician Discusses Current USSR Situation

LD2105211691 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Vasiliy Titov]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Political struggle in the Soviet Union is reaching apogee, but, despite all complexities and obstacles, the Soviet Union will be an effectively functioning state, integrated into the world community, by the end of the decade. This comment was made by Academician Stanislav Shatalin at the international conference "Problems of Peace and Security in the Northeast of the Asia-Pacific Region: View into the 21st Century", in Moscow today.

According to Shatalin, the country is undergoing a critical period in its development, characterised by extreme polarisation of political spectrum and an exacerbation of political struggle. Until perestroyka was a

formally postulated desire of changes that did not affect the foundations of the existing social-political system, it satisfied everyone.

However, as the need to change the foundations of social and economic system became increasingly obvious, resistance to reform broke out into the open. Shatalin cited the recent plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee as an example of open clash of various attitudes to the reform process in the Soviet Union.

Common sense that took the upper hand at the plenum allows one to hope that radical reform of the political and, primarily, economic system will continue.

In this context, the academician hailed the recent joint statement signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and leaders of nine Union republics. The document can provide a basis for starting constructive cooperation between republics and the centre.

Analysing the government-proposed anti-crisis programme, Shatalin noted that, along with positive elements, like respecting interests of republics in retaining gold reserves and distributing foreign currency earnings, some details cause concern.

The absence of a single approach to privatising part of state property, watered-down wordings on delimiting powers between the centre and republics—all this can hamper the process of creation of a single all-Union economic space.

On prospects for signing a new union treaty, Shatalin reaffirmed his well-known view that the problem cannot be resolved. He advocated what he called a realistic solution consisting in forming an economic union on the basis of voluntary association with some powers in the field of economy delegated to the central government.

The success of economic reform in the Soviet Union depends to a large degree on the efficiency of its interaction with other countries, including their economic and political support, Shatalin said. He also warned that a Soviet need for such type of aid should not be regarded as its weakness.

"Our country has a huge potential and we can deal with our problems ourselves," he emphasised. However accelerating the process of the Soviet Union's integration into the economic and political world system would serve the interests of all states.

Deputies Form Anti-Extremist Group

PM2205094991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[G. Semenov report: "Deputies' Appeal"]

[Text] A group of USSR, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Moscow City Soviet Deputies have come forward with an initiative to create a public movement of constructive forces. Its main task is to be to take specific action to stablilize the political and economic situation in the country. The deputies call on all "who find extremism and radicalism of the left and the right, and the populism that goes with it, unacceptable" to join together in this movement. They invite entry both from private citizens, irrespective of their party affiliations, and by parties, unions, and any public organizations, which at the same time can keep their internal structure, programs, statutes, and freedom of action.

Implications of Moscow-Republics Accord Eyed

PM2205095991 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 18, 5 May 91 p 3

[Observer Lyudmila Telen article: "Deferred Payments"]

[Text] Contrary to forecasts, Mikhail Gorbachev kept all his titles in last week's political battles. This time his opponents were left empty-handed. Just what tipped the balance in Gorbachev's favor? Apart from behind-the-scenes maneuvering, deals, and treachery in the corridors of party power, it was undoubtedly the joint statement by the leaders of the nine republics. This was the only fresh evidence that the president's policy could still be fruitful.

Through this move Gorbachev reaffirmed his reputation as a flexible tactician with no equal even among his experienced "party comrades." This conclusion is all the more obvious following the Central Committee plenum. Gorbachev's strategic gain is not obvious. Will the joint statement strengthen his authority in the future or, on the contrary, will it become grounds for another round of trades between different political forces?

The situation worked against Gorbachev. What achievements could the president and general secretary show his Central Committee? The miners' strikes? The rampant disobedience in Belorussia? An independent Georgia?

It seems that the president initially intended to enhance his reputation with the anticrisis program. In style and substance it was wholly in line with our leader's tastes and political manner. On the one hand, it proclaimed a radical transition to the market; on the other hand, it reconciled all kinds of excesses to this idea. In addition, it prudently kept quiet about specific market mechanisms. It was thus obviously counting on support from different political flanks.

However, it seems that the president initially overestimated his premier's authority. What kind of a program actually was it when strikers around the country united under the slogan: "Pavlov Cabinet—Resign"? Or when the premier was mercilessly berated even by "his own people" in grassroots party organizations? Not to mention Pavlov's "popularity" among people having to stand in line... The listless discussion of the Pavlov program at the Union Supreme Soviet was a clear

reflection not of the document's quality but of the lack of any real interest in it. People did not believe in the republics' goodwill or the realistic nature of their intentions. Ultimately, they did not believe in the premier himself. On the other hand, the president had had his fill of listening to orthodox Marxists. And he saw for himself the republics' insulting lack of interest: Among their top figures only Nazarbayev turned up at the session, the rest were represented at best by parliamentary committee chairmen.

The following story is circulating in the corridors of parliament: Three ministers—Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo—gave the president an ultimatum on behalf of their colleagues: Either the president takes resolute steps, or such steps will be taken without him...

It was necessary to win the support of the republic authorities. One can only surmise by what means all nine "signatories," including Yeltsin, were lured to the Kremlin and dispatched to Novo-Ogarevo.

Did Gorbachev openly tell them that he was threatening to resign? Did he outline in gloomy terms the inevitable prospects if this were to happen? Did he promise to be fairer to the republics in the future? One way or another, when threatened with a coup by the apparatus everyone became amenable, but, it seems, in only one sense: to composing the document in such a way that it would commit nobody to anything in the future.

Just what does observance of "existing laws" actually mean—Union laws or republic laws? Or the signing of the Union Treaty by "sovereign states"—does that include the Russian autonomous entities or not? Or what about the reference to anticrisis measures? If that means the Pavlov program, why not say so directly? Whichever word you light upon is an enigma, whichever formula you pick allows for two interpretations...

Nonetheless, everything falls into place if you recognize that the statement is not a real plan of action but a lifeline thrown to the president by the republic leaders when the going was tough. And it seems that the aim has been achieved with the minimum of losses.

Only two of the signatories made substantial sacrifices for the sake of agreement. But these two were Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Judging by everything, the joint statement forces both of them to change their political stamp [pocherk] to a certain extent.

Boris Yeltsin appears to have foregone his main trump card in his battle with the center—the support of the workers' movement. The appeal to the strikers he made with the president will possibly be seen by the most radical of them as a "stab in the back." And this on the eve of the Russian presidential elections. What lies behind this concession of Yeltsin's? An even greater concession to him from Gorbachev? Will Yeltsin now be able to explain himself to the miners without losing anything?

Gorbachev also made a sacrifice. He will probably have to pay for the service done him at a critical juncture not only by Yeltsin but by the other republic leaders. But in the shape of what compromises? Will he be fair to the republics in the long-term? Will he resist the temptation to interpret the joint statement to the center's benefit again?

Thus, so far the joint statement is full of doubts and queries. And that is why it holds out the prospect of a new surge of political activity rather than any falling off.

The hopes of left-wingers that Gorbachev would break with the party apparatus were not borne out. The right-wingers' plans failed. But even the president failed to achieve a stable, much less a long-term, success. He merely won a deferral of the most immediate payments falling due. Not on his obligations to his party—as some might think—but primarily on his obligations to his country.

So just how will the president use this breathing space?

Yelena Bonner Speaks on Sakharov Anniversary

LD2105213291 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1400 GMT 21 May 91

[Address by Yelena Bonner to international congress commemorating the 70th birth anniversary of Andrey Sakharov in Moscow Concert Hall on 21 May—live]

[Excerpts] Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov would have been 70 years old today. The anniversary falls at a difficult time for the country of which Sakharov was a citizen, not only by right of birth but by the bitter right of lying in its soil. But he was also a citizen of the whole world—by right of his love for it and by right of his unswerving struggle for peace upon it. In our super-militarized power he was the only scientist who defended peace for the whole planet with a high level of professionalism and absolute courage, quite apart from the interests of individual parties, groups and departments or of one state system. In an equally unbending way Sakharov defended the person, the individual, the right to hold one's own convictions, the right to one's own life, the right to one's own freedom and simply the right to happiness. [passage omitted]

The first international congress "Peace, progress and human rights," dedicated to the memory of Andrey Sakharov is declared open. It was conceived and is being held absolutely independently of any state structures and government bodies of the USSR and other countries. The main resources for holding it were received from the independent publishing houses of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and OGONEK, and the main foreign currency contribution was made by the Alitalia air company and the federation of American trade unions. And as a result of hard work over an 18-month period by four people in the USSR, one person in Italy, and two in the United States we have been able to meet here in this hall today.

What is the idea of the congress, besides paying tribute to the memory of one who has gone? We want to repeat collectively what was done by Sakharov on his own for any years running, to talk in a professional and truthful way about the most acute problems of the present day. But talking is but a part of the matter. We want to be heard by those people upon whom depends the resolution of the problems that have been raised, and heard not afterwards, as was the case with Sakharov, not 10 or 20 years later, but heard today.

Into one congress it is impossible to fit everything that ails the present world. We have chosen two working topics. Chernobyl, past, present and future; and the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe on the road from totalitarianism to the law-governed state. Outwardly far removed from each others, these subjects are linked by Sakharov himself, the public figure and the scientist.

Sakharov the scientist was not only the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb; there is a journalistic cliche, it is one-sided and it is now time it was forgotten. Sakharov was a pioneer in the field of theoretical work on the peaceful use of thermonuclear energy. And Sakharov was a convinced supporter of the development of nuclear power generation, believing that it would make it possible to raise living standards for all people living on earth, not to lowering living standards in the wealthy countries but to raise those in poor ones. [passage omitted]

The second topic, which seemed to have been precisely formulated a year and a half ago, gradually began to give rise to doubts. Questions arose. Are we on the road from totalitarianism to the law-governed state? Are we not marking time? Have we not turned backwards? The landmarks of this transformation are well known: The indirect election of the president; the first and subsequent additional powers for him and the simultaneous process of the disintegration of the union; the blockade of Lithuania in response to the legal, constitutional, declaration of independence; main directions, instead of an economic program; the first draft of a Union treaty which in essence completely rejected the sovereignty of the republics; the subsequent draft which was somewhat touched up—which draft is under discussion today we do not know. It has not been published. And the decree on the protection of property, which turned into the protection of party property; the order on joint patrolling; and that quiet privatization by the apparatus and nomenklatura, privatization not to the people, but from the people. And finally the last thing: the recent agreement signed by the leaders of nine republics and the president. It has been received as a document which opens up some kind of road ahead, albeit not an absolutely shining one. It has been received as appeasement in the battle which in the mass consciousness became expressed in the formula: Gorbachev or Yeltsin? But in essence what is taking place is a struggle that is far from over between the former republics and the center of the former Soviet Union. The republics are fighting for real independence and this is a progressive process, the creation of sovereign states in the place of the imperial, totalitarian one under whose oppression our peoples existed for 73 years. And the fact that regimes that are far from democratic are capable of coming into being at the same time—as has happened in Georgia—is the result of the actions of the center; in the case in question it is the direct result of the work done with spades and gases in Tbilisi.

Let me return to the nine plus one agreement. Its assessment of the strike movement has an anti-worker slant, and its motive of most favored status for the republics that have signed the agreement puts one seriously on one's guard. The bloody events in Karabakh, which followed immediately after it was signed, are a direct indication of the consequences that republics which have not signed the agreement can expect. Once again, as was the case in January after Vilnius and Riga, the question is in the air: Who is next? Moldova? The Baltic republics for a second time? Georgia, where Ossetia is already ablaze?

Today Russia awaits the election of its president. Earlier we waited for the referendum and for congresses in their turn. We waited for laws to ease our life. We waited for a long time for the price rises. We got them, with the removal of the 100-ruble notes as a preliminary. We do not know what we will be invited to wait for after 12 June. They intimidate us with the threat of famine and civil war. But this is in a country where there is already a semi-famine for the greater part of the population. And war is already taking place, though it is not civil war but a war between the old Stalinist structures and the new ones which are hardly born. The old in its death agonies defends its own power, but the bosses of the party that is in its death agonies defend their own property, their own, separate from the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the party here is called communist. The result of defending the property is blood. In Baku and Tbilisi they spilled blood in defending the Central Committee. In the Baltic republics they were defending party property. The blood of Karabakh is a response to the independence of Armenia and the nationalization of party and Komsomol property.

Until the party hands over—until the party itself hands over everything, right down to the last threat, right down to the last wooden ruble, or Pavlov ruble, to use today's parlance, to the people who worked for it—Stalinism will triumph and it will triumph until we pass through the period of true sovereignties. It is time to clearly say that sovereign states can only unite into a confederation, that our future, if we want a free future, is a confederation and all talk about a federation, whether renewed or of the old type, is a fiction. Why were fascist states not as stable as totalitarian ones? An element of the sovereign—private property—always remained within them. While the essence of democracy is a parade of sovereignties—the sovereignty of the individual, the sovereignty of the family, the sovereignty of one's own home, the sovereignty of one's enterprise, be it large or small, the

sovereignty of any national community, the sovereignty of the people, and finally the sovereignty of the state.

They suggest to us that the world tendency, particularly in Europe, is striving for unification. That is true, but it follows decades of freedom, it comes after the first world war. The struggle for sovereignty is taking place not just in our own country, it is taking place throughout the whole of East Europe, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia: It is the retribution for decades when freedom was absent.

Such are the times and such is the country in whose capital the coordinators and experts of the congress are going to have to answer questions placed before them by the subject: the USSR and the countries of East Europe on the road from totalitarianism to the law-governed state.

So what then—has nothing happened over the past six years? Things have happened, and perhaps the most important thing of all, a change in the public consciousness. Just as one cannot stop a river with the palm of one's hand there is nothing—and this includes the Army, the special purpose militia detachments, famine, and even war—that can halt the process of the emergence of the new society, although they can apply the brake and make it into a bloody one, which essentially is what is already taking place. But they are not going to be able to plunge the country into total fear once again. This is understood perfectly well by those who hold power in their hands. And it has therefore become possible, after six years, for us to meet in this hall on the 70th anniversary of Andrey Sakharov.

Many of foreign guests took an active part in the public movement for the defense of human rights and in the worldwide Sakharov defense campaign. To them and their comrades-in-arms in all countries we express our sincere gratitude for their support and defence of Sakharov during the difficult years. As a result of their efforts, Sakharov got his freedom for the last three years of his life, during which he taught many people in our country how to distinguish between falsehood and truth and helped them to rid themselves of fear and to regain faith in themselves and faith in the person.

The majority of those here present did not know Sakharov personally. Far from all of them were fellow-thinkers of his. Very few of them were his friends. We are united by the fact that we were all his comtemporaries, the contemporaries of a man whose destiny drew the attention of many people throughout the world in different ways, turning some into well-wishers, in others evoking hatred. It also draws the attention of people today, but often in a speculative fashion, and for some reason this process has delivered a painful blow at our country and particularly at its democratic wing. Those who turned up on the scene after the call to Gorkiy by Mikahil Sergeyevich Gorbachev—please do not call yourselves friends of Sakharov. You never were Sakharov's comrades-in-arms and you still have to complete your own journey to a real democratic awareness. I am amhamed for you in front of people sitting in this hall who came to the house under indefatigable round-the-clock surveillance by the KGB, who made their way to Gorkiy, who mortaged their own houses in the United States in order to collect money for the Sakharov defence campaign. I am ashamed that public figures who call themselves democrats have bcome basic speculators. Build up your own authority with your destiny!

I am grateful to Mario Soares, the president of Portugal. The fourth Sakharov hearings took place under his patronage in Lisbon in 1983, and he was the first head of state who at the very beginning of our efforts for this congress accepted my invitation and thereby insired hope taht something would come of our venture.

I thank Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia. The year 1968 became the starting point for those whom it is usual to call dissidents in this country. Seven people went onto Red Square at the time carrying the slogan: For your freedom and ours.

And genuine dissident glasnost dates from that year—the Chronicle of Current Events began to come out. MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI, ARGUMENTY, OGONEK, NEZAVISIMYA and other independent publications, you must acknowledge the debt of gratitude you owe to the publishers of the Chronicle, living and dead, for it taught you to speak the truth.

All the members of the movement in defense rights saw in their Czech and Slovak friends an example of courage and fortittude, and I am happy to repeat here, in the present of Pan Alexander [Dubcek]: For your freedom, and ours! [applause]

I thank Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the USSR [as heard] Supreme Soviet, who accepted our invitation to come here today. I do not know whether they have arrived: I have not seen them yet. [camera shows Gorbachev in his box, Yeltsin in the audience] Oh, excuse me! [applause]

Their presence at this genuinely democratic meeting will undoubtedly promote success in our work, widening the circle of people who will show an interest in our documents and will respond to the recommendations of the congress. I think that part of the recommendations will be addressed to them. The working part of the congress will start tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Friends, Associates Remember Andrey Sakharov

LD2105212191 Moscow TASS in English 2049 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—[Words indistinct] the congress's recommendations, especially as some of these recommendations will be addressed to the leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia.

Academician Leonid Keldysh spoke about Sakharov's great contribution to science, the range of his research

interests, the combination of two gifts in Andrey Sakharov—that of a theoretician and that of an inventor.

Andrey Sakharov's close friend and colleague from the United States, Sidney Drell, stressed the role Sakharov played in the struggle for strengthening international security. The signing by the Soviet and U.S. leaders of a strategic arms reduction treaty in the year of Sakharov's seventieth birth anniversary would be a fine tribute to the memory of Andrey Sakharov, the American scientist stressed.

On behalf of the Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel greetings and best wishes for success were conveyed to participants in the congress by chainman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly Alexander Dubcek. The congress was also addressed by one of the activists of the dissident movement in the USSR Yuriy Orlov, now a U.S. citizen.

The opening ceremony ended in a charitable concert commemorating Andrey Sakharov.

Internal Affairs' Gromov Interviewed

LD1805221191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1215 GMT 18 May 91

[Interview with Colonel General B.V. Gromov, first deputy minister of internal affairs, by Igor Fesunenko on the "Who's Who?" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Fesunenko] Hello, dear friends. This is "Who's Who" on the air again. As you know, this is the program in which we acquaint you with prominent Soviet state, political, and public figures. [passage omitted] Our guest in the studio today is Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union and USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs. Welcome, Boris Vsevolodovich.

[Gromov] Thank you.

[Fesunenko] [passage omitted: After some personal background material, Fesunenko asks Gromov for his thoughts about Afghanistan]

[Gromov] There is an expression: My soul aches for Afghanistan. I think that whoever said that put it exactly right, and whatever we are doing now, including me—both when I was in the Army as commander of the Kiev district troops, and now here—all the time you keep comparing what you are doing with what happened there in Afghanistan. Why? Because Afghanistan brought—I am not afraid to use this word—purity to my soul. Purity in my attitude to people, first of all. So what the comrade from Lutsk asks, I think his question is right: Of course I feel nostalgia.

About the second question, whether I feel guilty for people being killed in Afghanistan, I think this question first has not been asked in the right way. Second, you know, when a commander of whatever rank is organizing combat action, of course the first question in his head is to make sure people are not killed. But of course people died, there were losses, but at that time and in that war, losses during specific combat actions depended on particular causes. But bearing in mind that at all times and in all places I set myself the task of keeping people from being killed—that was the main aim of my life there—I do not feel guilty in any way.

[Fesunenko] Inna Viktorovna Patriyenko from Maykop has just phoned in this question: What is the state of affairs with our advisers in Afghanistan—presumably she means military advisers—and why are they there after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops?

[Gromov] Well, they are there because, first, we have a bilateral treaty with Afghanistan, and this bilateral treaty has remained in force. It provides, among other things, for the presence of military adivisers there. Second, I must say that the number of military advisers is small. They help in things like organizing troop training—Afghan troops, I mean—passing on our experience, and other things.

[Fesuneko] Does it not seem to you that in recent years the application, deployment, and use of our military advisers in a whole number of countries, developing countries, was not always justified? Take Iraq. I do not know, did they prepare it for war, so to speak: was it justified, what do you think?

[Gromov] Well, I would put it like this. In general, of course, we, as a mighty and great country, including and primarily in the military respect, probably could not ignore the fact that we were simply bound to help other countries, and we have always done this. But this aid was expressed in different ways. In the case in question, if the question of military advisers and specialists has arisen, then clearly, at that time it was probably difficult to anticipate that such a man as Saddam Husayn might come along who would turn the army, for which our specialists were working—not advisers, but specialists—who would turn the army against a small neighboring state, and in the end would turn this army against his own people. I think, of course, this is wrong, but at the same time I think that this should not in any event affect our advisers. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] There are very many questions—they came in yesterday and are still coming in—as it has recently become customary to say, on interethnic relations. Here is one specific question, from Comrade Mevzayan in Armenia. On 9 April 1991 you were in Karabakh. Why did you go there, and why did you refuse to meet journalists?

[Gromov] Well, it is well known that in Karabakh the situation has been tense for several years. It will soon be the fourth year since the situation there became deadlocked, and in general some kind of decisions have to be made there. It was precisely with this aim in mind that I went there to find out what was to be done, what was to be undertaken, so as, at least, to stabilize the situation so that people would not be killed there. We met many

categories of people in Karabakh, but I had no plans to meet journalists, as time was limited on the one hand, and on the other—and may the comrade journalists forgive me—I understand that if you are going to have a meeting with journalists you need a minimum of three hours for certain.

[Fesunenko] You simply had no time?

[Gromov] Yes, I simply had no plans to meet journalists.

[passage omitted: Fesunenko reads several questions on Georgia]

[Gromov] In the first place I have to say that all interethnic relations should, in my view, take as their premise that the small peoples of our country—for example, the people of South Ossetia—should be regarded in about the same way as the story of living organisms entered in the Red Book, or something like that. How long will the slaughter last there, as the comrade asks in his question. It is difficult to say; everything depends on the resolve of the people who, so to speak, have an influence on the situation. I have in mind, primarily, the leadership of Georgia. In general, the issue there is such that, on the one hand, the leadership of Georgia thinks that they are right, and on the other hand, the leadership of South Ossetia think that they are right. If both these leaderships cast aside their arrogance, all kinds of territorial claims, various wrongs, and so on, then this question could be resolved in the very near future. I do not see any major problems there that might place a barrier in front of the resolution of this problem. The most terrible thing is that as a result of, well, not arrogance—how could I put it most simply, clearly: incorrect decisions by the leadership of one or another people—in the final analysis, it is the ordinary people that suffer. That is where the most terrible tragedy lies.

[Fesunenko] Briefly, what does the policy of the center, the policy of Moscow, the policy of the department which you head with Pugo, boil down to?

[Gromov] It boils down to this: that it is only by political methods that these problems can be resolved. There can be no other way. You will not resolve them by military methods; it will be even worse. If you tackle the problem by introducing the Georgian militia there, or some other militia, it will only get worse. That is, this is an extremely delicate matter, and it requires an extremely delicate attitude.

[Fesunenko] You have spoken quite correctly of how painful this question is, how it has indeed brought everything to the surface in people. This is borne out by the questions that are coming in, and moreover, quite often, bitter questions and, I would say, monstrously unfair. For example, Valentina Ivanovna Fakhnovich from Yerevan asks you: Why is it that you, as deputy minister, hate Karabakh and the Armenians? Why do you allow what has been going on there? Or Roza Petrovna Golubeva from Kaliningrad: Why is it that only Armenian gunmen are destroyed, and only the Armenian civilian population that are killed? Again, some kind of bias, but you see the accusations that are being made against you. And Nikolayevna Smirnova has just sent a short question which presupposes a brief answer. Returning to [words indistinct] Nagorno-Karabakh, she accuses you of meeting with the Azerbaijanis and ignoring the Armenian side. Why?

[Gromov] I would put it this way: It is difficult for this woman, at such a great distance, to decide such questions for me: Whether or not I hate some people, in this case those of Armenia, or Karabakh. If I hated the Karabakh people, or rather, the people living in Karabakh, I would not be likely to go there or make decisions which have been directed only toward stabilizing the situation.

[Fesunenko] And here are two questions in one: Valentina Ivanovna Smirnova from Baku has just sent a question by telephone, and also Tamara Kharenovna Fomundzhera, from Moscow: How do you feel—but the questions are in principle on the same subject—about the fact that they have now begun evicting the Armenian population from the lands where they have lived not for decades, but for centuries? And she writes that in charge of this, by the way, is the Afghan, Polinichko. Smirnova also asks about the eviction of the Armenians.

[Gromov] Well, the question connected with eviction is, as we understand and know, an anticonstitutional question: The solving of such a question by such methods. I cannot say exactly what is being decided there, as she asks, by Comrade Polinichko, because these are local issues, but I think that in any case the fact that we have the current statistics—they indicate that people living in the regions where there are interethnic conflicts, the hotspots, are tired of living there because of the constant shooting, because of the constant attacks, cattle rustling, and ultimately the deaths sometimes of people, or wounding—and they are themselves making the decision and asking to be sent either to relatives in other regions or to the original territory of their ancestors, where they live. In other words, as far as I know, all this is happening at the request of the inhabitants themselves.

[Fesunenko] Nikolayevna Smirnova has just sent a short question which presupposes a brief answer. Returning to your [word indistinct] Karabakh, she asserts that you met with Azerbaijanis and ignored the Armenian side: Why?

[Gromov, chuckling] I have already answered that question. To learn the situation, you must, after all, meet an enormous number of people. The main purpose of my itinerary was to meet the organizational committee of Nagorno-Karabakh. Unfortunately, I did not have time for more. I think that on my next visit we will certainly also meet the comrades who live in Stepanakert itself.

[Fesunenko] A further mass of questions has come in, and they are not about Karabakh and not just about the Trans-Caucasus.

People are also worried—and this is understandable and natural—by the situation in the Baltic region, too. There are mutually incompatible points of view of the situation in Lithuania. For example, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Veretenik from Leningrad asks: How long will OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] hold the television tower and other premises in the capital of Lithuania? Explain the legality of these actions. What is your attitude to everything that has happened there? At the same time you can reply to a question from Boris Yakovlevich Zimon, a retiree from Mocow. He simply asks to be told exactly what OMON units are, what are their precise tasks, to whom are they subordinate, and so on.

[Gromov] Well, about Vilnius: Are the presence of our internal troop units there and the actions of OMON legal or illegal? I think that there has already been so much discussion of this, so much has been written, and so much more has been said that this makes it unnecessary for me to give a more expansive reply.

[Fesunenko] Tell us your attitude.

[Gromov] I will say briefly that if there was no legal basis for the presence of our units there, then evidently they would not be there. Second, I should make it clear that the television tower and the other premises are not being held by the Vilnius OMON, but are being held by units of our internal troops in accordance with the fact that these premises do not belong to Lithuania Television. The actions of our troops are paid for by the appropriate bodies.

[Fesunenko] What bodies?

[Gromov] Well, I mean those who are paying, in this case the Lithuanian television center, for example. These days it is simply impossible to protect it without pay. This is all on a contractual basis. Therefore, the appropriate payments are being made, in accordance with the existing laws.

Now, with regard to the second question you have there.

[Fesunenko] What is OMON, and to whom is it subordinated?

[Gromov] In our country, in accordance with the decision of the USSR minister of internal affairs and the collegium, OMON was set up. Today there are in the country 30 such OMON's with a total strength of about 8,000 personnel.

[Fesunenko] Let us explain immediately that OMON stands for Special Purpose Militia Detachment.

[Gromov] Yes, a special purpose militia detachment. Well, the very concept, the very name indicates the purpose of this detachment. This detachment is mainly intended, if mass measures are held—demonstrations, rallies, all sorts of actions—to ensure the protection of the population while these actions are being held. That is the main task of the OMON units. These OMON detachments have been set up on a legal basis, and, as I have already said, there are 30 of them in the country now, and they carry out their tasks in strict accordance with orders from the USSR minister of internal affairs. There are regulations governing these OMON detachments. There are specific tasks they fulfill. And, overall, they do not deviate from fulfillment of these tasks.

[Fesunenko] Boris Vsevolodovich, when you speak of strict fulfillment of tasks ordered by the minister, and so on, and say that they do not deviate from these tasks, do you include in that the Vilnius OMON, which was so splendidly portrayed by my colleague Nevzorov in a certain well-known program?

[Gromov] I am including the Vilnius OMON, because the situation with the Vilnius OMON is altogether very complicated, since it was set up in the first place by a decision from the USSR minister of internal affairs and the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Vilnius. So it answered above all to the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, of course. But as a result of certain well-known events there—including events connected with certain instances of discrimination against those who served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were loyal to their oath—as a result of a certain attitude that was adopted toward them, certain negative elements, to put it mildly, appeared in the activity both of the present Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, naturally, as a response, of the OMON of the city of Vilnius.

[Fesunenko] Excuse me, just as you were replying, I was handed a question from Irina Petrovna Bubrina from Voronezh: I would like to know your view of Nevzorov's reports from Lithuania, your attitude to him as a journalist.

[Gromov] My opinion of Nevzorov is not a bad one. I do not share all of Nevzorov's views. But I am profoundly convinced that he is a very talented journalist, very talented, and I think that he gets it right on many things.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. And to finish with the Baltic issue, a question from a collective has come in; it was sent to the reception room of one of our leaders. It was sent in by the staff of the bodies of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic who remain loyal to the oath of Soviet militia. This is how the question has been signed. It says that at present a split has taken place in the bodies of the Lithuanian Internal Affairs Ministry. Repressive structures of the police are being formed. The staff of the Directorate of Internal Affairs are forced into taking Lithuanian citizenship and to take an oath of allegiance to the separatist regime of Landsbergis. The majority of the staff of the Internal Affairs bodies remain loyal to the oath given to the Soviet militia, and refuse to take an oath to the new regime—this means to Landsbergis. These people are subjected to harassment—they are being fired.

The question is: How do you, Boris Vsevolodovich, as deputy minister of internal affairs, see the social and legal protection of such people?

[Gromov] A large and known commission set up by the president on Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is working. In this instance, the commision working in Lithuania to solve all the problems—or, let's put it this way, disputed issues—includes Comrade Demidov, a USSR internal affairs deputy minister. I would put it this way: The question that they have sent in is also a delicate one. On the one hand, one understands that people who are loyal to the oath, who are loyal to Soviet power—they should, so to speak, naturally, be able to find support and someone to lean on. At the same time, Lithuania has a legitimate power which also makes the relevant decisions. Yet, according to our laws, they are making decisions on the setting up of illegal formations.

[Fesenunko] That is, whether we like Landsbergis or not—by the way, he has been a guest of our program—but he is a legitimate, elected head of the sovereign Lithuanian state. Am I right?

[Gromov] A legitimate one, a legitimate one.

[Fesunenko] On the other hand...

[Gromov] On the other hand he makes illegal decisions, according to union legislation, such as a decision on the creation of a department for the defense of the country. They are arming it and this is illegal.

[Fesunenko] This is prohibited by a presidential decree.

[Gromov] Yes, this has been prohibited by the president's decree. So, two parallel structures have come into existence, and these are two armed parallel structures. And since this is the case, that means this may lead to...

[Fesunenko interrupts] I am sorry, but I think they are not just parallel, they are confronting each other.

[Gromov] Well, yes, you are right—they exist in parallel and confront each other. Since this is the case, all this may lead to very large and serious consequences. That is why what I want to say is that the commission working there now—our governmental and union commission, and that of Lithuania—I think they will find a proper solution to the issue which will not hurt one side or the other.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, let us hope this happens.

[Gromov] Yes, let us hope.

[Fesunenko] And here is a complex philosophical and political question. Viktor Aleskandrovich Voronin, a reserve officer from Orel, sent in a question yesterday by telephone: Do you, Boris Vsevolodovich, understand the depth of the danger for the Russian people, in a danger which is coming from a heavy Zionist political superstructure in our society? At the same time, do you take into account the sad experience of the Russian military and civil intelligentsia, which perished from a genocide organized by Trotskyism and Zionism beginning in January 1918?

[Gromov] Well, I would like to note that every person can have his own opinion, including one on the heavily Zionist superstructure of society. Presumably he has his own data on this matter, his own, as is said, private detectives who know more than we do. This is all I have to say to him.

[Fesunenko] That is, you do not see any terrible disaster hanging over the country from the heavily Zionist superstructure in our society?

[Gromov] I think it is not only impolite to speak on such a matter, but this subject probably should not be discussed.

[Fesunenko] Very well. Then here is an easier, simpler question. The comrades have already seen the video compiled by our correspondents at the beginning of this edition, and Viktor Andreyevich Perov asks why Boris Vsevolodovich still reads the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY? Presumably, this compromises you in the eyes of Comrade Perov.

[Gromov] What is interesting about today? And not only today, but also that period which was begun by perestroyka? The interesting thing is that a pluralism of opinions presupposes that on the other side of the coin there is an opinion expressed by one or another person, on his or her views, on his or her inclinations, on his or her sympathies and antipathies.

[Fesunenko] Yes.

[Gromov] Well, if he does not like ARGUMENTY I FAKTY he does not have to read it. But this does not mean that I should not read it. I find ARGUMENTY I FAKTY interesting. Maybe I do not agree with what they write, but I like to read it.

[Fesunenko] I do too. By the way, one cannot escape the fact that it is the most popular Soviet newspaper. It has the largest circulation.

[Gromov] There are also a lot of interesting educational facts in it.

[Fesunenko] You are absolutely right. As we have been speaking about the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, there are some more questions on another newspaper. Esteemed Boris Vsevolodovich, could you please tell us what relations you have with the Ukrainian republican newspaper KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA and what was the outcome of the legal dispute between you and this newspaper? This is asked by Comrade Grigoriy Alekseyevich Lazarenko from Kiev.

[Gromov] Yes, there actually was, if one can put it this way, a legal dispute with this newspaper. Generally speaking I always enjoyed very good relations with this

newspaper. And I am grateful to the staff of this newspaper who arrived together with many other people at the bridge in Termez on 15 February and met me there. So we did have good relations but at a certain time an article written by Martirosyan, a people's deputy, appeared in the newspaper in which I as well as two other people was accused of preparing and participating in a military coup. After all, this is their opinion. But the thing is, the repeated mention of preparation and participation in a military coup which included me led me to think an end should be put to this, taking into account the cultural level of the person and, after all, respect toward people. But on the other hand, one must probably answer for everything you write and for everything you say.

[Fesunenko] In any case, to finish this subject, you are not preparing a coup?

[Gromov] No, we are not preparing a coup.

[Fesunenko] So the comrades who thought about that can sleep in peace.

[Gromov] Yes, they can sleep in peace.

[Fesunenko] But in general, do you believe there is any danger of a coup or not?

[Gromov] I think that in our country, at today's level of development, this is not a possibility even if there are people who would like to carry out such a coup. [passage omitted: Gromov describes what led to his being made Hero of the Soviet Union]

[Fesunenko] We really had finished what we can call the subject of Azerbaijan-Armenia-Karabakh, but literally this second question has come in from Samvelo Ramich from (?Okiyan), who asks that we return to it, and begs to ask this question: Azeri OMON men have taken nine senior officers of the Armenian militia. What is happening to them? After all, they are prisoners. He really wants an answer. Do you know anything about the fate of these people?

[Gromov] We get a lot of questions about the militia and about Armenian people in general who have been detained there. Not hostages, but detainees. We have already answered, and I want to repeat again, that the USSR Procuracy has started criminal proceedings against all of those detained there, especially recently. So, where are they? Well, of course they are either in Baku, or (?somewhere in the rayon), perhaps in Moscow now. I can not say definitely.

[Fesunenko] So this is all a matter for the investigation bodies?

[Gromov] No, it is a matter for the USSR Procuracy. It is not the investigative directorate of the USSR Minstry of Internal Affairs.

[Fesunenko] The Procuracy.

[Gromov] The Procuracy. And then I must say that for almost all the names we have given the relatives an answer. Lots of them have been in Moscow, including at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Fesunenko] A personal question, but since it is asked by a student at the political college I could not leave it out. Esteemed Boris Vsevolodovich, why have you come to meet viewers in civilian clothes and not in military uniform? This is from Vladimir Vladimirovich Ivanov from Moscow.

[Gromov] You see, work in the system of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs permits me to wear either military uniform or civilian dress, but since basically my work is connected with civilian, departmental, and other things, it is simply more convenient for me to go to work like this.

[Fesunenko] Well, that is your right. Now Aleksandr Sukov, or Sukhov—it is not very clear—who is in the Army, asks this: Why has the professional Army General Gromov, a professional soldier, exchanged his profession for a job in the internal services? Why is this? Why has a professional army man gone to the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Gromov] Well, I went because, first, there was a decision, or rather a decree by the president. I can tell everyone that for me this decree came as a surprise. It was the most complete suprise. Indeed, the last six months have been nothing but suprises in my life. One of the first was this one. But since such a decision had been made, evidently they considered it necessary for me to enter this system. Perhaps I can be of more use here.

[Fesunenko] Boris Vsevolodovich, there is a mass of questions, submitted yesterday and today, a whole pile of them, as you see. [passage omitted]

How do you view your being nominated as a candidate for Russian president? And so on, variations. Do you agree? Do you intend to give your agreement, and so on and so forth. This is a lively, burning theme. This is the only thing being talked about. There is a mass of possible candidates, probable ones, and even improbable ones—let us be honest. So, nevertheless, what is your attitude toward this problem?

[Gromov] Well, in the first place, thank you for this question, and second, making use of this opportunity I want to reply that indeed I received many proposals; many telegrams arrived requesting that I be a candidate for president. I am eternally grateful. I have collected by now the necessary number of signatures—114,000—but having balanced the pros and cons, and experience and the situation and so on, I agreed at the request of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov to be a candidate for Russian vice president together with him.

[Fesunenko] This is the first time that you are announcing this officially?

[Gromov] Yes, this is the first time that I have talked about this.

[Fesunenko] Well, comrades, here is probably the first sensation in our program. For the first time we have found out from the horse's mouth, from Boris Vsevolodovich, about this decision. We thank him for making it public, for reporting his decision to the country on our program.

I dare wish you on our behalf, on behalf of the program, of course on behalf of the viewer, success in your election campaign, the electoral struggle alongside Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Maybe in this regard you will say a few words on what you are going in with, what you are throwing yourself into this election fight with, what ideas and wishes you have.

[Gromov] Yes, the fight will really be fierce and long. But the most important thing is to compose and have a program. It is necessary to proceed from the actual state of affairs, that is, what we have today—and also to look a little into the future. Nikolay Ivanovich and I are, of course, still working out our program, and we will have a joint program. But with regard to myself, well in my program, I envision issues connected to prices, the stabilization of prices, the fixing of these prices, the reduction of prices on socially important products such as bread, milk, potatoes, maybe even by increasing the prices of goods which are in greater demand.

In my program I envision issues connected to privatization, although I am not completely in agreement with what our government program contains today. If they have to set the task of implementing this privatization in a strictly defined schedule, for example by the end of this year, then evidently from my point of view this is not completely realistic. It is not possible that some average factory which will be acquired by some kind of owner—this means that it will come down to workers, engineers, and technical personnel being simply not thrown out onto the street, but something like this. Maybe, without rushing to define my position, reprofiling somehow—in short, let people find their position on privatization.

The housing issue as well; the main aim in the end is to have your own apartment, your own house. We speak about priveleges and credits during building, but at the same time we have forgotten to lay a base. The most important thing is that there is no base. There are privileges, credits, but no base. This is an issue.

In my program I envision questions connected to retirees, veterans. Afghan veterans are a special issue. I will not reveal everything, since eventually all this will be published and known. There is the question of women. [passage omitted]

Of course, one of the main sections concerns order, in the broad sense of this word, order concerned with the fight against crime.

[Fesunenko] This ties in completely with your present office. Here is a question that fits in. Valentina Vasilyevna Petrova from Moscow asks: In order to introduce order and defend the Constitution and socialism, decisive measures of physical compulsion are necessary. Do you share such a point of view? This seems to be concerned with the states of emergency, judging from the question.

[Gromov] Well, I think that on the whole we must of course act only in the spirit of the law, since all actions outside the law, including physical pressure—well, we know what this leads to, and the history of our country is a shining witness to this. For this reason I think that in this regard—please excuse me for such a bad word—there is no need to careen from side to side.

Beginning with small things, it is another question to take under control the streets, courtyards, places where there are lots of people—theaters, movie houses, markets—by increasing the number of militiamen, their technical equipment, and everything connected to this. This is right. That is, in this regard there is a lot of work, but this work must be carried out so that our people can walk the streets in the evening, so as to be able to go to those same theaters, or those same movies. [passage omitted: in reply to a question, Gromov says that despite being a soldier all his life, he has had some political experience and is thus able to be a politician]

Perhaps the scale was different, but I was not far removed from politics, and I consider that I have experience too. I know our country and many of its regions—the Baltics, and center of Russia and the south of Russia, and the south of the whole of the Soviet Union.

[Fesunenko] You were there in the army?

[Gromov] Yes, I served there, which means I had a lot of contacts. I think this can all only help me. [passage omitted containing indistinct words]

[Fesunenko] A few more questions purely about your current professional duties and concerns. Here is Aleksandr Robertovich Bayunov: There is evidently some [word indistinct] pull toward a state of emergency and all sorts of emergency measures and so on. There is a revolutionary situation in the country at the moment. Perhaps there is a case for taking stricter measures against criminal elements?

[Gromov] Well, if that is what he thinks, perhaps it is worth (?listening to), but you know I would like to say this to him: There are an awful lot of proposals. Of course people are worried by this, but here again you can not give in to such a spur-of-the-moment reaction, seeing disorder in the country, seeing some degree of chaos, perhaps, and all the rest, but you must not go rushing off in the other direction, if I may say it like that. Nothing good will come of that. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] There are several questions where the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] is being reproached for

being headed by nonprofessionals. They mean Pugo and you. What do you say to this? Some comrades even charge that we have a rise in crime precisely because the MVD is run by nonprofessionals. This was said by, in particular, Comrade Ivanov of Moscow oblast and also by Boris Igorevich Antonuk: When will the Soviet militia be run by professionals? Why has there been a fourth minister in four years? Will there be a fifth one, and when? This is a burning question. What do you think of this; on professionalism in the MVD?

[Gromov] I would say the following: It goes without saying that professionalism is essential everywhere. But, if one wants to speak about those who head the USSR MVD today, then I would not say they are not professionals. Well, let us imagine such a situation. There are different professionals in the MVD. There are professionals on crime. There are professional investigators; there are professional, so to speak, specialists combating economic crimes; and professional traffic inspectors. That is, they are professionals who are involved in a narrow field of activities. There are no professionals, in the broad sense, in the MVD. Then one can say: Suppose a moment comes and a specialist in crime is to head the USSR MVD. How does one assess him? In heading the USSR MVD, is he a professional in the broad sense, or what? I think that in this case the leader of such a large ministry—maybe even not only the MVD—must be a person who has experience in all spheres of life.

[Fesunenko] [passage omitted] I would also like to ask you what you think of professionalism in the armed forces. Preparing for the program I examined your previous interviews and I noticed some progress, so to speak, some evolution in your views. In an interview with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in 1989 you were categorically against a professional army. But in a year's time, in the December edition of the journal DIALOG, in another interview you had already somewhat changed your opinion, saying that you, in principle, favor a professional army. Do you think we need a professional army or not? And if we do, then when and what will it look like?

[Gromov] All of this is constantly changing according to people's views and approaches, to what is the situation, and the level of development both of the army and of society. But I continue to say on this score that in principle I am not against a professional army. I mean professional in the sense of hired. We already now in fact have professionals—somewhere around 40 percent. But as for a hired—a hired professional army is what I would say—I am not against the idea. But to achieve that requires, first of all, time. In the second place—this is the main thing, I am deeply convinced of this—it is not only the army that has to be ready for such a thing, but the state as well. Because to put the army on professional lines needs money; it needs, in short, an enormous collection of things to be done first at the state level.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, Boris Vsevolodovich, for taking part in our program. [passage omitted]

Economic

CPSU Panel Views Destatization, Privatization

PM2105140991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "To Protect Consumer. From Session of CPSU Central Committee Standing Socioeconomic Commission"]

[Text] A problem on whose solution the transition to a market economy largely depends—destatization of ownership—determined the agenda of a session of the CPSU Central Committee Standing Socioeconomic Commission. It was held 17 May under the chairmanship of V.A. Ivashko, first [as published] deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU's stand on this fundamental question of the shaping of a strong and flexible mixed economy is expressed as promoting in every possible way the creation of favorable conditions for this process, while at the same time striving for the social thrust of the reshaping of ownership. To put it more simply, given the present historical breakdown [slom], the working people's interests must be fully ensured and reliably protected.

This concept formed the basis of the report delivered by Yu.N. Pakhomov, academician-secretary of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, on behalf of the commission's working group, and it could also be traced in the speech of G.G. Melikyan, representative of the Union Cabinet of Ministers. An exceptionally complex, multifaceted, and lengthy process affecting the most important aspects of people's lives was examined in a profound and unbiased manner in the report and in numerous speeches. The debate showed that its participants well understand the tremendous significance of the steps aimed at overcoming state monopolism in the economy.

The following conclusion is also of considerable importance: It is not the employer but the consumer who must become the true leader of the market being created in our country. Only then will it be possible to speak of civilized market relations.

At the same time many people are concerned at the fact that the creation of the legal and methods bases of destatization has been inadmissibly protracted and that a number of the decisions adopted are of a general nature. They do not pay sufficient attention to questions of legal protection and the balanced nature of the economic interests of the state, collectives, and individual citizens, nor have they created mechanisms restricting the concentration of property in the same hands and the penetration of the enterprise sphere by the slick operators of the shadow economy.

Hence the clear expression of the opinion that the state must retain prerogatives in regulating the economy's

development and defining without delay the list of enterprises not liable to reduced state control or privatization. The state must remain the subject of ownership of natural resources. At the same time the state sector in the economy can function on leasehold and shareholding principles and other progressive forms of management.

Citizens' ownership of the means of production should be encouraged within reasonable limits and on a labor basis in those spheres where it is not economically expedient for major state enterprises to function, many commission members believe. This applies, above all, to light industry, the food industry, trade, and the services sphere. The commission supported the idea of the sensible combination of compensated and uncompensated privatization methods. One of the chief issues here is the personal contribution of every working person to the creation of state property.

Proceeding from specific situations in life, the participants in the debate—I.F. Zhilin, general director of the "Minudobreniya" Association (Voronezh Oblast); V.A. Gayvoronskiy, electric welder at the "Azovmash" Production Association; K.A. Nikolayev, foreman at the "Mosstroymekhanizatsiya" Trust; A.I. Yasinskiy, deputy general director for economy of the "Avtovaz" Production Association; N.I. Bekh, president of the "Kamaz" Joint-Stock Company; and O.D. Potreki, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee—supported a point on the expediency of using diverse forms of destatization with due regard for the specific nature of enterprises and the opinion of labor collectives.

After approving the main points of the report and taking into account the course of the discussion, the commission decided to prepare on this basis corresponding materials as a guideline for local party committees with due regard for the adoption of the USSR Law "On the Basic Principles of the Destatization and Privatization of Enterprises."

It was decided to forward the materials and the specific proposals for stepping up control and improving the legal regime of the destatization and privatization process to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Union Cabinet of Ministers.

Information was adopted on a forecast of the state of the national economy through the end of this year.

Some organizational questions were also examined, and the commission's plan of work for the second half-year was approved.

Agriculture

Deputy Prime Minister Notes Decline in Farming

LD2105212391 Moscow TASS in English 2045 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The amount of food produced in the Soviet Union in the first four months of 1991 dwindled by seven percent, Soviet deputy Prime Minister Fedor Sinko told a news conference here today.

Animal farm produce was the worst hit by the decline, especially meat and dairy products.

According to Sinko, the slump was caused by the disruption of economic ties as well as the bad weather during last year's haymaking season.

The anticrisis programme prepared by the cabinet of ministers envisages measures to rectify the situation and ensure the provision of food to the country, Sinko noted.

The main task is to improve the supplies of material and technical resources to the agro-industrial complex. Much attention is given to the improvement of production relations in agriculture through creating small lease collectives and cooperatives within major collective and state farms.

Work is being made to attract foreign investments in the agrarian sector of the Soviet national economy. These investments will be used above all to develop new farm machinery, purchase advanced technologies and build new processing enterprises.

CPSU Commission Discusses Prices, Procurements

914B0166A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 May 91 p 1

[TASS article: "To Restore Parity of Prices: Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy"]

[Text] A meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy chaired by Ye.S. Stroyev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took place on 16 May. There was a comprehensive examination of questions connected with the solution of vitally important problems of the functioning of the agro-industrial complex under conditions of market relations.

V.I. Chernoivanov, USSR minister of agriculture and food goods, gave a report on the state of affairs and measures to ensure parity of prices for agricultural output and the output of other sectors of the country's economy.

In particular, it was stressed that as a result of sudden increases in prices of material and technical resources, increased costs of capital construction, and increases in various deductions from profits, financial and economic conditions for producers of agricultural output have sharply worsened. The implementation of urgent measures to stabilize the food supply to the population and to solve the crisis as well as programs for social development of the countryside are under threat of breaking down entirely.

The discussion was lively and, at times, heated. The following members of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy expressed their opinions: A.S. Kamay, second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee; L.I. Khitrun, first secretary of the Ryazan Obkom [oblast party committee] of the CPSU; S.A. Tereshchenko, first secretary of the Chimkent Obkom of the Kazakh Communist Party; S.A. Osminin, first secretary of the Kirov Obkom of the CPSU; Ye.M. Zolotarev, first secretary of the obkom of the Kazakh Communist Party; V.F. Vilchinskiy, chairman of the Druzhba kolkhoz of Vinnitsa Oblast; Yu.A. Peskov, general director of the Rostselmash production association; A.N. Komin, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices; and V.G. Doroshenko, first secretary of the Kazankovskiy Rayon Party Committee (Nikolayev Oblast) of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

V.I. Shcherbakov and F.P. Senko, deputy prime ministers of the USSR, spoke at the meeting.

The speakers noted that since the beginning of the year the economic situation in the countryside has become much more complicated. To a great degree this is connected with violation of the existing parity of prices. Attention was paid to the need to adopt radical measures to compensate for losses that kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other enterprises of the agricultural sphere have unfairly suffered. At the same time it was considered necessary to work out a mechanism allowing for the support of equivalent exchange through the pricing system as well as compensation for additional expenditures connected with increases in costs of capital construction and in the manufacture of production and technical goods which are not taken into account in the new purchase prices. The proposal was made to form a special fund to support parity of prices.

There was an insistent demand for increased punishment of officials who permit unjustified increases in prices. With the purpose of strengthening supervision, it was recommended that the USSR State Committee for Statistics introduce a system for the quarterly calculation of changes in levels of prices in order to adopt necessary solutions in a timely fashion.

Participants at the meeting also discussed the question of policy for purchasing grain in 1991. M.L. Timoshishin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Purchases of Food Reserves, gave a report.

Administrative command methods for filling state reserves with grain are outdated. Members of the commission were in favor of putting economic stimulation of goods producers at the basis of grain procurements. It was recommended that counter-deliveries of combined fodders for grain be instituted and that price levers be used for increasing purchases of soy, rape, peas, and sunflowers.

Summing up the results of operations, Ye.S. Stroyev noted the exceptional urgency of the questions that had been examined and the importance of their immediate solution for political and socioeconomic support of the peasantry and the labor collectives of agro-industrial production. Restoration of parity of prices is hardly a purely theoretical task. Today it is the most important direction of the party's agrarian policy.

With regard to the questions that had been discussed, the commission gave appropriate instructions to party committees and communist leaders of Union organs.

'Supplements' To Defray Increased Farm Costs

PM1705092791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[V. Konovalov report: "It Costs Them More To Produce Their Own Products: Government Preparing Decision on Establishing Equivalence Between Agriculture and Other Sectors"]

[Text] Persistent rumors have been circulating to the effect that prices for food products are going to be increased yet again. There is no smoke without fire. And this rumor also has a certain basis, although all the evidence suggests that no increase in food retail prices threatens us in the near future. However, changes are inevitable in reciprocal accounting between the manufacturers of food products and their partners.

Intensive work is currently under way on the preparation of a document—which could become a USSR presidential decree or a Cabinet of Ministers resolution—on the establishment of equivalent prices in the relations between agriculture and other sectors. Debates on the subject are continuing virtually on a daily basis between republic and departmental representatives. A draft of the future document already exists, but there is no sense in going over its contents, because amendments are continually being introduced, and participants in this work are still arguing over even the general concept.

One of these participants is B. Poshkus, deputy chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases.

[Poshkus] In recent years there has been a marked movement toward the achievement of parity in pricing between the agrarian sector and other sectors of the economy. An especially important step in this direction was last year's increase in purchase prices for agricultural output. It seemed that possibilities were at last appearing of producing products without making a loss on them. However, this was an extremely short-lived situation. The cost of agricultural material and technical resources began to rise rapidly, and the cost of building and installation work in particular tripled. These increases cost agricultural organizations a sum in excess of 60 billion rubles [R]. In addition to this, the necessity of paying their employees compensation for retail price increases involved kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] in large expenditure. This amounted to a further R22 billion.

Thus it is, estimates show, that the additional costs of agricultural enterprises and organizations not taken into account in the new purchase prices for agricultural output will total more than R80 billion in the current year. Whereas, according to estimates for the current year, profits in agriculture are expected to amount to just R62 billion. This discrepancy places kolkhozes and sovkhozes in a hopeless situation. Urgent measures were needed to rectify the situation prevailing in the agrarian sector. This task was set in the USSR president's decree of 8 April.

[Konovalov] What measures specifically, in your view, could be effective?

[Poshkus] So far we are talking about versions of a future document, which are now being discussed. There is a proposal, in particular, to introduce strict regulation of wholesale prices and tariffs on the industrial output sold to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural organizations: to effect sales of this output this year at fixed prices as they stood on 1 April 1991. At the same time, by way of compensation for additional expenditure occasioned by increased costs of material and technological resources and capital construction, it is proposed to introduce supplements for farms on the proceeds of the sale of their agricultural output. According to estimates, the size of these supplements might amount to as much as 20-30 percent of the proceeds on the sale of the output. It is proposed to introduce these supplements without altering the level of the purchase, wholesale, or retail prices of agricultural output and food. As for expenditure connected with compensating employees, it is proposed that this be recouped from the republics' budget and nonbudget resources.

[Konovalov] Are there other suggestions for solving the problem?

[Poshkus] Perhaps the only suggestion that can be called fundamentally different is for selling prices of agricultural produce to be set free, which would send food retail prices soaring. This is also being discussed in the course of the debate on the future document. But I am absolutely convinced that no one will take this suggestion seriously, because in the present tense situation it is impracticable. So there is no cause to fear increases in retail prices for food products in the near future. [Poshkus ends]

So, all the signs are that yet another attempt is to be made to correct the price imbalance within the framework of the "regulated market," which is light years away from a real market. Can it succeed? Obviously a temporary improvement in the financial situation of the producers of agricultural output is possible with the aid of these measures. But the real market with its own pricing system is inevitable.

Scientific

Object Seen Floating Around Mir

LD2105203291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 21 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The flight of the Soviet-British crew onboard the Mir station is continuing. There are already primary results from the joint work. Not all of them, however, can be unequivocally interpreted. Our correspondent reports:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent P. Orlov] [passage omitted] Yesterday evening, during the late communication session, a strange object was filmed. You can see it, there, at the very center of the screen. [Video shows the Mir station in space and a phosphorescent object hovering around it]

If it is a UFO, so be it. But Musa Manarov, who was filming the craft during docking with the station, has doubts, saying that he saw how that thing was coming off the craft. Of course, there is nothing cheerful in the fact that an object of quite a considerable size is flying around the station, even if it is not a part of the Soyuz cargo craft.

[Orlov] Let us recall that Helen Sharman is the first woman on board the Mir station, something to make seamen envious. Joking aside, it is still not clear what it is that is accompanying the station. [end recording]

Well, we will wait for further reports. The fact is quite interesting indeed, and perhaps, fairly alarming.

Press 'Denied' Coverage Rights for Space Launch

PM2005134391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 91 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[A. Tarasov report: "One Second Fast"]

[Excerpt] This evening the hatch of the Mir orbital station is to open for the most famous woman in Britain.

No, I have not made a slip. This week, at least, Helen Sharman has rightly become a real celebrity in the British Isles.

How can it be otherwise, seeing that each people sends its first cosmonaut beyond the confines of the earth only once in its history? This is for all the future centuries and millennia. I am pleased for the brave and assiduous girl and for proud Britain, which has at last become a space power and caught up with Syria and Afghanistan in this sphere.

And all thanks to the charity of our mighty space sector and its chief firm "Energiya." Why charity?

Judge for yourselves. The money for the "British" flight has, in practice, been shelled out of our own State Bank's pocket. There is not a single British scientific instrument in the program.

Not that I am against this. Do not think that. Just as I was not against the joint "Intercosmos" festivals during the preceding decade of fanfares. In general, I place friendship above profit and pettiness. Let us take everyone without exception for a fast, free ride in our space "troika." Country after country, in turn, just as we began, without haggling.

But then there is no need to strike the pose of those inveterate businessmen and miserly knights who pawn even their own Soviet press. But it is necessary—for the first time in history it was denied an organized flight to the launch. Our esteemed foreign colleagues received all the coverage rights, while our fraternity blinked after their arcraft... If Baykonur were a civilized zone, we would be a little more independent. But it does not feature either on Aeroflot's map or in the schedule, and here you are tied to all sorts of lists—on board, in the bus, in the hotel. If you have not got on, you are no use to anyone.

It is not a matter of petty shop grievances. It is a matter of an inveterate principle: Fend off your own, but bend over backward for foreigners. And total indifference to your own public opinion. We will see where this can lead. [passage omitted]

Study on Chernobyl Shows No Increase in Cancer

AU2105120191 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1055 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] A study by international experts on the Chernobyl reactor disaster has yielded unexpected results. According to this study, there has been no noticeable increase in the incidence of leukemia and other kinds of cancer and no health problems of the population that can be linked to radioactivity. Drinking water and foodstuffs in the area affected by the disaster are reportedly only slightly contaminated. The study, which was carried out under the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was presented in Vienna. However, it is largely based on information provided by the Soviets, which cannot be verified.

Military

New Draft Terms Do Not End Conscription Policy

PM2205084991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Stringer Lieutenant V. Fatigarov: "Changes and Problems. From the Briefing on Innovations in Navy Service"]

[Text] Yesterday in the Soviet Army Central House the USSR Defense Ministry press center held a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on questions concerning active military service in relation to the decisions of the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Participants at the briefing included Major General G. Kashuba, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry press center; Major General V. Nikitin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff administration department; and Captain 1st Rank B. Tsybenko, chief of the Navy General Staff administration department.

Answering journalists' questions, the USSR Defense Ministry representatives noted that work on changing the length of active military service and manning the Army and Navy on a voluntary contract basis has been going on at the Defense Ministry since 1989. This was brought about by the need to introduce a large number of amendments and changes to the Law "On Compulsory Military Service." After all, what we are talking about, for example, is not a mechanical transfer of length of service. There are many problems behind this issue. One of these is the turnover of personnel. In the Navy this will now be 33 percent at a single draft, whereas today it is 20 percent. Of course, this is bound to have a telling effect on the level of training of ships' crews. Already the fall 1990 draft will be serving two years, which will require a stricter approach to the training of young sailors in the Navy's training subunits. A significant broadening and improvement of the Navy's training base is called for, which will entail an increase in Defense Ministry budget appropriations since the state is not allocating extra funds for the planned program to be carried out.

In the initial stages this may reduce the Navy's combat readiness to a certain extent. Meanwhile, carrying out the experiment of manning units with volunteers on a contract basis will help to increase the professionalism of military personnel.

At the same time, it was noted at the briefing, it should not be thought that carrying out this experiment and changing the length of service are going to lead to a full transition to the voluntary principle in manning the Army. Compulsory military service is being retained. Servicemen who have concluded a contract will differ from those serving alongside them by receiving pay and 30 days' furlough on completion of two years' service. If they wish to break the contract, then they must complete their service without higher pay and without their previous service being taken into account.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Plight of Deserters

PM1905143591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Major S. Popov: "There and Back"]

[Excerpts] On 7 March this year a young man arrived at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn and declared himself to be Stanislav Kaminskiy, a deserter from the Western Group of Forces. [passage omitted]

Kaminskiy made no secret of the fact that he deserted deliberately. He gave an interview, making up "horrors" as he went along because they hinted to him: You must pay for the life to which you aspire. Why did he return? He simply could no longer live in the West: At night he dreamed of his native Leningrad, his wife, and his mother. [passage omitted]

Kaminskiy's adventures can be considered to be over. But he was not the only one to flee to the West. Kaminskiy has recounted that in refugee camps in the FRG he encountered some Soviet soldiers who had deserted and would now like to return. But they are frightened by the rumors being spread in the West about the most severe punishments—up to the death penalty—threatening them, although it is well known that, under Article 247 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code, desertion is punishable by from three to seven years' imprisonment, and the death penalty is not used at all in peacetime.

And another thing. Only recently yet another Soviet soldier, Private A. Shishigin, went along the same route—there and back, as far as France. But, according to him, he quickly grasped that in the alien country nobody wants him....

Seminar on Lessons of World War II Opens

PM1705093991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Yu. Samsonov: "All-Union Seminar"]

[Text] An all-union seminar entitled "Lessons of History and the Present Day" opened 14 May at the M.V. Frunze Soviet Army Central House. (It marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War.) It is being held by the All-Union "Znaniye" Society, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Defense Ministry, and a number of other leading USSR ministries and departments, along with the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and Armed Forces Veterans and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

USSR Vice President G. Yanayev, K. Frolov, chairman of the All-Union "Znaniye" Society Board and vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate, and A. Milyukov, head of a department of the USSR president's staff, delivered reports.

The seminar will last four days.

Ivashutin on War's Outbreak

LD1605082491 Moscow TASS in English 2107 GMT 15 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 15 TASS—"Way back at the end of December 1940, data on a Hitler-issued order on direct preparations for a war against the USSR were obtained and conveyed to Moscow. We had these data eleven days after Hitler endorsed the Barbarossa plan," General of the Army Petr Ivashutin, former chief of the main intelligence department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS.

He spoke in connection with the approaching 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War (June 22, 1941). Ivashutin went through the war from first to last day in the battle against Nazi agents.

"Soviet military intelligence, one of the main tasks of which was to warn in time about an arising threat to the security of the USSR on the eve of the war, accomplished its task with honour," Ivashutin said.

At the same time, he said, its contribution to the cause of the victory over Fascism would have been much greater, were it not for the Stalinist repressions against military intelligence personnel.

Disquieting information on Nazi Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR began to reach the intelligence department in 1938 and particularly from the middle of 1939, the former military intelligence officer said.

He added that the value of this information was in the fact that it came from both Western and Eastern countries, which made it possible to get full idea of the scope of an imminent danger to the Soviet Union.

"The intelligence department of the General Staff in time uncovered the political plans and strategic designs of Nazi Germany and reported them to the military and political leadership of the USSR," Ivashutin emphasised.

"We reported that the Fascist command was planning to complete the rout of the main forces of the Red Army and suppress the Soviet people's will for resistance within four to six weeks and end the war with full occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union," the general said.

However, the government statement dated June 14, 1941, said that "rumours about Germany's intentions to break the pact off and launch an attack on the USSR are totally unfounded".

Ivashutin explains this as follows: Stalin, aware that the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces were unprepared for a war against Nazi Germany, tried to stall for time.

"For fear of providing Fascists with a pretext for an attack and expecting to avert a clash through diplomatic negotiations, Stalin took a wrong path," General Ivashutin said.

Defense Minister Meets With Service Veterans

LD2105170491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 21 May (TASS)—A meeting was held today at the central museum of the USSR Armed Forces between Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, and Colonel General Nikolay Shlyaga, head of the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, with the leaders of the association of USSR internationalist servicemen who arrived in Moscow for their first all-army conference of internationalist servicemen.

The problems and prospects of the development of this patriotic movement were discussed. The organizational committee for convening the all-Union unification congress of the international servicemen was elected. Participants in the meeting adopted a statement in which they confirmed their devotion to the military brotherhood and the glorious traditions of the USSR Armed Forces. Oleg Baklanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Presidential Defense Council, took part in the meeting.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Council To Discuss Possible USSR Sanctions

OW2205054891 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1800 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] The Baltic Cooperation Council uniting the Economic Ministers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will meet in Tallinn on Thursday (May 23). According to Leonhard Tammevali, Estonia's Deputy Economic Minister, the Council will discuss, among other issues, ways to counter the possible imposition by the Soviet Union of a "special regime" in trade with the three Baltic republics in the event of their refusal to sign the new Treaty of Union.

The Valentin Pavlov Cabinet's anti-crisis program is known to provide for a switch to world prices and hard-currency payments in trade with the six republics determined to secede from the USSR. It also envisages the introduction of export/import taxes and custom duties—a measure expected to make Baltic goods uncompetitive on the Soviet market.

According to some sources in the Baltic region, an appropriate presidential decree may be ready by July.

L. Tammevali mentioned a report by ex-First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee V. Turasov to Vice-Premier V. Doguzhiyev that he said specified the measures which should be taken with regard to the six disloyal" republics.

On would be to freeze the sale of "deficit" goods to these republics, to sell other products at world prices to them, and to purchase Baltic-made goods at prices lower than the world's average.

According to L. Tammevali, if a program of this kind were adopted, "it would mark a big political mistake—actually, the beginning of an economic war."

The Estonian deputy minister suggested that the Baltic republics respond by taking stops to coordinate their efforts, reorientate their economies to largely intra-Baltic cooperation, and import large volumes of material resources before the USSR introduces its "special regime."

Countermeasures against possible Soviet sanctions have also been discussed in Tallinn by the Council attached to the head of the Estonian parliament. The council, which involves the key Cabinet ministers, decided to refrain from passing any resolutions for the time being. It recommended that Estonian Premier E. Savisaar meet with his Soviet opposite number V. Pavlov to request additional information from him.

Baltic Finance Ministers Disagree on Payments

PM2105091591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent I. Litvinova: "Baltic Financial Experts' Talks"]

[Text] The finance ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been unable to agree on a common approach toward payments into the Union budget. Lithuania's position is categorical: There can be no question of any payments since we have declared independence without any transitional period. Latvia and Estonia are prepared to pay for the joint programs in which they are interested. The dispute is over the sum: The Union is demanding money for the stabilization fund and the compensation fund—it is a case of several billions. Latvia agrees to pay only 318 million. So far it is not known how the financial experts' talks will end, but since the start of the year no money has entered the dwindling Union coffers from the Baltic republics, own correspondent I. Litvinova reports.

Lithuania Cables Moscow Over Airborne Division

LD2205101191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 0900 GMT 22 May 91

[Summary] Government representative Jursenas, describing various acts adopted by the government, read in Russian the following message from Prime Minister Vagnorius to the Soviet leaders:

"To the government in Moscow: to the Soviet Union's President Gorbachev and Minister of Defense Yazov.

"We inform you that according to information available to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, units of the Pskov airborne division have been transferred to Lithuania. This provokes great anxiety and alarm in all Lithuania's citizens, as servicemen of this division took part in the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius.

"The Government of the Republic of Lithuania is alarmed at the absence of official information on the part of the Soviet leadership on the stationing of additional military contingents, and expresses the hope that a real exchange of information would help to avoid any incidents and the complication of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania.

"Signed: Prime Minister Vagnorius"

Lithuanian Official Criticizes Russia on Treaty

OW2205061091 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Ceslovas Stankevicius, Deputy Chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Council, has blamed Russia for dragging out the signing of a treaty with his republic. In an interview with the Lithuanian weekly ATGIMIMAS he said "We've repeatedly, since February, heard Fedor Kovedyayev, member of the RSFSR delegation to talks

with Lithuania, claiming that the Russian Federation would like the treaty to be signed without delay—but those have only been empty declarations." According to Mr. Stankevicius, Russia's leadership has ben unwilling to clearly define its stand on the problem of Lithuania's annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, fearing protests from the reactionary factions of the Russian Parliament and Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

Discussing the future treaty between his republic and the Russian Federation, C. Stankevicius said that it would be supplemented with a separate agreement on the Kaliningrad region spelling out the economic and legal terms for the flow of goods and migration of people across Lithuania and that region. The Lithuanian official said the agreement would be finalized at a special meeting with RSFSR negotiators later this month.

Lithuania Proposes Budget Talks With Center

LD2105093191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] The leader of the Lithuanian Government has proposed to the Soviet Union's representatives holding a discussion on financial relations between Vilnius and Moscow.

In a telegram addressed to the Soviet prime minister, his deputy, and also the finance minister, it is noted that in mid-May the Bank of Lithuania received a directive from Moscow to recover from the republic budget the debt owed to the Soviet Union's budget for the first quarter of this year.

A reply is given in the telegram by Gediminas Vagnorius that the budget law of Lithuania does not provide deductions for the Soviet Union's budget, and therefore the mentioned directive cannot be examined as a purely financial matter.

At the same time, the Government of Lithuania, without refusing to deduct certain payments to the USSR Budget but with prior agreement concerning this, proposes a discussion of these questions without delay at a meeting of the negotiating delegations, or at a separate consultation between the government leaders or finance ministers of Vilnius and Moscow.

Vagnorius Supports Soviet Economic Program

OW2105061791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1800 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] The Prime-Minister of the Lithuanian Republic Gediminas Vagnorius sent a telegram on Monday addressed to the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Prime-Minister Valentin Pavlov and vice premier Vitaliy Doguzhiyev to inform the Soviet leaders that the Lithuanian Government supports the substance of the action programme of the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers on coping with the economic crisis and its basic lines and efforts".

The telegram says further on: "We intend to participate in the implementation of the programme, first of all in relation to the normalisation of economic relations and the invigoration of foreign economic efforts on the basis of the development and signing of an appropriate bilateral agreement between the Soviet and the Lithuanian governments."

Vagnorius assured the Soviet leadership that in the event of a positive response to Lithuania's proposal, the Lithuanian Republic's government "is ready to start the development of a draft agreement immediately".

Lithuania Will Withstand Division Pressure

LD2105114691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuania 2100 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Parliament chairman Vytautas Landsbergis has warned that any decisions regarding the administrative division of Lithuania adopted outside parliament will have no legal force.

A conference of Vilnius and Salcininkai Rayon deputies is planned for next Wednesday in Eisiskes, during which an announcement is expected on the establishment of a new Polish autonomous entity.

At this morning's briefing, Vytautas Landsbergis noted that similar resolutions can only be treated as proposals to the Supreme Council. As we have previously-reported, the parliament has resolved to prepare a draft proposal this month on a new administrative division of Lithuania, providing for the creation of a Vilnius district, with a defined juridical status.

For some time, solutions to Vilnius regional problems were successfully coordinated by a joint work group of parliamentary and Vilnius region representatives. However, the latter have ended their activity within the work group.

Meeting with journalists, Vytautas Landsbergis focused attention on the fact that intentions to establish autonomy by unconstitutional means parallel the more frequent aggressive actions by Soviet soldiers in that region. According to the leader of the parliament, such coordinated activity may indicate a long-term preparation for Lithuania's forced division. He did not reject the possibility that this was simply blackmail. However, he noted, such danger needs to be reckoned with and we should prepare for it.

Vytautas Landsbergis also voiced the hope that the leadership of the Soviet Union will act sufficiently soberly, with deference to the political situation, and will limit itself to pressure. Meanwhile, according to the chairman of the parliament, Lithuania will be able to withstand the pressure.

Vytautas Landsbergis expressed the belief that Lithuania will avoid conflict and will not be entangled within the traditional Soviet scenario, as applied in the Caucasus, Moldavia and other areas of the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister on New Constitution

OW2105133291 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1530 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Lithuania's Foreign Minister Algirdas Sandargas expresed the hope that the Soviet Union would take part in the Helsinki-2 conference next spring "with a new membership and a new Constitution".

"In this connection we are mainly concerned with whether Lithuania will be mentioned in that Constitution or not," said Saudargas. He emphasized that for now the Soviet Union is largely opposed to Lithania's (and other republics') presence at the Helsinki Conference because Lithuania's membership in the USSR is anchored in the Soviet Constitution. The minister suggested that "if the Union does not include Lithuania in the new Constitution, this will mean a de-facto recognition of our independence".

Saudargas reminded that in the referendum on February 9 an overwhelming majority of Lithuania's population supported the formula of the new republican Constitution that Lithuania is "an independent democratic state", thereby giving the Lithuanian government a clear mandate to a policy geared to the attainment of independence and the signing of a bilateral agreement with the USSR.

Saudargas emphasized that there can no alternative to the above arrangment, i.e., a special status for Lithuania the republican opposition speaks of. The present-day Lithuanian government's chief rival is the Forum of Lithuanian Future, a body rallying together intellectuals, that plans for Lithuania to stay in the USSR for another 3 to 5 years with a special status.

Lithuania Rejects Gromov Claim on TV Occupation

LD2105123291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Kostas Birulis, minister of communications of the Republic of Lithuania, has submitted the following statement to ELTA:

Last week during the broadcast of the Moscow Central Television "Who is Who," General Gromov, replying to questions by Russia's journalists about the seizure of Vilnius communication facilities, said they did not seize anything, that the Soviet Union's Internal Troops were only guarding the facilities, and the owners of the facilities including the television center, are paying them for it.

The Lithuanian Ministry of Communications states that General Gromov is making use of false information. Neither the Vilnius radio and television center, nor the intertown telephone and telepgraph center, the Vilnius post, telegraph and telephone enterprise, nor other communications enterprises whose facilities have been seized by the military, have not asked for the protection of the Soviet Union's Internal Troops and are not paying for this protection.

In our view, the sooner the uninvited guards leave, the safer it will be. One can only express regret that such a high-ranking general is so poorly informed.

Reportage on Baltic Leaders' White House Talks

Leaders Cited on Meetings

PM2105140791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 11 May 91 p 1

[REUTERS-ELTA report under the general heading "President Bush Meets With Leaders of Baltic Countries"]

[Text] Washington—Following their meeting with George Bush the heads of the three Baltic countries stated that the United States is being increasingly bold in its support for these countries' desire for independence.

Bush is trying to preserve a balance in relations with the Kremlin and relations with the Baltic states. Before the actual meeting with the leaders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia he repeated that he supports Mikhail Gorbachev.

Leaving the White House, I. Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, said: "Secretary of State James Baker suggested that we find a solution which would allow us to win independence and the Soviet Union to preserve its reputation."

Later, at the National Press Club, I. Godmanis told journalists that the U.S. President supports the Baltic countries' desire to obtain observer status at the CSCE meeting to be held in Berlin this June.

Estonian Premier E. Savisaar said that Bush had "expressed an essentially positive view" on this issue.

Somewhat earlier, during lunch, V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, told journalists that the Baltic states could take more resolute action. If the West continues to be willing only to talk rather than to do anything, they will be helped by other republics wishing to secede from the USSR. The Soviet Government is just a shadow hanging over the Baltic and frightening the United States and other states. That is why the Baltic countries "could be forced to switch to a more vigorous Eastern policy to make this shadow disappear." Incidentally, it is already disappearing, and this entirely natural process could be accelerated further.

I. Godmanis said: "We think that there is only one way—an international conference and serious top-level talks between the USSR and the three Baltic states."

During the talks Bush promised that he would raise the question of the Baltic countries' independence in his future meeting with M. Gorbachev. He will propose that

the Soviet Union acquire three good neighbors—three small Finlands which will be of great use.

The White House statement says that the United States will continue to refuse to recognize the occupation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1940, but that it hopes for fair and constructive talks.

Landsbergis Meetings Reported

PM2005153791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 8 May 91 p 1

[ELTA special correspondent Kyastutis Jankauskas report: "V. Landsbergis' Visit to United States"]

[Excerpt] ELTA special correspondent Kyastutis [name as transliterated] Jankauskas reports from Washington:

On Monday Lithuanian Supreme Council President Vytautas Landsbergis, who is visiting the United States, met with a large group of entrepreneurs in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The chamber's members are America's largest private corporations, banks, and associations.

Landsbergis gave an account of the political situation in Lithuania and familiarized people with laws adopted by the Lithuanian parliament. Lithuania's developing economic ties with East European states were considered. The question of Lithuania's relations with Poland was discussed in more detail.

Talking about Lithuania's place on the world political map, Landsbergis stressed the importance of cooperation and collaboration with foreign countries. Landsbergis invited businessmen to visit Lithuania.

The Supreme Council chairman gave an interview to CNN television and USA TODAY.

On the same day Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, and Valdemaras Katkus, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, met with Vytautas Belyauskas [name as transliterated], chairman of the Lithuanian World Community, and its vice chairmen, Gabiya [name as transliterated] Petrauskiene and Algimantas Guryatskas [name as transliterated]. During the meeting a program of aid to Lithuania from the Lithuanian World Community was elaborated and possibilities for financing economic programs were discussed. Lithuania's diplomatic activity abroad and the problems of coordinating it were considered in detail. During the conversation there was discussion of the Lithuanian World Community's influence through parliaments and governments on consultations between Lithuania and the USSR.

Afterward a meeting took place with representatives of Jewish social and political organizations of the world. The Jewish community's position in Lithuania and its cultural affairs were discussed. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Speaks to Congress Panel

PM2105142791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 10 May 91 pp 1, 4

[ELTA report: "V. Landsbergis' Stay in United States. Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet, to U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission 7 May 1991"]

[Text] In speaking of the human rights violations being perpetrated by the Soviet Union in Lithuania, I should, above all, speak of the human right to life. I will cite you one of many eyewitnesses to the events of the night of 13 January in Vilnius—from a book in which their statements are published.

"We held hands and stood before a huge, oncoming tank, which broke through right in front of us. I barely managed to remove my foot from the caterpillar track, when I heard a shout to my left. Turning my head, I saw a woman or girl on the ground.... Her legs were under the tank's caterpillar track. Men tried to push the tank and drag the casualty out from under it, but it was not possible to move such a mass (it was a big tank, not a light one). I began beating on the tank's armor with my fists, shouting in Russian that a woman was under it. Then a paratrooper ran up to me, swearing dreadfully, struck me a painful blow in my back, kicked me in the abdomen, and pushed me away from the tank....

"A well-built young man who had been standing in our ranks, dressed in a paratrooper's uniform with medals on his chest, jumped out in front of the tank shouting: 'Guys, what are you doing? You're shooting your own people! I served with you. We didn't do that even in Afghanistan. Go ahead and shoot me, too!' A paratrooper ran up to him. Apparently he did not manage to kick him, because our guys dragged him into their ranks. He stood there and wept loudly. Big tears ran down his cheeks.

"We held hands again and began chanting: 'Lithuania! Lithuania! Lithuania will be free!...' Algirdas Sukis, Vilnius."

To prevent such events, Lithuania must regain full state independence and must be recognized not only in words—which would be expressed in some legal forms, as hitherto—but also in new political steps by the state. You know what must be done to ensure that the next Soviet military attack involving casualties in Lithuania is condemned not only in the European Parliament, as this time, but in the UN General Assembly, for example, and by the democratically minded members of the UN Security Council. The resolution proposed by Congressman Don Ritter in the House of Representatives indicates the correct way, and this time, I believe, the U.S. Congress will not have any doubts.

Nonetheless, I wish now to speak of such a feature of Soviet policy and political conduct as theft.

All the recent terrorist sallies by Soviet troops in Lithuania may be called measured attacks coupledwith creeping occupation. And, alas, with theft of belongings.

They have carried out attacks on police patrols, customs offices, driving schools, and flying clubs, looting television sets, employees' personal cameras, a typewriter, drills, vehicle tires, and construction materials, including even a can of ordinary paint.

Of course, this is armed banditry; and when this is done by troops, they confirm in the very best way that they are troops of occupation and are operating not in their own country but in a foreign, conquered country.

In this case the Soviets must observe special international conventions, including the Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying state from taking residents of an occupied country into the army. But they are violating these and other conventions by, for example, forcibly taking Lithuanian youths into their army and kidnapping them in the street or even from their parents' home.

The matter of the policemen's weapons is very characteristic. It is clear that anyone who takes weapons from a policeman is directly aiding the criminal world. But soldiers of the subunits of the Soviet battalion stationed in Vilnius have not confined themselves just to night attacks on a police patrol. On receiving the order from Moscow, they also took over the reserve weapons dump of the Lithuanian police.

It is already two months since those events. The Lithuanian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], which includes the police commissariat, is negotiating with the USSR MVD, and high-ranking Soviet officials have repeatedly promised to return the stolen weapons but have not yet done so. Of course, the thieves have not yet been punished either and, what is more, they even praise them.

Back in January a "black beret" special subunit subordinate to the USSR MVD took over the Lithuanian Police Academy building in Vilnius. They have made themselves at home there and have still not returned the building to the police academy. And last month Soviet soldiers also took over Vilnius Driving School, built with Lithuanian Republic funds, and are lording it with equal impunity there, with no intention of moving out.

The biggest theft, concerning a building, equipment, and citizens' belongings, was the takeover of the Lithuanian television and radio building, perpetrated this January. Thousands of people then lost their normal working conditions, for they refused to work for the occupiers.

Thirteen people were killed during the takeover of the Lithuanian television tower, and another one died later, because physicians were impotent against Soviet bullets.

The world was informed of that act of aggression and inhumanity by international television and the press and by Lithuanian journalists' video tapes. But still too little, or maybe nothing at all, is being said about the fate of the Soviets' "spoils of war."

Soviet troops are still in the seized buildings. Others have only come to replace the special units of killers subordinate to the USSR MVD. People are on hunger strike outside the main complex of Lithuanian television and radio studios: Producers, technicians, and editors are protesting at the fact that Soviet soldiers are still occupying their place of work. The Lithuanian Republic general prosecutor has instituted proceedings against USSR Internal Affairs Minister Pugo. The Lithuanian Parliament and Government and representatives of the public have repeatedly put to the USSR leadership—officially and unofficially—protests, wishes, and proposals that the Soviet troops be withdrawn from the Lithuanian television and radio building.

It is a pity the USSR Government has not wanted to make such a goodwill gesture. It evidently plans to continue to "watch over" one group of police bandits which has compromised itself and which is united with the obscure national salvation committee. This group is now using the taken-over television for its own propaganda. It is surprising that M. Gorbachev himself has called the activity of such groups anticonstitutional. Maybe the soldiers are fulfilling a mission, reckoning that Lithuania will nonetheless surrender, collapse, and take the communist path together with the occupiers of the television tower.

Then the actions of these occupiers would be justified in retrospect, as it were. Since Lithuania's capitulation, which they are demanding, would justify and legalize the old Stalinist crimes of 1940.

And here we recall the Soviets' biggest theft, when an entire neighboring state—Lithuania—was taken over and appropriated and its people had their freedom and motherland taken from them.

It is a pity that the right to have a motherland is seldom mentioned among the human rights about which modern democracies are so concerned. True, it is recognized sometimes, but not for everyone. It is particularly strange when it is not recognized by those peoples which have founded their own states and whose people have been able to freely cherish and express love for the motherland.

After 1940 people defended this right in the anti-Bolshevist, anti-Nazi, and, once again, anti-Bolshevist resistance. The right was taken away, and the resistance was routed. Lithuania lost one-fourth and even more of its population; it was bypassed by the Atlantic Charter and the promises of international accords, and World War II is not yet over for Lithuania, as well as for the other Baltic countries.

And yet the "Sajudis" movement for perestroyka in Lithuania, which was born in 1988, once again defended all human rights. Since the elections in February and

March 1990 they have been defended by the freely elected parliament and government of Lithuania, of which the Soviet Government is so intolerant and which it wants to rout. Why? Because it does not want to return what has been stolen.

Based on our own experience, we could advise the U.S. Congress and Administration: Do not believe a government of thieves, which deceives everyone. Check them out—the supreme Soviet power—by simply asking the question: Why do you not return the stolen television and radio building to the Lithuanian authorities and the people who worked there?

The Lithuanian people have a good saying: "Whoever lies also steals."

The entire Soviet system was based on lies, and so also on theft.

Therefore, economic reforms are not enough to correct this system; it is necessary to abandon lies and return what was stolen.

Only in this way can the former empire of evil become a different society and state or, rather, a community of free states.

We join in this process when we sweep aside the Soviet lies with whose help they want to steal even our reason and to enslave it, as Czeslaw Milosz, the author of the book "Enslaved Reason," wrote.

We join in this process when we do not accentuate theft and do not fraternize with thieves.

Landsbergis Talks With Bush Cited

PM2105140191 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 11 May 91 p 1

[ELTA special correspondent Kyastutis Yankauskas report under the general heading "President Bush Meets With Leaders of Baltic Countries"]

[Excerpts] Washington—U.S. President George Bush received the leaders of the three Baltic states in the White House at 1115 on 8 May. [passage omitted]

In the plane en route from Washington to Los Angeles Vytautas Landsbergis told this ELTA correspondent about the White House meeting.

"At the start of the talks President Bush recalled the tragic events in Lithuania and noted the unpardonable blame attached to the USSR Government for the events of 13 January in Vilnius.

"The meeting discussed the future of the Baltic countries, the strengthening of their independence, talks with the USSR, the return of the Baltic countries to Europe via the Helsinki process, the granting to them of observer status, the provision of credits, and the possible resumption of the blockade by the USSR."

Vytautas Landsbergis told the U.S. President that our position and stance are very clearly defined—we want to restore the previous legal and normal interstate relations which we had until 1940. America advocates the independence of the Baltic countries and highlights the destiny of these countries, and the current meeting reaffirms the comprehensive spotlighting of the Baltic region as a European problem.

Washington Policy Toward Baltics Viewed

PM2105145591 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 11 May 91 p 4

[Mechislav Sadovskiy "Observer's Notes:" "Better To Have Three Good Neighbors...."]

[Excerpts] World public attention has been fixed on the U.S. capital for the past few days. And not only because George Bush—the most popular postwar president—has returned to the White House and is back at his duties following a small cardiac problem. There have been a number of meetings and talks in Washington of substantive importance for East-West relations. [passage omitted]

President George Bush received the leaders of the Baltic republics. This meeting—the first White House meeting with the three leaders of the Baltic republics—lasted 45 minutes. The U.S. Administration stated the consistency of American policy in refusing to recognize the inclusion of these states in the USSR in 1940. G. Bush noted that during his meeting with M. Gorbachev (the dates have not yet been set) he will stress that it is very advantageous for the USSR—both politically and economically—to have three good neighbors.

It is worth noting that George Bush held talks with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto the same day. The statement that followed the conclusion of these talks synthesized, in my view, Bush's assessment of the Baltic problem. He stated, in particular: "We discussed the very complex situation in the Baltic states, and I reaffirmed the U.S. policy of supporting the process of change through constructive and fair talks. We are united in the view that it is impermissible to use force and important for all sides to be pragmatic in seeking a settlement to the Baltic problem."

Thus, the U.S. Administration has again unambiguously advocated that the Baltic republics be granted their independence. But, at the same time, it does not want to show the Kremlin that Washington is thereby turning its back on M. Gorbachev, since the United States has an interest in preserving the reform-minded leadership in the Soviet Union.

The USSR, for its part, is no less desirous of good relations with the United States and, above all, of economic aid during the transition to the market.

So is this perhaps an important chance for a real solution to the problem of the independence of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics by way of negotiations with the Soviet Union?

RSFSR

Fourth Congress of People's Deputies Continues

Moscow TV Reports 21 May Proceedings

LD2105215191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1845 GMT on 21 May begins carrying a program of recorded excerpts of the Fourth RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow on 21 May.

The first 35 minutes of the program consists of a shortened version of the Russian Television 0655 GMT relay including Yeltsin's opening remarks to the congress and his proposals for the congress agenda. Tarasov is heard speaking about the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan issue; the vote on this issue and the subsequent minute of silence for the victims of the conflict are also included in this portion. The exchange between Yeltsin and Poptsv on the coverage of the congress proceedings and the subsequent vote is also included.

At 1920 GMT Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee on Legislation, delivers a report on the first point on the agenda, the election of a president. Following this Shakhray goes on to talk about the law on constitutional amendments.

At 1849 GMT Yeltsin says that Shakhray will spend 30 minutes replying to questions. Deputy Smolin aks about restrictions on the president's activity when in office. Deputy Medvedev asks what will hapen if the relevant amendments to the Constitution are not passed. Deputy Muravyev asks if a president can sack mayors. Shakhray replies to each in turn.

There is a break in the program at 2000 GMT when the "Vesti" newscast is carried. This lasts until 2014 GMT.

At 2014 GMT the program resumes with Yeltsin inviting deputies to speak. Deputy Smolin makes points on various articles of the law on the presidency.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, who is now in the chair, offers the floor to Deputy Kazarov who criticizes the haste with which the law on the presidency is being pushed through. A vote for Yeltsin is a vote for capitalism, he says. Khasbulatov switches off the microphone on Kazarov and gives the floor to Deputy (?Koptyan) who says that the Union leadership is more interested in holding on to power than helping Russia. He denies that a presidency is the same as a dictatorship.

Deputy Rakov speaks in favor of the law on the presidency and backs Yeltsin.

At 2038 GMT the announcer says that the discussion on the presidency was then deferred until tomorrow and the congress moved on to discuss other issues.

Deputy Grankin is heard complaining about several aspects of the people's circumstances and proposes several measures to tackle it. He is followed by Deputy Mashkov who talks about the media and the power of propoganda; he criticizes the domination of the press in the provinces.

At 2044 GMT the announcer says that other speeches were also heard and that the congress will continue on 22 May.

21 May Proceedings Reviewed

LD2105142691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1000 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Today is the first day of work for the regular Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Congress of People's Deputies. Our parliamentary correspondent Olga Vasilenko reports.

[Vasilenko] The agenda of the fourth regular RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies has been voted through. It includes such items as endorsing the law on the RSFSR president and on alterations and additions to the RSFSR Constitution.

But during this discussion, during discussion of this matter, several deputies insisted that these issues be changed. First, the changes to the Constitution, and then, based on this, the law on the president. Deputies Konovalov, Berestovoy, (?Mozayev) and (?Baburin) insisted on this, but then Deputy (?Mashkov), from Sverdlovsk, went to the microphone and said that it was time for us to be getting away from the Bolshevist principle of starting with the idea and the underpinning it, so, on this issue, the law on the president takes first place, and then changes to the Constitution, and the report will be from the committee on legislation. It is to be delivered by Deputy Sergey Shakhray.

Another item on the agenda is on the candidates for president. But here Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin proposed not discussing the candidacies. After all, each one has gathered more than 100,000 signatures, so they are already included on the ballot, and they also have the broadest opportunity of speaking anywhere. This was linked with the fact that deputies had proposed that contenders for the post of president should speak for 15 minutes each at the congress about their programs. But really, the congress has catastrophically little time. Ahead lies a wideranging campaign for preparing the presidential election. Each address could lead to broad polemics. Time would be wasted. Concerning the candidates, who failed to gather 100,000 signatures, Comrade Yeltsin said they will be discussed after the report by the

Central Electoral Commission, and the congress will decide whether to include them on the ballot or not.

The third item is on endorsing the Russian Law on the RSFSR Constitutional Court. Here, too, there were differences of opinion. Several deputies spoke in favor of not electing the members of the court at present, and in general, pehaps, of not voting on this item, and not including it on the agenda. Some even asked why it is needed now and what actually is a Constitutional Court? But nevertheless, the item was accepted in the formulation proposed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: on endorsing the RSFSR Law on the RSFSR Constitutional Court.

On the fourth item, any other business, a lot of difficulties arose. Several deputies proposed addressing the border conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan—a group of Russian deputies had been there—and including it in the discussion. But, in the first vote the item didn't get through, which simply caused bewilderment among a substantial section of the hall. How can we pass over in silence what is going on, especially if the human rights committee is insisting on it? No one has any intention, deputy Tarasov thought, of whipping up feelings about the Army and inflaming interethnic conflict. We simpy need to know the truth. It was proposed to hold a roll call vote on this item. In the roll call vote the item passed.

An additional two items were included under any other business: on the address by Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Isayev on the situation in agriculture and on how land reform is proceeding in Russia and on the address by Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, containing information on the Union treaty, on preparations for signing the Union treaty.

Deputies are now about to assemble a drafting commission to begin discussing the first item on the president and on alterations and additions to the Constitution.

TASS Rounds Up First Day

LD2105185891 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Surzhanski]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Today's session of the Fourth Congress of Russian People's Deputies focused on amendments to the Russian legislation in connection with the introduction of presidency in the republic.

The congress is being attended by over 1,000 deputies and candidates for Russian presidency and vice presidency.

A large number of journalists has been accredited to cover the congress.

Chairman of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin stressed in his opening remarks that executive presidency in Russia is not a purpose in itself but "a major step to increase efficiency of power and strengthen Russia's statehood."

The Russian presidential elections are scheduled for June 12, 1991.

Deputies approved the congress' agenda. The congress will make amendments to the Russian legislation in connection with the introduction of presidency, discuss the bill on Russia's constitutional court and elect its members.

It will also discuss the preparation of new Union and federative treaties, the pace of land reform, and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and on the conflict-torn Azerbaijani-Armenian border.

Chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee on Legislation Sergey Shakhray delivered a report on laws on Russian presidency. He called apprehensions about dictatorial powers, which the future president will enjoy, groundless. He said the president's powers will be determined by the Russian congress and the parliament.

Heated discussions of Russian presidency revealed almost equal number of its supporters and opponents. The former insisted on an immediate introduction of presidency to stabilise state administrative bodies' work, while their opponents warned against a dictatorship.

The congress has not approved the bills and will continue debates on Wednesday.

Before the evening session closed, deputy, Army General Boris Tarasov announced his intention to create a new parliamentary faction. The faction, preliminary called Otchizna (Motherland), will aim to "uphold Russia's integrity, defend the Armed Forces and promote patriotic feelings."

Presidency Issue Discussed

LD2105180391 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The evening session of the Fourth Congress of Russian People's Deputies, which opened here today, discussed laws on Russian presidency.

In his report, chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee on Legislation Sergey Shakhray focused on laws on Russian presidency and amendments to the Russian Constitution.

He stressed that apprehensions that the Russian president will stand above the Russian parliament, were groundless.

He said that relationships between the Soviet and Russian presidents will be determined by a new Union treaty, which is expected to provide the basis for the republic's new constitution.

Heated discussions of the Russian presidency revealed almost equal number of its supporters and opponents. The former insisted on an immediate introduction of presidency to stabilise state administrative bodies' work, while their opponents warned against granting wide powers to one person and demanded that the elections be postponed to equalise candidates' positions.

Ivan Koptenko, a worker from Siberia, said that the presidency is part of a larger reform of bodies of state power and noted that currently, "neither the democratic leader nor the parliament or the government have sufficient powers."

"Only a reform of state administration bodies can bring some changes, which are impossible without the presidency," physician Petr Rakov from Ulyanovsk said.

Some deputies disagreed with these positions. Party official Oleg Kazarov from Ulyanovsk said that the law on presidency is only part of the problem. Another part is to where the president will lead the republic.

He accused the Russian ruling bodies of attempts "to revive the class of entrepreneurs" and said that "voting for Yeltsin means voting for capitalism."

Leader of the Rossiya parliamentary faction Sergey Baburin said that the forthcoming presidential elections are undemocratic, because the candidates have to campaign in unequal conditions. "Undemocratic methods cannot be used to build democratic institutions in society," he said.

The parliament has not approved the bills on presidency and will continue debates on Wednesday.

Presidency Bill Passed

LD2205100491 Moscow TASS in English 0948 GMT 22 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Lyudmila Alexandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 22 TASS—The Russian Congress of People's Deputies endorsed the bill on the president of the Russian Federation here today by 615 votes to 235, with 66 abstentions.

Under the new law, the Russian president is the highest official in Russia and head of the executive.

While in office, the Russian president must suspend membership in political parties and public organisations and cannot take other posts in state and public bodies and organisations.

The bill prevents the president from accumulating dictatorial powers, giving the last say to the Congresses of People's Deputies and the parliament.

The Congress and parliament finance the president's programmes and can repel any presidential decree or impeach him if he violates the Constitution or Russian or Soviet laws.

The president cannot dissolve "the Congress or parliament. [Word indistinct] the bill will be included as a separate article into the Russian Constitution. The Congress has yet to approve amendments to the Constitution connected with the" creation of the new presidency. [quotation marks as received]

Khasbulatov Describes Work

LD2105142891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1018 GMT 21 May 91

[Interview with R.I. Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Dorenko during adjournment of RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in the Kremlin—live]

[[Excerpts] Ruslan Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, is taking part in our broadcast today. [passage omitted]

[Khasbulatov] One would like to hope that the congress will go well, that we fairly vigorously complete adoption of these necessary laws opening up judicial opportunities for the presidential campaign that is already being conducted in the country. And it is hardly sensible now to try to block, what is more by some kind of chicanery, or to search for some kind of nuances that would slow down the presidential campaign already under way. [passage omitted]

Everyone, I think, is well aware that there is no place for delaying the congress, that this work must be completed within a week and we all need to work quite dynamically. So I would call on all our deputies, all peoples deputies of Russia, to work really hard precisely so that we can adopt all the necessary laws and other legislative acts, making it possible to carry out this presidential campaign under truly normal conditions. [passage omitted]

I would like everyone to be reasonable and sensible with regard to understanding the specific situation, and that any delay or attempt to drag this congress out, or to postpone it will, after all, arouse quite legitimate public dissatisfaction. [passage omitted]

We have worked out a fairly good law and we have debated it in many rayons. It seems to me that it will not, of course, finally resolve all the problems of the power hierarchy and coordination, but this is a very fundamental block of issues. [passage omitted]

Deputies Cited on Expectations

PM2205081591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Ye. Sorokin feature: "Don't Get Bogged Down in Squabbles—PRAVDA Survey on the Eve of the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies"]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies began work in Moscow today. Yesterday, PRAVDA's correspondent asked several of the forum's participants to respond to a number of questions. What do they expect from this congress? What kind of atmosphere did they think should prevail there? Will the agenda include all the questions which are worrying Russians? This is how they replied.

Yu. Chapkovskiy, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "I expect this congress to resolve constitutional questions concerning the presidency. I think that we will "polish these things up" still further at this congress. The laws adopted in the parliament are not quite complete. And of course I am certain that we will select worthy claimants to the post of republic president.

"It is understood that the problems of getting our economy out of the deep crisis are more important than the presidency, and I do not support the hasty organization of the elections. Many deputies think this way, so it would be worth examining questions on getting the economy out of the crisis in greater detail. You know, I. Silayev's guidelines need to be more concretely defined. This program is not yet complete.

"As far as the atmosphere at the congress is concerned, obviously certain clashes are unavoidable because, after all, nothing has actually changed with the disposition of forces in the deputy corps. I have participated in four congresses, and I cannot remember us having even one 'easy' congress.

"Naturally, the statement by the 'ten' headed by the president relieved tension inside the Russian deputy corps. However, there can be no hope of unanimity."

I. Galushko, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "All the laws which we have drawn up should 'pass' because everyone can see the need to strengthen authority. The overwhelming majority of deputies realize the need to institute the post of president, so the congress will progress normally and at a working pace. Although there could be efforts to block it. If we pay attention to all the rivals' arguments about introducing this post, it will be another 100 years before Russia has a president.

"I do not believe that the president will solve all our problems. But at the very least the need to restore structures which used to be the concern of the party—which has now withdrawn—has come to a head. Who the president will be is another matter. A lot depends on this."

S. Osminin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "The congress will be a very prominent landmark in Russia's history. The issue at hand is not just about the president but about changing the entire structure of our system in general. This is bound to worry people because we are not prepared to assimilate such radically new approaches. The deputy corps must approach solutions to all of these questions very responsibly.

"That aside, we have not exhausted all our possibilities in the context of the socialist choice. Rushing to extremes and revamping Soviet power, production and economic relationships, and our entire basis without exhausting everything which socialism can give, is at the very least irrational. We do not have to be inward-looking: We have to take on board everything useful in the West that is applicable in our conditions."

S. Filatov, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "Above all I expect the congress to solve the issue of the presidential elections. I hope that we will not start a confrontation and that all problems connected with altering the power structures will be discussed in a constructive spirit. Like never before, we need consolidation today in order to obtain at the congress the 708 votes required to amend the Constitution. After all, the old power structure has clearly become obsolete and it is hindering work to renew the life of Russia.

"At times it is said we are being hasty. But you know, in any matter you have to begin from the top. Tremendous experience on this score has accumulated in the world. Admittedly, no other place has to deal with difficult nationality questions. We must introduce presidential power more speedily. Of course, the soviets are still needed, but as legislative bodies more than anything else."

Yeltsin Says He Will Pursue 'Radical Reforms'

OW2205082491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] At a meeting with Soviet and foreign reporters Tuesday Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin has stated that no matter will he be elected the Russian President or not, he will continue to fight for "giving the Russian people maximum democracy and will pursue the most radical reforms in the sphere of economy, culture, etc."

Speaking about the strike in Kuzbass, B. Yeltsin said that all agreements, resolutions and decisions on that region have been adopted by the Russian government and the main task now is their implementation. "We should not forget that coal miners just suspended the strike, not stopped it. It is too early to get relaxed. But I think we will finally fulfil our promises to them", he noted.

Answering the question of IF's [INTERFAX's] correspondent, B. Yeltsin said that he plans to deliver a speech on his election campaign at a meeting of the "Democratic Russia" movement in Moscow on June 1.

Ryzhkov Called Yeltsin's Main Presidential Rival

PM2105134491 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 91 p 1

[I. Sichka article: "The Presidential Race. Gorbachev Has Apparently Stopped Fighting Yeltsin. Is Ryzhkov Going To Start Now?"]

[Text] The Congress of Russian People's Deputies that opens today is to approve the participants in the first "final" in the race for the post of president of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The first, because in theory a runoff is possible. The sports terminology was suggested to me by the rapidity with which events are going to develop. In the third week of May the congress will name the candidates whose names are to be on the ballot paper, and the voting will take place 12 June. Only three weeks for all this. A real dash.

But before embarking on a discussion of the candidacies, the congress must fulfill one "formality"—it must approve by a two-thirds majority the amendments to the RSFSR Constitution relating to the introduction of the post of president. Let me remind you that at one point a fierce struggle broke out between the two opposing deputies' groups—"Communists of Russia" and "Democratic Russia:" first over the very idea of the presidency, and then over the principles of its implementation. In the event the democrats prevailed, and the Supreme Soviet is submitting draft "presidential" laws for ratification by the congress. Will the struggle over them continue at the congress? Will attempts resume—if not to bury them—at least to delay their implementation?

Hardly. And not because the "Communists of Russia" have become reconciled, or changed their views. New tactical considerations have emerged.

Until recently, they did not have in reserve any personality who could be seriously set up against Yeltsin in a nationwide election. What can you do, perestroyka has not given birth to a leader among their ranks, and you can't force people to like you. So a motto was adopted in response to the democrats' onslaught: We can't win, but we won't let you win either. And the debate would have moved on, sometimes turning into a squabble, from the last congress to this one. Nothing sensible would likely have come of it, since neither side has a two-thirds majority among the body of deputies.

But then, at precisely the right moment, N. Ryzhkov finally recovered from his illness and decided to set a new precedent in our political life: to come back from retirement to state service. Having won the support of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Plenum and launched a vigorous campaign, he inspired certain hopes in his political creditors. In this situation, there is no point in putting procedural spokes in the democrats' wheels.

About the presidential candidates. The Central Electoral Commission has officially registered six contenders. Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Boris Yeltsin; personal pensioner Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in the recent past; Vadim Bakatin, member of the USSR Security Council and former USSR minister of internal affairs; Colonel General Albert Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District; Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party; and Aman Tuleyev, chairman of Kemerovo Oblast Soviet.

The last two have only a minimal chance of reaching the next stage of the election contest, because they have little political experience and are not sufficiently well known among the population. All except V. Zhirinovskiy chose not to enter the election under the flag of the parties that nominated them, and are formally considered independent candidates.

Without a doubt, the number one contender is Boris Yeltsin. His popularity rating among the population remains one of the highest among active politicians. Furthermore, in the period since the last Congress of Russian People's Deputies he has considerably strengthened his positions by making a key contribution to ending the miners' strike and signing the well-known statement by the "ten" together with Gorbachev. The ending of the strike and the transfer of the mines to the RSFSR's jurisdiction constituted a major step toward consolidating Russia's economic sovereignty, and the signing of the statement by the "ten" is basically a recognition of the political principles for which Yeltsin has recently "gone through purgatory," as you might say. Yeltsin has named as his candidate for vice president Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel A. Rutskoy, leader of the deputies' group "Communists for Democracy."

The most serious competition for Yeltsin promises to come from Nikolay Ryzhkov (with Colonel General B. Gromov for vice president) and Vadim Bakatin (with R. Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, for vice president). True, N. Ryzhkov's trump cards are not particularly obvious. Although, judging by press reports, in the course of the nomination process he has already succeeded in collecting more than a million signatures, I think it is a bit too soon to create an image of the "popular favorite." N. Ryzhkov's main propagandist, strange as it may seem, is V. Pavlov. The unpopular and sometimes frankly clumsy actions of the present Cabinet of Ministers call to mind Ryzhkov's words last year: "You will remember this government...."

It is clear from Nikolay Ivanovich's election statements that he still rejects, in principle, private ownership and "shock therapy" methods in the economy. Last fall, let

me remind you, these principles cost us the 500 days program and the alliance of Russia with the center that had taken shape around it.

The third contender, Vadim Bakatin, won a reputation as a liberal politician with left-wing inclinations while he was minister of internal affairs. At the time, this fact did not please conservative circles in the country's leadership, who blamed him for the "breakdown" of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs in the Baltic region and sought his removal from the post of minister. But in the continued struggle he could be hampered by the fact that he has a lower popularity rating among the population than Boris Yeltsin. His political track record is too short as yet.

General Albert Makashov can hardly be expected to succeed. After repeated statements to the effect that the army is prepared to impose order in the country if the politicians cannot do it, his popularity took on a specific coloring. Nor is his vice presidential candidate, Professor A. Sergeyev, likely to add to his votes. Sergeyev is known for his antimarket sentiments and for his mandate from the second initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party: seek the post of president, and when you get it, abolish it and restore soviet power.

As you can see, the main contenders for the highest state office in Russia are well known. Each of them has already won a certain reputation for himself, and three weeks of competition among their election programs are hardly likely to add anything fundamentally new.

Reform Efforts, Character Praised

91UN1516A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 May 91 p 2

[Article by observer Aleksandr Tayurckiy: "Only His Own Decency May Become a Hindrance for Nikolay Ryzhkov"]

[Text] *The first major mistake made in the course of perestroyka was openly admitted at the January 1991 plenum. In one sentence. "The plenum believes that the economic crisis... is a result of the lag in the pace of political and economic transformations." Who allowed it to happen? Why is it that of all the resolutions of the 19th party conference, which many now would rather not mention, two remained unfulfilled. Implementation of the resolution on national relations was torpedoed by the national-separatist movements, with their savagery resembling a fascist dictatorship. In addition, the resolution on economic issues remained unfulfilled. Its centerpiece was the promise, given by the party at the highest level, to put forward a sequence of economic transformations that would by January 1991 accomplish the largest phased price reform, which would allow both the establishment of a market mechanism and at the same time provide social protection for working people.*

For the time it was the only correct line. It was outlined correctly. The minor part that remained was to implement it. But this was not to happen. For two years, both overt and covert forces blocked any movement along that road. As a result, the nation is today writhing in the shock born of the doubling and tripling of prices. Had the highest organs of power gathered enough courage in time, a 30 percent increase would have done it. Today this seems unrealistically low, but such a possibility did exist. But it was not seized.

Who was it that did not carry out the decisions of the conference? The key posts were held by party members; they also comprised the majority at the Congress of People's Deputies, the creation of which was also stipulated by the decisions of the same 19th party conference.

I will not answer this question, for the names of those who did not carry them out are legion. I would rather say who tried, in the most complicated political confusion of the last two years, to hold to the outlined course.

Analysis of the speeches, meetings, interviews, and various statements by the leaders of the time show that the danger, invisible to the naked eye, was seen, alas, by only a few people—Gorbachev, Medvedev, and Ryzhkov. But the first found himself strongly squeezed by new political structures; it is enough to remember how many times he was drowning in the waves of either populist or conservative anger at congresses and sessions—the coming of age of our Union parliament was a painful process. The second did not have real access to the levers of economic power, and the dramatic misunderstanding with which he was surrounded in the party culminated in certain scenes at the 28th congress. And the third.... The third took the blow upon himself. He did not have to do this. He could have started maneuvering, which keeps many in high-level positions no matter what they do—everything rolls off them like water off the proverbial duck's back.

Of course, it was not the letter of the party resolution that guided N. Ryzhkov at that time but his understanding of the complexity of the situation. He began practical implementation of the reforms.

Do you remember how he proposed, at the end of 1989, to raise the prices of a number of delicacies, beer, and cigarettes? You have probably somewhat forgotten by now. Try to recall the size of the proposed increase. Against the background of the current three ruble beer and same-price—but bought only with coupons—cigarettes; against the background of a 40-ruble thimble-sized jar of red caviar (I would not even mention the black), these proposals look like a girlish sigh in comparison with the roar of Hurricane Lolita.

That was when he suffered his first defeat. The Supreme Soviet, full of a high sense of responsibility for the well-being of the people and intoxicated with the narcotic of nearsighted populism, gave the government a steam bath. To be precise, they did not even make it sweat; they simply threw it onto the hot stove. All

increases were rejected, with prices maintained as before. The trade mafia was especially jubilant on this occasion—the gigantic differential between the state price and the black market one flooded into its pockets, forming and nurturing the forces that were preparing for new battles. In a few months the price of cigarettes was raised by local soviets by a multiple factor, but this no longer brought about the wrath of the supreme organs; the new power only sneezed—probably under the influence of sniffing this expensive tobacco—at the shy attempts by the Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices] and the procuracy services to bring prices "into line."

Half a year later Ryzhkov's government undertook the second and last attempt—not even to hold the line but simply to try to save the situation. As is clearly seen from his presentations, Ryzhkov was already fully aware that the economic situation of the country was no longer dramatic but simply tragic.

Do you remember what was done to him in the higher echelons of power and in the mass media? You probably remember, so I will not repeat it. At that time he committed several tactical errors in carrying out this major attempt—his last—to correct the market situation, mainly in the timing of the announcement of the government's intentions. It is true that he did not prevent it, either. He was no longer permitted to act in a way that would be politically favorable to his line. The roadblocks—erected on one hand by the squealing of almost all the media and of the not-too-bright figures of populist bent, a regrettable surplus of whom had been elected to the local soviets, and on the other hand by conservative forces inside the state and economic party structures—dictated another course of movement, another course of events.

In N. Ryzhkov's concept, the entire sum of the price increase was supposed to be 135 billion rubles. This contained built-in full compensation on a number of products, and children's goods were practically untouched, etc. A year later prices were raised by 310 billion rubles. According to eyewitness accounts, when Ryzhkov heard the news of the scale of the price increases on television, he exclaimed: "This cannot be true!" It turned out that it could. True, neither he nor any of us knew at that moment the full depths of the pits of shock into which society fell. He did not know (and neither did V. Pavlov, by the way) that under the cover of the government price increase the republic and local authorities simultaneously would increase, on their own, prices of transportation, services, and housing, and cancel subsidies to workers' cafeterias and children's institutions. Their calculation was simple and precise—all the anger would fall on the premier's crew-cut head.

I still have on my dictaphone recording a distressed outcry by V. Medvedev at one of the backroom briefings of that period: "Why can they not understand?! We will have to pay triple the price for all of this! It is inevitable!" His guess was right on target! We are, indeed, paying exactly triple the price today.

The broken government barely made it on the last remaining engine to the end-of-the-year landing. The rest is known—an illness which, it is my deep conviction, was political in nature.... Smooth, outwardly logical stepping away from the business. Even here N. Ryzhkov was thinking less about his reputation than about those who were staying at the bridge of the ship going out of control.

Such is his nature. Even extraordinary circumstances, which he encountered quite frequently during the past years, did not make him sacrifice (for the common cause, as they say) his decency and honor. He would not permit himself even to simply yell at a Chernobyl bungler, a railroad slob, or a ministerial bureaucrat. He punished them severely, but without raising his voice, without humiliating people, even if their actions fell on the wrong side of the law.

Look at the uneven surface of our public life. Look at the hundreds, if not thousands, of red-and-white float-turncoats, "co-mutants," as Boris Oleynik calls them, which turn one or the other side up depending on the circumstances, but always stay afloat. And all the time they are at peace with themselves, with each other, and with their conscience (it is assumed they have one.)

Ryzhkov lives in a different moral space, removed from all this to the maximum degree possible. It may sound strange but, in my opinion, by his human qualities he is close to such people as Roy Medvedev or Vladimir Maximov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn or Alexander Zinovyev. Much as they are, N. Ryzhkov is a man with convictions; he is not an ideological empty shell or a politico maneuvering with self-abandonment.

It is good that he has decided to enter the race for the presidency of Russia. No matter who wins, his presence lends authority to the elections. To each of us, it presents an opportunity to make not only a political but also a moral choice—since the people who have entered this race are too different in their human qualities.

Much is stacked against him. And the ebbing wave of last year's irritation—this sore spot will be persistently scratched again. Also the fact (and a paradox) that the crowd of conservatives nostalgic for the past will jump to help him—pre-election logic pushes them in this direction. This "help" and kindness will be worse than thievery, however. They will not be able to help him; more likely they will scare people off with their bureaucratic hats and hurrah-shouting.

A serious hindrance in N. Ryzhkov's quest may be his innate decency. It works for him, but it also works against him. In a moral sense, Russia is living through a part of its history that is far from the best. That night blindness that was so characteristic of the previous elections and elections before that, when among those

elected to the soviets—especially local ones—were scores of people without honor, who not only did not know how to work selflessly but even how to behave in the session hall, has not left our eyes yet. The sight will be recovered, but it looks as though it is still quite a distance away.

N. Ryzhkov, however, will not be able to go against his conscience. Unlike the current head of Russia, he will not be able to leave one party—having declared at its congress that he would remain above parties—and start organizing another one tomorrow, which has now nominated him for president. He will not be able to say today that he is reaching out to the president and tomorrow trip him up. It is exactly the decency that ruined many Russian politicians in the past, having led some to political ruin, others to cardiac arrest, and still others to the scaffold.

I think that another topic that will be massaged is a thesis about Ryzhkov's so-called indecisiveness. This is a myth. In 1985, N. Ryzhkov was the only man in the Politburo who voted against the ignorantly conceived anti-alcohol campaign, which a couple of years later shot into our economy a torpedo stuffed with 50 billion "drunken" rubles.

Do you remember how he acted in the Chernobyl situation or after the earthquake in Armenia? Next to these also stand his decisive steps to stop building industrial complexes to produce protein-vitamin concentrates when he realized their harmfulness, although this was unanimously denied by a powerful academic chorus.

Also working against Ryzhkov is the tradition that emerged in Stalin's time and became especially reinforced under Brezhnev. It is simple: When someone leaves the political arena in the Soviet Union, it is forever.

The first person to overcome the "leave forever" syndrome was B. Yeltsin. Strictly speaking, however, Yeltsin has never left the political arena entirely—he always held one portfolio or another. He also had great help on the part of the Central Committee of the time, which attempted to use a dull old axe to cut the ropes that held Yeltsin's ship to the pier of big politics.

As for Ryzhkov, only a month ago it was thought—by some with regret, by others with glee—that he had left for good. Today he is coming back, but the psychological stereotypes sit in the heads of millions like rusted iron spikes and "work" against him.

So what does work for Ryzhkov today?

"For" is his enormous, dramatic, and sometimes bitter experience of working in our environment. He is not going to pass the buck to the center or the autonomous regions and complain that someone is putting obstacles in his way—he will simply pull the cart up the hill, putting in for 10 people, acting cool-mindedly, firmly, and, of course, more competently than many others.

"For" is his honesty and deep-seated innate decency, which nobody denies, even his most bitter enemies.

"For" Ryzhkov is the realization experienced by many that the 500 days-long "big jump" and the thoughtless, mad plans for privatization and liberalization (read: monopolistic bacchanalia) of prices are, in substance, nothing more than command-totalitarian projects turned inside out, which bring short-term political profits to their creators and new misfortunes to the people.

Remember an old, sad joke—five-year plan in four years on three benches in two shifts for one salary? Does not it resemble the slogan about building a developed postindustrial society of universal prosperity in 500 days?

Today, understanding of the fact that a long and difficult road lies ahead of us finally arrived. This understanding works for Ryzhkov, who never promised anybody mountains of gold, that is, he never deceived you and me. On the contrary, he had the courage to look millions in the eye and tell the truth, just as he did in the dramatic May days of last year when he was talking about the necessity of the price reform because the economy had reached the "red line."

"For" Ryzhkov is his common-sense predictability, which is important in a society that finds itself in a state of growing anxiety. It gives every citizen confidence in at least the nearest future, perhaps not a very sweet one, but real and guaranteed by the word of a man whose honesty is above reproach.

"For" Ryzhkov is the fact that, unlike other contenders, he is hard to influence. Neither confidential whispering into his ear nor the deafening chorus of newspaper sirens will make him go against his conscience, which means against the people, or make him try to extricate himself, to be cunning, or shun responsibility.

The strongest argument in Ryzhkov's favor is the fact that he is an expert and specialist in the area of executive power, which is what presidential power is about. In this he has no equal. Neither B. Yeltsin, with his rich experience in political struggle, political juggling, and amazing maneuverability, and by now also the experience of legislative activities; nor Bakatin, with his political and ministerial experience—none would hold his own in comparison with N. Ryzhkov: He will have a head start of many points. His knowledge of the economy of Russia and its links with the economies of other republics is unique. I dare say that there is no other man like this in the entire country.

...If all of us could comprehend the meaning of what is happening, and, better still, learn a lesson for the future, things would start improving. All that is needed right now is to free the great popular energy. The energy of Russia is a million-degree thermonuclear plasma, so far still twisting in the magnetic trap of the old structures. Soon it will break out; the question is, what form will this freeing of energy take. Will it be in the form of a gigantic

explosion that will disperse life past and present in planetary space, or in a form of creative work that will take the country to a new and higher frontier.

Both are possible. The former, considering our history and political traditions, is, unfortunately, a more likely—although less preferable—outcome.

The latter... there is still time for the latter. But only if we make the right choice.

Addresses Campaign News Conference

PM2205085591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 1

[N. Garifullina report on press conference held by Russian presidential candidate N.I. Ryzhkov and running mate Colonel General V.V. Gromov, USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs; date not given: "N.I. Ryzhkov: 'My Credo is Defending People....'"]

[Text] The election campaign program of Russian presidential candidate N.I. Ryzhkov is becoming increasingly busy. Last Saturday he visited the Flight Control Center, where he spoke with cosmonauts and specialists, inquired about progress in space research, and asked their opinions on using conversion to develop various sectors of the national economy and science, including astronautics. A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at which N.I. Ryzhkov spoke. He presented his vice presidential candidate—Colonel General V.V. Gromov, USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs.

"Boris Vsevolodovich is one of the most popular generals in our army," N.I. Ryzhkov said. "But the issue is not the army or that we want to impose a clampdown. General Gromov is a true citizen of the fatherland, a genuine patriot, a courageous and honest man. His firm civic stance is well known to all. I think that a mature politician noted for his high sense of morality, diligence, good organization, and decency is needed as vice president today. General Gromov has experience which might be envied by any politician."

Asked whether he had any fears that people might suspect him of seeking to curry favor with the army by choosing a fighting general of high standing, N.I. Ryzhkov said: "I don't need to curry favor with the army. I have always regarded the army with great respect and will continue to do so."

A question to General Gromov: "Will he be able to deal with economic affairs if elected vice president?"

"Someone who serves in the army does not only deal with military matters. He has to tackle a large number of questions on the economic plane. While, on the other hand, I do not think that it is ever to late to learn."

"Nikolay Ivanovich, can you count upon Mikhail Sergeyevich's vote?"—an AP correspondent asked.

[Ryzhkov] I cannot answer for Mikhail Sergeyevich. He will vote for himself.

[AFP] Nikolay Ivanovich, how do you rate your chances?

[Ryzhkov] In wholly positive terms, otherwise I would not have started this. Why enter the fray if you are not confident? Let me tell you that as of this morning more than 600 collectives—plants, factories, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, organizations, and institutes—have nominated me. And around 2 million signatures have been collected, too.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent] Nikolay Ivanovich, would you please tell us what policy you will pursue, if elected president, regarding the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic and other regions? And a second question: Many former autonomous republics and oblasts of the Russian Federation have adopted a new status. How will you regard their sovereignty declarations and what policy will you pursue regarding national-state formations?

[Ryzhkov] The Russian Federation is a multinational republic or state. Therefore the nationalities question is one of the most important for the Union as a whole and for Russia, too. I will do my utmost to find political solutions in order to prevent conflicts and ensure that every citizen living in Russia can feel free and at ease, regardless of nationality.

My position regarding Russians and the other peoples who have lived in Russia but have, through certain circumstances, found themselves in other republics is to pursue a line that ensures that they feel as free as they would feel in Russia.

I will not pursue the policy which Comrade Yeltsin has in respect of the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic. Let me make that absolutely plain to you.

The second question—regarding the sovereignty of Union republics: Russia is made up of 16 autonomous republics. Today virtually all of them have declared themselves republics, excluding the word 'autonomous.' I have a meeting planned with the leaders of these republics during which we will examine the question of sovereignty. This question is extremely complex, but, from the economic and social standpoint, all the structures belonging to Russia—republics, krays, and oblasts—must, I think, have uniform rules and be equal, socioeconomically speaking. We must, I think, respect the statehood of the former autonomous republics belonging to Russia.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent] What was your government's main miscalculation in economic policy which caused the crisis, or was it due to purely political reasons?

[Ryzhkov] The government's five years of work must be split into two phases. The initial phase was the first three years, 1986-88, when the old system was still operating

and elements of the new were being introduced; nevertheless we did make progress at a certain pace. In the middle of the five-year period we effected a major shift toward the social sphere. We achieved a pretty good improvement in the construction of housing, kindergartens, and the material base and boosted the production of meat and milk.

"Then, in the two subsequent years, we began sliding into crisis. One reason was the political instability in the state when we entered the period of political confrontation, when the war of laws and the era of the supremacy of republic laws began, and when the republics stopped obeying the rules of the economic game, to put it crudely.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent] Which political forces' support are you counting?

[Ryzhkov] I am counting on the support of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia and the support of those people who have faith in me.

Discusses Agricultural Program

91UN1493A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 May 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov, RSFSR presidential candidate, by political observer Konstantin Shcheglov; place and date not given: "Russia, My Pain and My Hope...."]

[Text] **Among those who were first to nominate N.I. Ryzhkov as a candidate for the highest post of state power in Russia were labor collectives of the Rodina Kolkhoz [collective farm] in Temalinskiy Rayon in Penza Oblast, the Novaya Zhizn Sovkhoz [state farm] in Pronskiy Rayon in Ryazan Oblast, and the residents of the settlements of Krasnaya Zarya and Pokrovskoye and the village of Soskovo in Orel Oblast. Was it not a surprise to Nikolay Ivanovich that this was done by agricultural workers and not industrial workers, with whom essentially all of his life has been linked? SELSKAYA ZHIZN political observer Konstantin Shcheglov began his conversation with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential candidate with this question.**

[Ryzhkov] Of course, this drew my attention and I would like to take advantage of our meeting to thank the rural residents for placing their trust in me. For the beginning is important in this as in any other matter. The more so since relations between the peasants and the government, and not only with the so-called Ryzhkov government, have always been complicated. They have not fully understood one another and there have been conflicts.

I have thought a lot about this in recent years and simply came to this conclusion: The first thing we must do is solve the problems of the development of agriculture and the food problem. Therefore, my position is set: With all of our difficulties we must first pay attention to agriculture.

I am speaking frankly. At one time I thought that the rural areas were a "black hole": No matter how much money we threw in there it would do no good; there has never been any return and there never will be. When meeting with city dwellers I frequently heard: They are out there doing nothing and we have to harvest their potatoes for them.... And there is the other side: We work from sunup to sundown, while they put in their shift and after that they are off to play dominoes. With each conversation like this I became more convinced: We must figure out what is happening in the rural areas. Why has life forced the peasant to live the way he is living today? Is he a different breed or something? Or does it have to do with the sociopsychological environment which was created, incidentally, not without our help?

When we say in a nostalgic tone of voice that everything was different about 20 years ago let us remember what the rural residents received for their labor. A pittance. And they and their families lived on what they could raise on the little parcels of ground in their garden. And that is within our lifetime, and, excuse me, a chicken was taken from each of them as a tax.

I do not mean to say that we have managed to do a great deal, but the people have apparently felt our concern and sincere desire to solve these problems, and they believed....

[Shcheglov] Nikolay Ivanovich, in general what roots bind the Ryzhkov family to the rural areas? As far as I know, your father, Ivan Fedorovich, started out as a shepherd and then found a job at a mine and worked the rest of his life in them.

[Ryzhkov] When it comes to my roots, they are as rural as can be. My father was from the village of Zaytsevo in Donetsk Oblast. They lived next to a miners' settlement and gradually changed their occupation. My father was a mine horse driver and a timberer and a coal hewer—the most difficult jobs. My brother also became a miner. But he was drawn to the land. In the first place, he had never really separated from it. In the second place, when you work a shift under the ground, practically in a rock-enclosed capsule—with no sun, in the dirt—and then come up into the open air, as it were, you always wanted to dig around in the earth, in the garden, among the green plants. And in 1937, when I started school, my father built the house where he lives to this day. Now, unfortunately, he is alone. He had a hard time dealing with mama's death—she died in November of last year....

About 10-15 years ago I suggested to my father and mother that they move to the Moscow area. They categorically refused: Here—on the Donetsk land—is where we were born and here we shall die.

Since mama's death father has been spending the winter with us. He visits my brother frequently, as well. I never had a vacation before and never visited my home region

myself. And since I moved to Moscow there is never any time; we see each other more frequently now here, in my home....

[Shcheglov] I have heard that until recently one of the beds in Ivan Fedorovich and Aleksandra Pavlovna's gardens was filled with more peppers than they knew what to do with....

[Ryzhkov] He laughs: Yes, we had that tradition. When someone would come to visit, they would ask: "What can we bring?" "We do not need anything," we would say. "Except perhaps a pepper...." You know, those large red ones that are bitter. They had their own way of preserving them.

[Shcheglov] Nikolay Ivanovich, could we hear a little more about your family. The SELSKAYA ZHIZN readers are interested in what your children do.

[Ryzhkov] I shall begin with the mistress of the house. I married my wife 36 years ago. You will agree that that is a considerable amount of time.... At that time she was studying at the Uralsk Polytechnical Institute. I was studying there, too, in the evening school. I was working as a section chief at the plant. She did her training at the plant. She went to work there later as an engineer-designer. She was not a party member. She never held any posts but she was respected by her colleagues. I would work at the plant until late at night and she was in charge of all the family matters. We never had any domestic help or servants—she always took care of the house herself.

My daughter Marina came along in 1956. She graduated from the juridical institute. She is a Communist. A lieutenant colonel in the militia, she now teaches in the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. My wife and I have always tried to make sure that the daughter of the director of Uralmash did not grow up spoiled. We can rest easy now: She grew up to be a person of firm convictions and in my view she understands life correctly. My son-in-law is also a lawyer and works in the customs office. I have two grandchildren: Kolya is named after his grandfather and is finishing the first grade, and Lyudochka is five years old.

[Shcheglov] What did you and do you value most in your parents' personalities and way of life?

[Ryzhkov] Modesty and, the main thing, a love of work. You know, I think the majority of our Russian people are like them in this respect, and they are like all the people.

[Shcheglov] Excuse the directness of the question, but what determines the character of Nikolay Ivanovich himself?

[Ryzhkov] I find it difficult to talk about myself. I have probably inherited something from my parents and acquired some things myself, that is, I have developed them in life. I am sometimes reproached for being irresolute and not being firm enough.... What can I say. I have traveled the path from section foreman to general director of a labor collective of 50,000 and sometimes I have had to not only resort to unpopular measures but to make hard decisions. Although what I value is a person who is evenhanded, and, of course, above all, honest, humane, and profoundly decent. It is simply that I have understood and seen what a hasty decision can lead to. Especially on the scale of the country. Like what happened with the anti-alcohol campaign for instance.... I insisted on changing over to the market in a moderate-radical way because I recognized that an unregulated turn to it could lead to catastrophic consequences. I think that many people are now beginning to understand this....

[Shcheglov] Is this—if one may put it this way—the view of the former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers? Needless to say, those years were difficult for you....

[Ryzhkov] Especially in the last year and a half when we were essentially first beginning to form a new power. Its establishment took place largely through the government: Remember, in 1989 the establishment of its membership lasted three weeks. There were endless discussions, sharp conflicts, fiery debates.... And then: In a year and a half the question of confidence in the government was raised six times! This, of course, has passed without a trace....

[Shcheglov] But still you decided to give your consent to the new situation: Difficult elections and, if you are successful, even more difficult work as president of Russia....

[Ryzhkov] Yes, of course the struggle will be hard, and if I win it, the responsibility will be immense. But I can do nothing else when it comes to Russia and her fate. Incidentally, on 9 May, when I was among the frontline workers in front of the Bolshoi Theater, one of them asked me candidly: What motivated you to run, Nikolay Ivanovich, especially against Yeltsin? After all, you once withdrew your name from the elections for USSR president.

Why did I refuse a year ago? At that time, as head of the government, I had submitted a program for proceeding further. And in that situation I considered it inadmissible even to think about changing positions. Nobody had a gun to my head today; no particular card is being played now. After the May Day rally Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev asked: "Is it true that you agreed to run for Russia?" "Yes," I answered, "two days ago." The fact is that for a year I had been paying close attention to the work of Comrade Yeltsin and his team and I could see where they intended to take Russia. Had I been confident in the course they were following, I swear I would not have agreed to be a candidate.

[Shcheglov] In the public awareness our political life is increasingly being linked to specific names. And, in my opinion, this is not just because society is predisposed to this kind of thinking but also "thanks to" efforts of the upstart political movements and their leaders. Still fresh in their minds is the hysterically turbulent campaign

unleashed quite recently by some of them against the "Ryzhkov government." In this connection, what ways do you as a presidential candidate suggest for getting out of our extremely severe sociopolitical and economic crisis? I understand that this cannot be answered briefly. We are speaking about the basic directions of your election program.

[Ryzhkov] We are working on this program right now. There have been many suggestions from the local areas. I would like to discuss all of them but there is not enough time. Here, for example, is one of the telegrams: "The collective of the Rodina Kolkhoz in Tamalinskiy Rayon in Penza Oblast at a general meeting, when establishing an initiative group and supporting your candidacy for the post of RSFSR president, consider the following to be mandatory points for your election program: strengthening of labor and social discipline, an uncompromising battle against speculation, reduction of the management apparatus, and reduction of prices for industrial and food products. We think the majority of the republic's working population will support you if you include these points in your election program. Chairman of the meeting, Yefimov." We have considered these positions.... Like many others, as well.

There are several principal issues I would like to discuss briefly. With all the respect I have for the Union republics, Russia is still the core of our state, the basis on which the Union was formed. It has immense territories, natural resources, production and scientific bases, and intellect. It has everything necessary to live in a free and worthy manner. And I see my task as contributing to the regeneration of this great Russia. This is my pain and my hope.... I am a long way from great power chauvinism. I think this is alien to our people in general. On the other hand, we must by no means leave to the whim of fate those representatives of the Russian peoples who live outside the republic. And here I understand the position Yeltsin took with respect to the so-called Russian-speaking population of the Baltics.

And the main thing that must be done is to stabilize the situation and halt the downward slide of the economy. The people must have at least some kind of hope. Otherwise a social explosion is inevitable. And here—I note again—a great deal depends on how the rural areas do their work.

[Shcheglov] But, Nikolay Ivanovich, we must candidly admit something else: The inequality in the commodity exchange between the city and the country is increasing, and not to the advantage of the rural areas. One gets the impression that somebody wants if not to bring the rural areas to their knees, at least to turn them back into some kind of donor for the city and thus bleed them white once and for all.

[Ryzhkov] That is precisely why today we must finally direct our attention to the rural areas. Indeed, prices of industrial products are increasing and procurement prices are fixed. Again we have the scissors sharpened on the whetstone of the refusal of specific aid to rural areas, especially in harvesting the crops.

I recall August of last year when I was in Orenburg Oblast and became convinced of how fatal this opposition is for the republic and the country as a whole. It is understandable that autonomous financing and other forms of relations are more and more persistently making themselves known, but today the rural areas obviously cannot do without aid from city dwellers. When I returned to Moscow I said at that time in the Council of Ministers: I ask you Comrade Ministers, to immediately give instructions to all industrial enterprises to help the rural areas. Unfortunately, some of the mass media literally the next day hastened to accuse Ryzhkov of taking up administrative command methods of work again. And many enterprise leaders were afraid of this campaign, openly stating that they were prepared to render assistance, but the leaders were literally holding them back: "Don't you dare!" My God, the autumn fields were literally heaped with tomatoes, onions, potatoes, and cabbage... And so much of it was lost because of the bad weather! I do not see how anybody can tolerate such a thing.

[Shcheglov] How do you feel about the ideas that are being persistently foisted on the people by certain circles concerning the ineffectiveness of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, that they will never be able to feed the country, that only Western-style farms are capable of doing this? And a related question: What is your attitude toward private ownership of the land?

[Ryzhkov] My position here is simple; I have not changed it and do not intend to: At this point to raise the question of "collectivization in reverse," of disbanding the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, is similar to death. And I am far from thinking that there are no shortcomings in the rural areas—as in anything else, they undoubtedly exist. But there are also the most immense reserves. Not only technical, financial, and human, but also organizational—on the plane of those same intrabusiness relations. Many farms are now finding new forms of work that make it possible for the kolkhoz or sovkhoz worker to work more closely with the land—so that they are not simply hired workers on it but actually become rooted to it.

As for the Western-style farmer, he is not so independent in the West today either. Everything is linked to cooperation.... That same farmer I once visited in Sweden belongs to six cooperatives. Technical equipment, mineral fertilizer, the sale of his products—everything passes through them. It is simply naive to think that we can solve all of our problems merely by dividing Russia up into small pieces. I did a serious analysis of the situation when I was working on my report for the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum where, incidentally, the need for multiple systems for our agriculture was first formulated. I hold the same position to this day. We have plenty of room for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and agro-industrial combines. There is enough room for

Western-style farms, as well. Life itself will dictate which of these forms of management is most suitable for one region or another. God willing, as they say, the Western-style farmer movement will spread throughout the land, but to rely solely on that is to go to extremes again.

About private ownership. I am not against private ownership as such; I am against private ownership of the land. Namely the land. It should not be an object of purchase and sale. If a person wants to work the land, it should be given to him. To be used indefinitely, with the right to inheritance. The peasant should be the master of the land. But in no case should he turn it into an object of trade.

[Shcheglov] Judging from the editorial mail, the majority of farm workers support your plan to run for president of Russia. What would you like to tell them?

[Ryzhkov] I would like to say once again that I have deep respect for the people in the rural areas. I think the land depends on them, that agriculture in Russia deserves something better, and the people working in it deserve a better life than they have today.

[Shcheglov] Thank you, Nikolay Ivanovich, for these two hours of conversation. I wish you success! And good health. Incidentally, about your health....

[Ryzhkov] I feel quite well now. Sometimes it even seems that all that happened not to me but to someone else.... So I hope I will have enough strength.

RSFSR Presidency Election Schedule Too Tight

PM2105133791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Professor V. Korobeynikov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Blitz-elections. On the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Presidential Election Campaign"]

[Text] The first stage in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential election campaign—the nomination of candidates for the post of head of Russia—is over. In a few weeks, on Wednesday 12 June—if the fourth congress adopts the appropriate laws—the Russian electorate, comprising over 105 million individuals, will have the task of electing him.

The speed, frankly speaking, has been sprinter-like. And unwittingly the question arises: "Will these elections serve the purpose, will they answer Russia's and the country's interests?"

Presidential elections are a big event even for countries with established democratic traditions—an extraordinary event demanding thorough legislative and political preparation and an all-around evaluation by the electorate of candidates' merits and deficiencies and the consequences of victory for one or other of them.

Although presidents have never before been elected in Russia, this institution in itself is not something absolutely new to us. The USSR president has exercised his powers for over a year, and there are presidents in a number of republics, too. We are also familiar with solid presidential practice in foreign countries. In other words, the possibility exists for looking at the imminent election of Russia's highest official representative from broad and objective standpoints. This is all the more necessary as the Fourth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, due to take place 21 May, is expected to ratify laws connected with confirming the RSFSR president's duties and his election, which, as we know, were only adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet at the end of April.

Legal regulation of the institution of the presidency not only has enormous political significance, but moral significance, too. It defines the procedure for electing the head of state as well as his human "parameters." For example, the American Constitution states that a claimant to the post of president of the United States must be a U.S. citizen of at least 35 years of age who has been permanently resident in the country for 14 years. A candidate for the post of head of the French Republic must be a French citizen, at least 23 years old, who has completed his military service and has no court judgments against him for committing any criminal offenses and certain civil offenses. He must submit the signatures of 500 guarantors occupying state elected positions in the country, and pay a 10,000 franc deposit.

Similar demands, or rather some of them, also appear in Soviet legislative acts and the Russian laws which have been adopted. However, on the whole one gets the impression that our parliamentarians, giving way to the ups and downs of interparty battles and yielding to the demands of the moment, as it were "tailor" legal norms to individual candidates and the current political situation instead of elaborating and confirming universal legal standards.

Such a tendency was already noticeable during the introduction of the post of USSR president. By way of an example I will point to the restriction on the age of candidates, who must be over 35 and under 65. If the first limit has a certain sense to it, the second is clearly artificial in character. It is no accident that other countries have no such restriction in their legislation.

Of course, in the "stagnation years" we grew tired of decrepit and incompetent bureaucrats with advanced deafness in the literal and figurative sense. But really senile dementia should not be confused with the wisdom of advanced years. Wisdom, as we know, is valued very highly always and everywhere. And it is particularly becoming of the highest state leader.

World political practice has advanced a whole series of criteria which presidents or claimants to this highest state position must meet. Some are fixed in law, others are maintained in democratic tradition and the authority

of public opinion. For example, under the Italian Constitution "the president of the republic is the head of the state and represents national unity."

In many countries it is generally recognized that the president is the symbol of state reliability, the personification of civil accord and stability, and serves as a guarantor of the people's confidence in their future.

The heads of many states are the leaders of one or other party. True, the electorate expects from them a demonstration of such qualities as the ability to rise above party passions and feuds, as the president must defend the interests of the people as a whole and not one or other separate part. The Russian parliamentarians, by adopting the Law "On the RSFSR Presidency," solved the said problem quite straightforwardly and in the spirit of the "present moment," as they say, by demanding that the Russian president suspend his party membership for the duration of his term in office. This norm does not appear in the legislation of major countries as it bears a blatantly antidemocratic character.

The content and form of the policy he proposes is decisive here. Political studies show, for example, that the electorate does not trust rigid political pragmatists given to extremes in solving the different questions and in their relations with the opposition.

Legislative clauses regarding the election of the head of a state republic should help in registering worthy candidates and electing the best of them. Unfortunately, the "Law on the RSFSR Presidential Elections" is still far from complete, and frankly in certain articles it is biased. It contains blatantly discriminatory clauses. Some of them stem from the strict time limit in which the Russian legislators find themselves, having declared the elections to be in the middle of June, which is only a few weeks after the legislation was adopted. This is also the reason for the legal norms designed to ensure a distinctive "blitz-election."

Only two-three weeks are set aside for conducting the most vital stages of the election campaign—the candidate nominations, the collection of signatures to support them, meetings between candidates and the electorate, and familiarizing the electorate with the candidates' programs through the media.

I am comparing these deadlines with a calendar for the 1991-1992 elections in the American state of Massachusetts which I brought back from a recent trip to the United States. By American standards, it turns out that we would need to be electing representatives for the authorities in a small city rather than the head of one of the world's largest states. Remember, across the ocean they devote more than a year to the presidential election campaign. "We don't have to do as America does." I hear you protest. This is true, of course. Nevertheless, a legislator must respect the voters' right to identify their position calmly and without haste or panic and to make a conscious choice, and also the rights of candidates understandably wishing to present their programs in the best light possible.

The time flaws, however, are not the only defects in the law which is being examined. For example, candidates nominated by parties, social organizations, trade unions, and sociopolitical movements must go through a selection process at the congress of RSFSR people's deputies, which is thus transformed into a revamped version of the district assembly which was dissolved after the 1989 elections.

There is one more norm does not stand up to criticism. A candidate is only considered to be elected RSFSR president if in the course of the elections he receives over half of the votes of those who participated in the ballot. Given that elections are recognized as valid with just over 50-percent participation by the electorate, the victor could be a candidate who receives, say, a mere 26 percent of the entire electorate's votes. How, then, can there be any talk of nationwide presidential elections?

The examples used are clearly sufficient to realize that we are dealing here with a typical case of "ad hoc" (improvised) legislation oriented toward the given situation and disposition of political forces. The interests of the majority of electors and the true development of democracy remains in the background.

The president's term of office—five years—can also be added to the list of debatable issues. Incidentally, this norm appears in several acts concerning elections in our country. No doubt it is seen as a tribute to the traditional five-year plans. After all, when building a rule-of-law state we must also think about creating a viable electoral system stipulating a definite cycle for holding elections. Foreign practice testifies to the logic of, say, a two-year cycle, whereby elections of one sort or another are held every two years. It is for this reason that most countries' presidents are elected for a term of four or six years (with the exception of France and Italy where the term is seven years). Will not we yet again be putting the cart before the horse if we specify a term of office for the RSFSR president without agreeing on a cycle for the functioning of the entire electoral system in general?

As we can see, the legislators have much to think about. For this they need time, and they need to harness powerful intellectual resources. But the advocates of a hasty presidential election say there is no time. Meanwhile references are made to the need to strengthen executive authority and the results of the March referendum. With regard to the first argument, the powers conferred on the RSFSR Supreme Soviet leadership by the Extraordinary Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies are wholly adequate, at least until the end of the current year. With regard to the second argument, can we say that the participants in the referendum were asked about a time and date for electing the RSFSR

president? Russian voters supported only the introduction of the post of RSFSR president elected through a nationwide ballot, and that is all.

In my view, the RSFSR people's deputies were hasty in naming a mid-June weekday as the day for the elections. I repeat, the election of a head of state requires thorough elaboration of the legislation, preparation of the electorate for the responsibility of choosing a high official personage, and the guarantee of equal conditions for nominating candidates for the presidential post.

The most logical way out of the situation is clearly a review of the decision on an election date and further work on legal clauses regarding the election of the RSFSR president. This could be done at the forthcoming congress of RSFSR people's deputies.

We cannot make a mistake in this election. The election of the first Russian president must be conducted in such a way as to serve as an example to all future generations.

Western Republics

Belorussian Political Strike Expected 22 May

LD2205011891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1906 GMT 21 May 91

[Excerpts] Minsk, 21 May (BELTA-TASS)—A general political strike will evidently take place in Belorussia tomorrow. And this despite the fact that the republic's Supreme Soviet session which began today adopted a decision after heated debates to include in the agenda, at the strikers' demand, the point on introducing amendments to a few legislative acts of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic which are in force. These amendments deal with the departyization of state enterprises and organizations, the depoliticization of law enforcement bodies, the nationalization of CPSU and Belorussian Communist Party property, and with young men from Belorussia doing their military service in their republic. Deputies will also be able to debate and vote on a proposal to found the institution of a republican presidency in Belorussia, as well as a whole range of economic laws designed to speed up and make as easy as possible the republic's transition to a market economy. [passage omitted]

This, however, did not fully satisfy the deputies who are representing the strike committees' interests and the parliamentary opposition. In their view, such very important problems as imparting the status of a constitutional law to the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the adoption of the new law on elections on a multiparty basis, the formation of a people's trust coalition government, citizenship in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and so on should not have been left off the agenda.

A special role in the strike committee's decision to resume the strike was played by the circumstances that their representatives in the end failed to be invited to the assembly hall of the Supreme Soviet and were not given an opportunity to state their position to the parliamentarians.

According to People's Deputy Sergey Antonchik, one of the leaders of the workers' movement, 80 percent of the republic's strike committees intend to resume the strike on 22 May.

Activists on Republic Dispute

91UN1512A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 19, May 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Belorussia: Two Forces—Two Positions"]

[Text] **A republic strike is scheduled for 21 May in Belorussia.**

In April 1991 another troubled region appeared on the country's political map: "peaceful" Belorussia.

3 April. Workers of four enterprises (the gear factory, the electrical machinery plant, the plant for automated lines, and the Minsk Tractor Plant) blocked traffic on one of the streets of Minsk as a sign of protest against price increases. Those participating in the rally warned the republican government and parliament that if within seven days measures were not taken to improve their lives, they would reserve the right to strike until they were victorious.

4 April. A decision was made to halt the strike until 10 April in order to give the republican government a chance to consider the demands and take appropriate measures. There were rallies in Gomel, Grodno, and Zhodino as well.

10 April. The strike was resumed and took on clearly political characteristics. One of the main demands was to convene an extraordinary session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

11 April. S. Shushkevich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and M. Myanikovich, first deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, announced the readiness of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and the government to consider the strikers' economic and political demands. Negotiations were initiated between the strike committee and republic leaders.

16 April. At a meeting of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium it was decided to convene a regular session of the Supreme Soviet on 21 May.

19 April. The demand was made that the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium convene an extraordinary session of parliament no later than 25 April. But this question was not brought to a vote.

20 April. The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers

adopted an appeal to the Belorussian people which called for them to be reasonable and to refrain from striking.

23 April. Representatives of 42 enterprises participated in a rally on Lenin Square in Minsk.

24 April. Some 10,000 workers of Orsha enterprises set out for the Orsha railroad center, warning that unless it was announced on the radio that an extraordinary session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet had been convened, they would halt rail traffic.

25 April. In the evening the strike committee adopted a decision to stop the strike, but on condition that if force were used in Orsha the strike would be resumed. At 2100 the blockade of the Orsha railroad center was removed.

On 21 May a republic strike was scheduled to coincide with the beginning of the fourth regular session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Our correspondent, **Yu. Rogov,** met during the strike in Minsk with USSR People's Deputy **S. Shushkevich,** first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Belorussian SSR People's Deputy **S. Antonchik,** cochairman of the city strike committee.

S. ANTONCHIK: We took a step backward today in order to take two steps forward tomorrow. The attitude of our Supreme Soviet Presidium toward the situation in the republic is criminal. These authorities are putting their trust in force. Through their inaction they are provoking the labor collectives to further opposition. When reason struggles against force, the confrontation cannot continue indefinitely. If they hold out until they win, as was declared at the beginning of the movement, the confrontation will lead to an explosion, which will lead to bloodshed. We will not be forgiven for that. The structure created 70 years ago cannot be destroyed all at once.

Before 21 May we had to do much work to consolidate our forces and create the all-Belorussian civil opposition movement. This will be opposition to the republic's corrupt communist leadership. It will be directed against the policy that is being conducted and coordinated on orders from the CPSU Central Committee and its offshoot, the KGB. The communists have ruled irresponsibly and the unwillingness of the republic presidium to meet us halfway is nothing other than a result of the communists' position. Right on the radio we suggested holding a roundtable discussion with the communists, one where we could present our positions before all the people, but they refused.

During the strike we were called destructive forces. But that is an old party device. If the 100,000 workers gathered there were destructive forces for them, will all the people not be a destructive force tomorrow?

S. SHUSHKEVICH: I consider the workers' actions on 3 April to be absolutely justified; one cannot regard it as unjustified when they walked out on the 10th in order to find out from the government about measures for social protection. The price increases were immense and the measures for social protection were miserly. The workers' protest was random, but real. The strike leaders, among whom were people's deputies, rode this wave, but it is easy to be the people's favorites when speaking out on the square. It is much more difficult to work in the Supreme Soviet where suggestions must be made in keeping with the regulations, and they must be pushed through, defended, and worded in an acceptable way.

The strike leaders had clear tactics. They made demands that were clearly unacceptable. And agitation would be generated on the wave of these demands so the protest would be constantly escalated.

I agree that the perestroyka elements of management are being introduced slowly, but strikes could lead to a situation where we would end up as bad off as everyone else.

I spoke in favor of convening a session of the Supreme Soviet not on 21 May, but on 28 May as was planned, because I can see how issues are being prepared for it. And during the session I do not want the strikers gathered in the square to exert pressure on the deputies. I support the demands for private ownership and withdrawal of the party from law enforcement organs, but some of the demands are unjustified and illogical. We have a good Declaration of Sovereignty, and now they have suddenly demanded that it be given the status of a constitutional act; that is, that it be made part of the Constitution. To give it the status of a constitutional act means that tomorrow we would have to eliminate all the strategic nuclear bases on the territory of Belorussia.

In keeping with our electoral law we have elected a parliament that is not very democratic, because we were not enforcing the "one voter-one vote" rule, and because the results of the elections were influenced by the official structures of the CPSU—and at that time they were much more powerful. One can express dissatisfaction with the members of the Supreme Soviet but, I repeat, it was elected according to the law, and it is the only body that can adopt a new electoral law. The strike committee is an ephemeral creation, and it is illegal.

Belorussian Miners Reply to Procurator

OW2105084391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1230 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] On Saturday, the central council of Belorussia's strike committees sent an open letter to the republic's procurator Georgiy Tarnavsi condemning what they called attempts by the procurator's office to force the miners back to work with threats of prosecution. "We wish to stress that such actions are futile. In the first place, we are no longer afraid of the communist monster and in the second place this is a political strike and is therefore not beyond the realm of industrial legislation [as received]. Our dispute is with Belorussian government and not the employees.

The letter asks why the Procurator's office was sending high-ranking officials to check up on the strike committees when those responsible for the "radiation genocide which is still causing harm to the population" (i.e. Chernobyl) have yet to be charged; why had the office not once acted to prevent the illegal allocation of appartments to party apparatchiks, and why are the strike committees being threatened with prosecution if they fail to register when no similar threat is being directed against the Belorussian KGB and Komsomol.

"The Procurator's Office has devoted all of its energy into saving the party committees which are actually under no physical threat whatsoever. While we are aware that the procurator's office takes its lead from the Belorussian Communist Party, we would point out that at Nuremberg they didn't just try those who gave the orders but those who carried them out. Now, a new Nuremberg awaits and every one of us must decide whether we stand with the accusers or with the accused."

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Debates Constitution

LD1805151591 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 16 May 91

[Text] We begin with a report about the work of the session of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, curently under way in Kiev. Today's discussion centered around the draft concept of the new constitution of Ukraine, submitted yesterday by chairman of the soviet, Leonid Kravchuk. One hundred members of parliament expressed their wish to speak on the issue. The most debatable were the provisions of the draft constitution determining the state structure in Ukraine, forms of government—either presidential or parliamentary—the structure of the parliament—whether it should consist of two chambers or one—the stand of the republic in relation to the union of sovereign states, and also the name of the republic.

Ihor Yukhnovskyy, head of the People's Council, that is the parliament opposition, said the following about the state structure of Ukraine:

[Begin Yukhnovskyy recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] What kind of a state should be built in Ukraine—socialist or capitalist—one may ask. I think it should be neither socialist nor capitalist, and at the same time socialist and capitalist. While building independent Ukraine we must set up an effective information system at all levels of economic management. We must use natural resources sparingly, protect ecology, take care of social protection of man. All this is part of the collective socialism. On the other hand, we must give green light to individual enterprise. We must admit the bankruptcy of the socialist system and pay off the debts to people by carrying out denationalization. We must set up banks and stock exchanges. We must introduce private property along with cooperative and state properties. We must do away with the monopoly of producers. We cannot build a renewed union of sovereign states until we build a sovereign state (?itself), said Igor Yukhnovskyy.

In analyzing the concept of the new constitution, Igor Yukhnovskyy pointed out that on the whole the People's Council supported the draft concept, under conditions that the chapter which reads that Ukraine is part of the union of sovereign states should be withdrawn from it. Ukraine's beonging to the Union should not be stipulated by the constitution, said Igor Yukhnovsky. This must be decided by the Union treaty, if it is signed. [end recording]

Quite a different point of view was expressed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Stanislav Gurenko, who spoke out for the above provision on Ukraine's belonging to the union of sovereign states in the new constitution. Stanislav Gurenko was also unambiguous in his opinion that Ukraine should be a socialist state. In part, he said:

[Begin Gurenko recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] We cannot agree with the proposal to refrain from socialist choice, because this would mean the change of the social and state structure in the republic, says Stanislav Gurenko. The fact that the principles of socialism were distorted in the years of Stalin's rule and during the period of stagnation do not give grounds to negate the socialist nature of our society. The consitution should contain the provisions guaranteeing social sphere, excluding exploitation of man by man, the exercise of genuine people's power and other factors which determine the very nature of socialism, said Stanislav Gurenko. [end recording]

The majority of deputies, despite their faction belonging, spoke out for fixing presidential form of government in the new constitution. Says Deputy Serhiy Holovatyy:

[Begin Holovatyy recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] The faction of nonparty members supports the idea of introducing presidential post as the top official post in the state. It also supports the idea of electing the president by universal and direct elections, but at the same time the faction of nonparty members is against presidential rule in Ukraine. Most suitable seems a mixed form of government which would include parliament as a legislative body and the president as the excutive power, said Serhiy Holovatyy. [end recording]

At the evening sitting the deputies continued to discuss the draft concept of the new constitution of Ukraine. They debated the question on the expediency of a two-chamber supreme soviet, which would consist of people's chamber and the chamber of representatives, or the senate.

Upon the proposal of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Kravchuk, the discussion of the draft concept of the new constitution of Ukraine will be continued tomorrow.

Ukrainian Party Central Committee Briefs Press

LD1705145891 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 16 May 91

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee today organized a news conference for Ukrainian and foreign journalists. The main subject of the meeting was a discussion of the concept of the new Ukrainian constitution by the republican parliament. Hryhoriy Demydov and Serhiy Dorohuntsov, people's deputies and members of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet; and Oleksandr Moroz, cochairman of the communist majority group in the parliament, shared their thoughts with representatives of the press. Representatives of the group of communist deputies came out in favor of a socialist choice by the society but for socialism in a new sense—where improvement of the people's welfare is placed above everithing else. When answering questions from the journalists, those taking part in the news conference came out against reorganization of the local government bodies and soviets, and against presidential rule, which is not controlled by the parliament.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Approves New Cabinet

LD2105145191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] The composition of the newly established Cabinet of Ministers, presented by Prime Minister Fokin, was approved today at the session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Masik, former deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, has been appointed first vice premier; and Maselskiy, former chairman of the Kharkov Oblast Executive Committee, has been appointed vice premier. State and sector ministers have also been appointed and the appropriate alterations have been made to the republic's constitution.

Ukraine's Kravchuk, Croatia's Tudjman Brief Press

LD2105201491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1614 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 21 May (TANJUG)—Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, said today that the problems of Croatia and the Ukraine are similar because both republics want to exercise their rights to independence and sovereignty.

Tudjman said this in Kiev at a news conference for domestic and foreign journalists at the end of his visit to this Soviet republic. Tudjman arrived in Kiev yesterday, and this afternoon he left for Yugoslavia. With him on the visit were Franjo Greguric, vice president of the Croatian Government, and Sergej Morsan, republican deputy minister for internal affairs.

Tudjman's view on the similarity of the problem of the two republics was also confirmed by Leonid Kravchuk, president of the Ukraine Parliament, who also spoke at the news conference. According to the two presidents, the exchange of views showed that there are many points on which both republics could act together.

The Ukraine is the second largest Soviet republic, with 52 million inhabitants. On 23 April in Moscow, Leonid Kravchuk signed with Mikhail Gorbachev and eight other republican leaders an agreement that secures the preservation of the integrity of the Soviet state as a union of sovereign states.

Kravchuk and Tudjman said today at the news conference that the talks have enabled them to understand better the views of both republics on the problems facing them. Many joint stands on economic issues and scientific, technical, and other fields of cooperation were achieved; this will help both republics to find a way out of this crises more easily, in order to achieve their independence and sovereignty.

They also agreed to cooperate further on all the issues discussed.

These stands which Tudjman and Kravchuk stated at the news conference were also recorded in a joint document which they signed at the end of the visit.

Tudjman said at the news conference that unless the stand on an alliance of independent states is accepted, Croatia will separate from Yugoslavia by the end of June.

Moldovan Supreme Soviet Disrupted by Clashes

LD2105201191 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Kishinev May 21 TASS—The Moldovan Supreme Soviet had to interrupt its session today following street clashes in the capital.

Supporters of the republican People's Front, angered by the parliament decision to endorse the Moldoavan Government led by Premier Mircea Druk by secret ballot, provoked disturbances in the streets adjacent to the parliament building.

The republic's interior minister, Ion Kostash, urged deputies to remain calm and said police took every measure to maintain peace and order in Kishinev. Nevertheless, deputies decided to interrupt the session.

According to republican radio, agitated people at the central square of the city attacked police cordons at approaches to the parliament building. Protestors threw stones at police.

Chairman of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Moshanu arrived in the square to urge the crowd to keep calm. The situation remains tense.

Caucasus

South Ossetia Tension 'Somewhat Lessened'

LD2105152491 Moscow TASS in English 1509 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz May 21 TASS—Tension somewhat lessened in South Ossetia on Monday. Food, medicines and building materials are arriving in Java from the Russian Federation.

A Russian Government commission, including experienced civil engineers, architects and seismologists, is now working here with specialists and designers from North Ossetia to help restore the district administrative centre of Java, shaken by the recent earthquake.

Water and gas supplies have not reached the regional centre, but electricity supplies from Georgia's single power grid have resumed.

In Tskhinvali, telephone and telegraph communications are still down and national television programmes cannot be received.

According to the North Ossetian Interior Ministry, the Interior Affairs Office has been reinstated in Tskhinvali. Its officers are cooperating with the USSR Interior Ministry troops, patrolling the state of emergency area and helping guard truck convoys that bring humanitarian aid to South Ossetia.

The situation remains tense in remote Ossetian villages in the Tskinvali, Znauri and Leninogorsk districts. Last night, militants opened fire at a group of investigating officers in the village of Ioncha, where they were working on orders from the USSR Interior Ministry. Fortunately, no one was injured. Ioncha is a village in which militants burned down some houses belonging to local inhabitants.

Special Purpose Militia Unit Set Up in Georgia

LD1605185991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 16 May (TASS)—A republican Special Purpose Militia Detachment (OMON—TASS note) is being set up in Georgia (a Transcaucasian republic—TASS note). Among its tasks is combatting terrorism, releasing hostages, disarming extremist groupings, and preventing mass unrests.

This subunit is being manned by former paratroopers, marines, and scouts. Reporting this, SOVETSKAYA GRUZIYA newspaper emphasizes that almost every third candidate applying for a place with the OMON is being eliminated after a careful check up. The detachment will be equipped and armed according to the latest achievements of technology, including modern firearms, means of communication, and personnel protection. Alongside specialized motor vehicles, the special purpose detachment will also have armored carriers at their disposal.

The newspaper points out that this subunit, unlike similar formations in other republics, will be subordinate to the Government of Georgia and the Georgian Internal Ministry alone.

Military Commander on Boy's Shooting

AU2005171091 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Russian 1430 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] We have just received a telex with the text of the letter from the Transcaucasian Military District Commander Colonel-General Patrikeyev to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, President of the Republic of Georgia. It reads as follows: In connection with your letter, which was published in a number of republican newspapers, concerning the extraordinary incident that took place on 13 May 1991 on the territory of military unit No. 43715 in the town of Gori, I want to let you know that on 13 May 1991, the Military Procuracy instituted criminal proceedings on the given incident, in accordance with Article 34, Chapter 3, and Article 126, Chapter 12, of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Georgia. An investigation is under way. The circumstances of the case are being ascertained. In view of the broad response to the given incident, a decision has been adopted to inform the Georgian public [on the results of the investigation] upon the completion of the case. On behalf of the Military Council, the command, and the personnel of the Transcaucasian Military District troops, I wish to express regret in connection with the tragic consequences of the incident and convey deep condolences to the victim's family and friends.

I would also like to share with you the doubts that I have with regard to the expediency, prior to the completion of the investigation and pronouncement of the lawful sentence, of the hasty and excessively emotional assessments, primarily in the mass media.

Georgia on Eve of Presidential Elections Viewed

LD2105172391 Moscow TASS in English 1656 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Tbilisi May 21 TASS—Political instability and economic crisis are the main features of the situation around the election campaign in Georgia. On May 26, Georgian voters will name the first Georgian president elected by a direct secret ballot.

There are six contenders, but only one of them, the present president of the Georgian Republic and the leader of the Roundtable-Free Georgia Bloc, which controls the majority in the parliament, is believed to have

real chances to win. The only rivals that count, according to specialists, are chairman of the National Renaissance and Accord Union Valerian Advadze and leader of the Georgian National Front Nodar Natadze.

Despite the obvious advantages, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's popularity lessened considerable over the past few months. According to a public opinion poll in March, only 60 per cent of the voters supported him, while in November last year he had the backing of nearly 90 per cent of the republic's population.

Experts say there are several reasons for the ebbing popularity of the Georgian leader. First of all, Gamsakhurdia has failed to stabilize the political situation in the republic. The military conflict in south Georgia is still on and a constructive dialogue with the centre has not begun.

Private enterprise in the economy is not being encouraged while many sectors of the economy are are on the verge of a collapse. There is not enough money for regular pay to workers and employees. Gamsakhurdia finds it increasingly difficult to blame all this on the centre. The results of the March 31 elections to local authorities have not yet been made public. Specialists believe the reason behind the delay lies in the returns which must have proved very unfavourable for the ruling bloc.

Seeking to ensure the victory of their leader in the forthcoming elections, representatives of the roundtable bloc have stepped up a campaign to discredit other candidates for presidency. Valerian Advadze even staged a hunger strike to protest the campaign of slander unleashed against him and the unending acts of provocation.

None of the candidates doubts that Gamsakhurdia is sure to win the elections. Advadze's recent statement stresses that he aims not so much to become president as to show people that the republic has a constructive opposition force capable of criticizing people intolerable to criticism.

Armenian Appeal for Observers Published

LD2105184391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1712 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 21 May (TASS)—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia has appealed to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the leadership of supreme bodies of state power of the Union and autonomous republics, calling for sending observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian areas on the border with Azerbaijan. The appeal, which was published here today, emphasizes that this is necessary in order "to prevent attempts to solve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh by changing the demographic balance" in the autonomous oblast and also in order to witness a disastrous position of the refugees on the ground. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia also called for all possible measures to be taken to return those deported from the Armenian villages of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the places of their permanent residence and "for further violence with regard to the Armenian people to be prevented."

According to the Azerbaijani side, inhabitants of some Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh were transported to the border with Armenia on a purely voluntary basis, following their written request. However, the Armenian side claims that these requests were signed under threats from special purpose militia detachments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan.

Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Reviewed

NC2205095591 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] The situation was calm in Stepanakert and in Martuninskiy, Mardakertskiy, and Shaumyanovskiy Rayons the night of 21 May.

Ninety residents from (?Kokh), (?Banavor), and (?Arakel) villages in Gadrutskiy Rayon have left Stepanakert and returned to their homes today. The commandant of the state of emergency region has promised to ensure their security.

Nearly 30 trucks entered (?Golanlar) village, which was then (?plundered). Yesterday the Azerbaijanis attacked the farm in Akhbulakh village in Askeranskiy Rayon. They drove away many animals, some of which were later returned. In the villages of Berdadzor subrayon the Azerbaijanis, like a pack of wolves, are dividing up the loot—lands, animals, houses, and everything else.

Armenian Council Views Condition of Deportees

NC2205085091 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers, chaired the meeting of the Temporary Council on the Emergency Situation on 21 May.

The prime minister and Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, briefed the meeting about their contacts at various levels in Moscow concerning the final examination of the joint program worked out by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and by the Council of Ministers of the Union republics on surmounting the economic crisis caused by the transition to market relations, the return of deportees to their permanent residences, and the release of those who were illegally detained in Armenia's border regions and in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh].

The meeting was also briefed about the mass rally held at Moscow's Manezhnaya Square on 20 May. The rally

condemned the atrocities being committed against the population of Armenia and Artsakh.

Next, Babken Araraktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, briefed the meeting about the condition of deportees from the villages of Gadrutskiy Rayon and Berdadzor subrayon in Artsakh who are in temporary camps erected near Khndzoresk and Tekh villages in Gorisskiy Rayon close to the Azerbaijani border. He also spoke about the work being carried out there by a delegation of the [Armenian] Supreme Soviet. Some concrete proposals for follow-up activity were presented.

Babken Araraktsyan also noted that many appeals have been received from the deportees demanding that necessary conditions be made for their speedy return to their permanent residences. These appeals have been submitted to the relevant state organs.

In connection with the examination of the problems related to the operational situation and on-site work, a broad exchange of views were held on the situation in Artsakh and on some issues of principle concerning the establishment of an independent statehood in Armenia.

The Republican Temporary Council on Emergency Situation will continue its deliberations tomorrow.

Azerbaijan Presidium Meeting Reported

NC2205072691 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] The Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet press center has disclosed the following:

The Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium met today. It discussed the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session, which will convene on 22 May. The members exchanged views on the matters the session will examine. The Presidium thought it appropriate to include on the agenda matters related to the draft law on the basic principles of the Azerbaijan Republic's economic independence, the draft law on (?poverty), and the draft agreement on the union of the sovereign republics.

The meeting unanimously approved the agenda of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet session.

Central Asia

Alma-Ata Roundable Discusses Union Treaty

LD2105094091 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 19 May 91

[Excerpt] A roundtable discussion on the problems of the Union treaty, sovereignty, and the constitution of the Union Republics, began its work today at the Friendship House in Alma-Ata. It was convened by the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Institute of State and Rights of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of Philosophy and Rights of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. The discussion was opened by Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. He stressed that at the present time these three issues are the most important and are inseparable. Scholars and specialists have been working hard on the concept of the new state law.

During the first day of the roundtable discussion the participants expressed their views on this subjet. Tatarnin, director of the State and Rights Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in his report spoke about the question in differentiating the rights of the national and republican governments in the renewed federation. Issues of the Union Treaty, properties of the Kazakh SSR, and sovereignty of the union republics were raised in the speeches of Abdullayev, chairman of the State Committee for Economy, Simanov, academician of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences. [passage omitted]

Kazakh President Receives RSFSR's Silayev

LD2005173391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 May 91

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev today received a Russian legislative delegation headed by Silayev, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. During their conversation, it was noted that direct, multilateral links on a mutually advantageous basis between the two republics are entering the sphere of practical action and have already proven their productivity. It is true that no specific data of any kind are cited in the dispatch.

Talks between the government delegations of Kazakhstan and Russia also took place today.

Talks on Direct Links Discussed

LD2005200991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 20 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the end of last year, Kazakhstan and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] signed an agreement on direct links and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. What progress has been made? Here is a report by our Alma-Ata correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent A. Nugmanov] This question was discussed today at the meeting between Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, leaders of a range of the RSFSR's ministries and departments, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. Special attention was paid to progress in making mutual deliveries, something which is still important today.

[Silayev] We have adopted many mutual pledges. Some are being fulfilled better than others; the latter need improvement. We have brought with us an important group of members of the RSFSR government. We are

also accompanied by representatives of what used to be the union State Committee for Supplies. There is a shortfall in deliveries by both sides. The issue of supervision is also important. What is essential is to see how things are working: what works and what does not work in the mechanism of our relations. There are skeptics who say that everything was easy when things worked through the center in a clearcut and planned fashion, when there was someone else to think for us. It is very true that we have now moved over to new economic relations. We must and we will tackle many questions directly.

[Karamanov, captioned as prime minister of the Kazakh SSR] We are fulfilling some of our pledges more successfully than others. Our task is to explore and to amend our ways in regard to the ones we find difficult to carry out, so we can increase as much and as deeply as possible our success rate in fulfilling our pledges. I think what is at issue is not our misgivings about each other, but the matter of looking as deeply as possible into the ways in which we can improve fulfilment of our mutual pledges in our own interests so as to enable both Kazakhstan and Russia achieve in their national economies certain necessary results. [end recording]

Kazakhstan Examines Tax Scale, Draft Laws

LD1905215991 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] A regular meeting of the presidium of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet took place, chaired by Asanbayev. Reports of the Cabinet Ministers of the republic, Komsomol of Kazakhstan Central Committee, and Supreme Soviet committees on drafting legislative acts were heard. A number of revised draft laws were examined. They will be presented to the fourth session of the legislature. Drafts on some laws have also been discussed. Taking into account the remarks and proposals, it was decided to return them for further consideration. It was recommended to propose to a regular session a draft resolution of the Supreme Soviet on the scale of taxes by enterprises, institutions, organizations, cooperatives, and other employers, irrespective of the property forms and economic activities in the state fund for contributions to employment in 1991. Working groups will prepare drafts of the crime code of the Kazakh SSR and a law on privatization of the housing fund of the Kazakh SSR.

Kazakhstan To Lead in Developing Market Economy

OW2205084191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 21 May 91

[From "Business Today"]

[Text] It seems possible that Kazakhstan, the largest of the Central Asian Soviet republics, will be the first to adopt all laws necessary for the free development of a market economy and foreign investors.

The session of the Kazakhstan parliament which opens on June 4 is to consider a draft law on restructuring government property, on joint stock companies, on the budget system, on hard currency resources and on the commodity exchange. In addition, the parliament intends to discuss the question of the creation of two free economic zones in the republic.

At present Kazakhstan, which is the only supplier of several rare ores and metals on the Soviet market, already has laws on foreign investments, on free economic zones, on basic principles of foreign economic activity and on the republican banking system.

Uzbek Army Accord With General Staff Explained

PM1705152291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 91 Union Edition p1

[Correspondent A. Orlov report: "Army Accepts Conditions Set by Uzbekistan, Which Sends More Than 100,000 New Recruits Into the Armed Forces Each Year"]

[Text] Uzbekistan—The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Government have for the first time concluded an agreement on improving conscription and compulsory active military service for the republic's citizens. This document is important in itself as a step toward the Army's democratization. Moreover, it is evidence of a new relationship developing between the center and the republic.

The appearance of the agreement became possible after the recent joint statement by the USSR president and the leaders of nine republics. Regarding the demarcation of powers in the USSR, the republic supports the center in building a unified, international Soviet Army into which people are recruited on an nonterritorial basis, although it itself determines the conditions and degree of its participation.

The document stipulates not only the rights but also the responsibilities of the powerful military department, which previously had a monopoly on dictating procedures. It also stipulates the responsibilities and rights of the republic, which intends to protect its young people as citizens of a sovereign state. The General Staff has consented to this "interference" by the republic because, as stressed in the agreement, military questions come under the "joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the republics as members of the USSR."

"What new aspects does the signed agreement introduce into the practice of military service?" I asked Major General V. Makhmudov, Uzbek SSR military commissar.

"The main point is that now we will work together with the General Staff to follow the progress of every conscript without exception: From the time when the young man registers at the rayon military commissariat,

through his training, service, transfer to the reserve, return home, and establishment in employment. In particular, it is going to become mandatory practice to send letters to parents with news of their son's arrival at his unit, indicating the names of his commanding officers, place of service, and so forth.

"The special features of our region have also been taken into account. For example, it sometimes happens that two or three sons from a large family do service at the same time. If the family finds itself in a difficult situation in this case, a conscript may be granted deferment of service. If the brother of a young man has died or been killed in service, the latter is completely exempt from conscription. The parents will decide which of their sons should be exempt."

[Orlov] But the conscript may decline to exercise this right?

[Makhmudov] Yes, that is another of our special features: Most of our young men want to serve in the Army. Let me give you an example from our traditional way of life. During matchmaking, the prospective bride's parents always want to know whether the suitor has done army service or not. If he has, he is seen as a strong, responsible person—a real man—and the girl is proud to have such a suitor.

There are also going to be tougher requirements concerning the examination of conscripts' state of health. It is no secret that frail, unhealthy young men have sometimes been taken into the Army in the past. This is intolerable, of course, so henceforth the republic's Ministry of Health and its competent specialists will be involved in deciding such matters. People dispatched to military construction detachments will only do service in Uzbekistan.

[Orlov] The agreement indicates that conscripts from the republic will only do service in the Transcaucasus Military District, Caspian Flotilla, or Black Sea Fleet at their own voluntary request. What do you think about this? Will there be people willing to do this?

[Makhmudov] I am sure there will. They will be given privileges, incidentally: extended leave and high pay—150-200 rubles per month. I must also point out that all conscripts from Uzbekistan—and there are more than 300,000 soldiers, sergeants, and seamen representing our republic's more than 100 nationalities serving in Army and Navy units all over the country—will be guaranteed social protection and insurance by the General Staff, which will also do its utmost to ensure their safety and strengthen military discipline and law and order in the units.

[Orlov] The leaders of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have appealed to young people to fulfill their sacred filial duty: to serve honestly in the Army. Has this appeal helped, as the previous conscription campaign did not go very smoothly?

[Makhmudov] Negligence and lax discipline cast shame on the title of defender of the motherland. This kind of attitude is considered a great sin in Islam.

More on Shenin's 15-18 May Tour of Uzbekistan

PM2005150391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Artemenko report: "Meetings in Uzbekistan"]

[Text] Tashkent, 19 May—O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited Uzbekistan 15-18 May. At meetings with working people of enterprises in Tashkent and in Tashkent and Samarkand Oblasts, he inquired about the work of primary party organizations and the reaction of the republic's Communists to the decisions of the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum and the proposals for the draft new CPSU Program. There was a discussion about how better to strengthen the party's ranks and build cadre policy, and about how party committees should cooperate more closely with soviets. Special attention was devoted to resolving social and domestic problems.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the miners' settlement of Dzhigaristan, which suffered recently from a natural disaster. He visited the families of casualties and expressed profound condolences to them. In Samarkand's Higher Military Motor Transport Command School named for the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet he inquired about the study process and the military, physical, and political training of students.

O.S. Shenin addressed the party aktiv of Tashkent and of Tashkent and Samarkand Oblasts. He was accompanied on his tour of the republic by I.A. Karimov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

Tajikistan Plans State Property Auction

LD2105183891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0956 GMT 21 May 91

[By TASS Correspondent Nina Merezhnikova]

[Text] Dushanbe, 21 May (TASS)—The start of the state property auction has been announced in the capital of Tajikistan. The provisional date for the first two auctions 28 May—was announced at a news conference held by the Cabinet of Ministers of this Central Asian Republic.

Abdujalil Samadov, deputy chairman of the Tajikistan Council of Ministers, named branches of industry and the spheres of production from which the work of the denationalization of property will begin. Among them are the retail enterprises, catering, and consumer services establishments.

The small repair, transport, and construction enterprises will be also brought out. Within the Ministry of Trade alone, nearly 3,000 shops, cafes, and restaurants are expected to be privatized. It has been decided to lease the large establishments of the consumer services with the subsequent buy out of the property.

According to Abdujalil Samadov's statement, a package of documents has been prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic. It outlines the regulations for creating the fund for supporting the enterprises and businesses. The government of Tajikistan is expecting a number of measures directed toward establishment of the most favored status for the future owners of private enterprises. In particular, it has been proposed that bank credits be offered to persons wishing to assume the sites destined for privatization into their private or collective ownership. The mechanism of denationalization in Tajikistan is being regulated by the law on privatization, which was adopted at the recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic.